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FOREWORD
This study was prepared by Dr. J. Gordon Milliken and his associates
of the Denver Research Institute. Through the years of experimental
programs in transferring the wide variety of technologies whose development,
augmentation, and utilization was necessitated by NASA mission require-
ments, the Technology Utilization Office has been aware of the difficulties
in dealing with management technology: as one of the most important and
interesting areas in which NASA contributions appear to lie, it is one
of the most difficult to synthesize, document, and transfer. To date,
its transfer and application in nonaerospace sectors of the economy has
taken place primarily through the movement of trained and experienced
people. Accordingly, the authors' task has been a most difficult and
challenging undertaking.
Experienced readers will note the absence or limited treatment of
some well-known management techniques. It was agreed that certain of
these, such as the Program Evaluation and Review Technique [PERT), found
their origins outside the space program, and while they have been ex-
tensively used, modified, and augmented by NASA and its contractors,
sufficient descriptive material already existed to make any value added
by inclusion here a marginal choice. In other cases, management techniques"
originating outside aerospace have been sufficiently modified for space
program applications that it appeared that sufficient contributions had
been made to merit coverage. The conclusions are those of the authors
who reached them following a period of interviews and extensive investi-
gations of available literature.
Joseph M. Carlson
Technology Utilization Office
Office of Industry Affairs and
Technology Utilization
PREFACE
The need for a guidebook to applications of aerospace management
techniques has been expressed by numerous persons. Among these were
officials of the Technology Utilization Office, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, who recognized the need as related to NASA's
assigned mission to disseminate useful knowledge resulting from its
aerospace activities.*
The management methods described and analyzed here have a common
characteristic. All have been used rather widely within aerospace--the
interrelated system of industrial and governmental organizations engaged
in aeronautics, the space program, and related high-technology enterprises.
A few of these management techniques may have originated within aerospace.
In most cases, the techniques were generated elsewhere but adopted by
aerospace managers and transformed or augmented to meet the critical needs
of their programs. In most cases, whatever the origin of the management
methods, they have evolved to a greater degree of refinement because of
their use by aerospace managers.
Scope of the Study
This study involved slightly more than one man-year of effort. Field
interviews were conducted during 1969 and 1970 with 44 persons in the
Federal government, 59 persons in aerospace and commercial industry, 19
persons in state and local government or related organizations, 26
persons in universities, and 11 persons in management consulting or
research organizations. The field work was supplemented by an extensive
literature search.
Certain study limitations should be acknowledged. The 25 aerospace
management techniques described were selected from more than 50 candidate
techniques as being the most widely applicable outside aerospace. The
report was not intended to include all useful management methods, nor to
include all examples of their successful application.
It was not our purpose, nor was it possible within the scope of this
*NASA's Technology Utilization Office (TUO) has pioneered in developing
methods for enhancing transfer of aerospace technology to other sectors of
the U. S. economy. Chapter XI contains additional information on TUO's
innovations in technology transfer, and discusses the technology transfer
process.
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effort, to attempt to authoritatively designate a point of origin for the
development of the management techniques.
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A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THIS BOOK
This is a guidebook for managers and administrators. .It is in-
tended as a source of useful information on new management methods which
show promise in solving selected problems of business, industry and
government.
This guidebook has three major parts: Part 1 describes actual .
and potential applications of aerospace management techniques to commercial
and governmental organizations (Chapters 11-IV); Part 2 gives brief
descriptions of 25 aerospace management techniques and discusses their
use within the aerospace sector (Chapters V-IX); and Part 3 describes
the aerospace sector's application of innovative management techniques.
The first part of this book has been designed as a guide to the
potential usefulness of aerospace management techniques in specific
organizational sectors. Chapter II is intended primarily for managers
in commercial and industrial enterprises; Chapter III for administrators
in nonaerospace agencies of the Federal Government; and Chapter IV for
administrators of state and local public services. Each of these
chapters contains a brief description of past and present use of aero-
space management techniques in that organizational sector and an evaluation
of the potential for future transfer of technology from aerospace to
those sectors. Each of the chapters contains an illustrated grid chart
indicating potential applicability of various aerospace management
methods in helping to solve problems in that sector. Some examples of
successful or potential transfer are also included.
The second part contains an introduction to the 25 management
techniques selected for attention (Chapter V) and includes summarized
descriptions of these aerospace-related techniques (Chapters VI-IX).
Written for clarity of understanding and brevity rather than for completeness
the descriptions include references to other sources for detailed
information. This part of the book is intended as a place of future
reference, rather than as material read at a single sitting.
The last part of this book describes the process of transferring
IX
management technology from one sector to another. Chapter X describes
some of the characteristics and historical development of aerospace
management techniques. This chapter explains how the aerospace sector
-f-i-rs-t—adopted~then adapted, these techniques, and provides examples
of how aerospace managers have responded to their needs by searching
for and using new management technology. Chapter XI discusses the
conditions which help promote management technology transfer, based on
observations from this and other studies. Some knowledge of the barriers
to transfer, and ways to overcome them, may help avoid disappointments
and may improve the chances of successful application of aerospace
management techniques to nonaerospace organizations.
A manager, faced with a problem that matches one of the common
problems of his sector (listed in the charts in Chapters II, III, or
IV) can learn which aerospace techniques (if any) are potentially
useful. In some cases, illustrations of related applications are in-
cluded in that chapter. In all cases, a reference to Chapters VI-IX
will furnish leads to more complete information on the potentially
useful technique.
CHAPTER I
ARE AEROSPACE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES USEFUL ELSEWHERE?
If He Can Put a Man on the Moon. Why Can't We . . . ?
The U. S. space program has been widely and deservedly praised for
its accomplishments. Perhaps the greatest of its achievements has been the
stretching of men's minds. After the Apollo Program successes, a national--
even a worldwide—reaction occurred. More men than ever began (in George
Bernard Shaw's words) "to dream of things that never were and ask, why not?"
More than anything else, the spectacular moon landing missions
demonstrated how skillfully U. S. managerial, scientific and engineering
technology could respond to a major challenge. It was natural that men
should ask why the successful efforts of the space program could not be
transferred and applied to solve crucial problems here on earth.
Many candidate programs have been presented: clean-up of polluted
air and water; elimination of poverty; eradication of cancer and other
diseases; development of convenient mass transportation systems; in short,
programs to solve almost every technological and social ill of U.S.
national life. In each case it is proposed to transfer or copy the space
program effort, often with a comparable commitment of funds and resources,
to attack a major problem believed too massive for present attempts at
solution.
Such speculation on application of our talents is healthy. A
necessary step toward progress is the process of considering al-
ternatives to what we are doing now. As a nation, it appears we are more
than ever before ready to abandon tradition and consider alternative
programs and alternative uses of our resources.
Once goals are defined and alternative programs to meet those goals
are considered, the next step in a national planning process is more
difficult: the realistic evaluation of the alternative programs to deter-
mine which are possible and which are not. This step must precede the
even more difficult step of determining priorities and deciding where to
commit our national resources.
Note: References to sources appear at the end of each chapter.
There may be candidate programs which, upon analysis, will prove
well-fitted for a large-scale national program effort. When these candidates
appear, the precedent set by NASA on the Apollo Program (which built on
earlier program experiences) will unquestionably ease the task of organizing
national resources into a program structure patterned more or less after
that of the space program.*
Nevertheless, we feel that most proponents of an Apollo-like response
to national problems, for all their vision, overlook the subtler ways in
which aerospace management techniques can be applied to business and
governmental problems. They see the forest but overlook the trees.
The authors believe that duplication of the management structure
and organization of an Apollo-like program does not, by any means, reflect
the only method — or even the most promising method—of transforming
hard-earned aerospace knowledge to the nation's problems. The real promise,
the significant value of aerospace knowledge, will come in our opinion
through widespread but unspectacular applications of specific technological
and managerial concepts and methods to solve problems of industry and
government. This diversified., fragmented use of aerospace techniques and
concepts may be both a more realistic possibility and (in total) an even
greater potential contribution to national goals than a new Apollo-like
program.**
Why Management Technology Transfer is Important
The quality and effectiveness of management can improve, although
slowly, through experience and self-education of managers within an
enterprise. A far more powerful and rapid means of improvement is through
transfer of management capabilities from other enterprises. Transfer
promotes technological change, and change is an essential part of progress.
*The management of large-scale national programs is discussed in
James E. Webb, Space Age Management, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969.
**Past research into the nature of the technology transfer process
indicates that progress normally occurs through a series.of incremental
advances, not usually through major scientific or technological thrusts
.The same is true of progress in management techniques.
If we as a nation hope to solve the problems facing us, to shape
our natural environment and our social structure, we must upgrade our
management methods generally. The managerial competence of industry and
government must support not only new Apollo-like programs, but the many
less spectacular projects which make up our complex economy. To make
the best use possible of our limited national resources, we must search
for specific methods already proven successful elsewhere and gain the
benefit of their use.
Why Select Aerospace Technology for Transfer?
The system of high-technology, complex enterprises generally known
as the aerospace sector has stimulated numerous innovations in science
and engineering. The abundant generation of new technological concepts
in aerospace programs is due largely to the heavy concentration of R 5 D
talent required by the complexity of these programs. Besides the many
scientists and engineers employed by the Federal government itself,
many more are employed in industry supported by Department of Defense and
NASA projects.
However, the innovations of aerospace are not limited to scientific
and engineering developments. James Bright, an authority on forecasting
and assessment of technology, has described the technological change re-
sulting from the U. S. missile industry, and its chain reaction effects
on management of the business environment:
It created . . . advanced technical specialties,
changed the educational background needed by
engineers and designers, and required different . . .
processes and new service activities . . . control
systems, and ... a basic and applied research
activity . . . itself larger than most traditional
industries.
Complex activities and control systems present novel management
challenges, as Chapter X discusses. The high-technology aerospace sector
has, as a result, become a source of numerous advanced management techni-
ques. Examples of such management innovations include the well-known
PERT and critical path programming techniques originally developed
simultaneously in two aerospace programs, and the scheduling/budgeting
extension, PERT/Cost. They include such useful tools of management decision
technique as the Simplex method for solving multidimensional linear
programming problems. They include breakthroughs in planning and fore-
casting, mission analysis, and systems engineering. They include signi-
ficant improvements in reliability analysis, a by-product of NASA's space
"expToration programs.
The growing concern with the management problems of other sectors of
national life makes -it increasingly important to search for management
knowledge generated in the aerospace-related sector and to transfer this
knowledge effectively to other public and private sectors where it can
be usefully applied.
It is important to understand that good judgment must be used in
selecting aerospace management methods for transfer, to assure they match
the needs and economic capabilities of the other sector. Naturally,
management techniques do not apply universally to all firms or to all
situations. The key is intelligent matching of method to need and en-
vironment, because some aerospace management methods chosen uncritically
for application elsewhere might do more harm than good.
Many potential benefits are to be realized from further selective
transfer of management technology. In appropriate situations, the
management techniques described in this book can provide a better
planning function for an industrial firm, better scheduling of operating
services of a city government, and other economic and social improvements.
Part 1 of this book gives examples of promising applications of aerospace
management techniques outside the aerospace sector.
Reference
1. Bright, James R., Research, Development, and Technological In-
novation (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1964), p. 10.
CHAPTER II
APPLICATIONS TO COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES
Past and Present Use
Thus far, commercial and industrial firms outside aerospace appear to
have adopted relatively few management techniques and concepts from aero-
space. This summary opinion is based on an overview of identified direct
transfers, which are comparatively few in number when viewed in the context
of the total management technology of U. S. industry. This is neither
surprising nor disappointing, considering the relatively recent development
of aerospace management technology and the typical slowness of the
technology transfer process. However, for reasons discussed in Chapter XI,
the potential for future transfers appears quite promising.
Of the 25 aerospace related techniques selected for attention in this
guidebook, a subjective appraisal indicates that only a few have been
utilized to any significant degree by non-aerospace commercial and in-
dustrial firms. These include value engineering and cost-effectiveness
analysis (indicating the cost-consciousness of the commercial sector];
policy analysis (in the larger firms where a full corporate planning
program exists, and particularly in analysis of marketing policies);
incentive contracting (in major facility construction); and operations
research (in the petroleum and other high-technology industrial sectors).'1
In some management areas (manufacturing management and numerous
applications of operations research, for example) commercial and industrial
firms use concepts and techniques similar to the management concepts of
aerospace, or equally advanced. These concepts and techniques appear to
have been developed largely within the commercial and industrial sector
itself or adopted from nonaerospace sources.
Several other of the 25 aerospace techniques and concepts have
analogous counterparts in commercial industry: project management;
source evaluation; management information systems; scheduling and status
reporting (often using PERT/CPM): logistics management; and quality
assurance. Yet a subjective evaluation indicates that the techniques
differ substantially from their aerospace counterparts in emphasis, rigor,
or sophistication. In some other management areas (financial controls,
for example) the stimulus of profit competition has resulted in the use
of management techniques very different from those found in aerospace.
These techniques are not necessarily less or moreadvancedJ!__Rather^
-they-are^better fitted for their environment.
In speaking about technological transfers from the space program
to nonaerospace industry, Dr. George E. Mueller, associate administrator
of NASA, said in 1969:
About 150,000 people who used to work in the
space program are working elsewhere in the industry.
The principal things that are going to come from the
space program are the approaches that we have used
toward achieving reliability . . . This rigor of
looking at things will become a part of our industrial
system that will--and should—lead to products that
will be better.1
Dr. Mueller has identified a major factor contributing to technology
transfer: the growing numbers of aerospace employees and managers who
have moved to commercial industry. Another force promoting transfer of
aerospace management methods is the growing diversification of industry
which brings aerospace and commercial organizations together within
industrial conglomerates.
Some diversified firms already have successfully transferred manage-
ment methods from their aerospace to their conventional industrial
divisions. Dr. Mac C. Adams, Group Vice President of Avco's Government
2
Products and Services Group, said in an interview:
Avco is setting up the Economic Systems Corporation,
which works on nonaerospace types of social problems,
pollution, manpower training, etc., as part of the
Government Products Group. By being part of the
Group and having contacts there, we assume that the
aerospace techniques can be transferred. The Economic
Systems Corporation pulls together teams of people
utilizing special talents of personnel throughout
the Group who otherwise are involved in our aerospace
effort. The corporate staff also arranges numerous
transfers between the Government Products Group and
the Commercial and Industrial Products Group. The
technology transfers aren't really successful unless
the people go over also.
Some further examples of successful transfer between divisions of diversi-
fied firms have been identified at TRW, North American Rockwell, and
especially at Litton Industries (discussed later in this chapter), al-
though other conglomerates have failed to achieve successful technology
transfers.
Overview of Potential Applicability
With a few exceptions (e.g., Government/Private Corporations)
all of the 25 selected aerospace management techniques appear to have
usefulness to the commercial industrial sector. The techniques are
not, of course, uniformly applicable through the sector. Some techniques
are costly to implement and are limited to the larger and richer enter-
prises .
A matrix chart which summarizes our evaluation of the potential
applicability of aerospace management techniques to the commercial
industrial sector is shown in Figure 1. The left axis lists selected
management problems believed common to managers in this sector. The
top axis lists the 25 aerospace management techniques described in
Chapters V-IX. The boxes at each intersection are shaded to indicate
the perceived degree of applicability of the technique as an aid to
solving the selected management problem. To illustrate the use of this
chart:
o Decision analysis (operations research) is
useful for anticipating results of a manage-
ment policy or decision, and for locating
a new branch plant or warehouse. It is not
generally applicable to problems of product
planning, quality control, or controlling
the performance of suppliers and subcontractors.
0
 Technological forecasting is an excellent
tool for environmental forecasting or planning
a new product line. However, the technique
is not applicable in improving product
reliability, developing a maintenance and
repair system for products, and obtaining
better operational information.
SELECTED
MANAGEMENT
TECHNIQUES
| Extremely Useful
| Useful
| Possibly Helpful
Probably Not Helpful
SELECTED MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
OF THE COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
OVERALL MANAGEMENT PLANNING:
Forecasting future environmental conditions (markets, costs, etc.)
Predicting results of management policy or potential contingency
Making good decisions with insufficient information
Organizing to develop and make several products in one factory
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PRODUCT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT:
Planning a new product line
Planning a product to be part of a larger system
Designing a product easy to repair or maintain
Improving product reliability in operation
Redesigning a product to lower costs or improve performance
Determing product performance before production occurs
A ©
MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS:
Managing a service operation for lower costs or improved performance
Controlling performance of suppliers and subcontractors
Managing spare parts supplies (lower costs, reduce stockouts)
Opening a branch plant with least disruption to operations
Repairing products after delivery to customer
EVALUATION AND CONTROL:
Getting faster and more accurate reports on operations
Getting better schedule or cost control and earlier notice of problems
Assuring a desired level of quality of products and services
Note: Numbers within boxes refer to paragraphs in Chapter II.
Figure 1. Potential Applicability of Aerospace Management Techniques to Commercial and Industrial Enterprises.
Examples of Successful Application
1. Applying simulation and modeling to forecast environmental
conditions. While the use of computer simulation is not new to
industry—one recent survey showed that 35 percent of U. S. corporations
used computer simulation to forecast trends in sales demand and inventory
needs--some industrial firms have developed highly advanced models for
simulating the operation of the firm in its total environment. The
Boise Cascade Corporation's timber and wood products division uses a
computerized model of some 15,000 mathematical variables to look 15
years ahead at operations, to decide on timber land use and plant
location. At Du Pont, a model is used to simulate the operations of
the entire dye industry and Du Font's role in it. Commenting on such
advanced applications of computer models by industry, Business Meek refers
to NASA as a prime example of a user of such new management techniques
and quotes former NASA Administrator James E. Webb's caution that the
computer science techniques cannot be successful if they merely are
applied mechanically. Instead, Webb emphasizes that the critical
factors of the changing environment must be recognized, and that the
successful manager is one who adapts techniques flexibly and innovatively
to that environment.
2. Applying technological forecasting to future industrial
operations. Two imaginative forecasts, both prepared by aerospace
firms, are being used to assess the economic aspects of future
commercial transportation in the U. S. A 1968 study, conducted by
North American Rockwell for the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, analyzed the managerial, economic and technological
4
problems of urban transportation. The findings are potentially
valuable not only to the manufacturers of automotive and conveyor
equipment but to the trucking and municipal transit industries. The
second forecast, developed by Lockheed International for the Department
of Transportation, projects major economic aspects of international
ocean transportation. The findings are intended to help private firms
eliminate uncertainties about introducing new technology (e.g., automated
containerships, advanced communications and material handling systems)
into the transoceanic transportation system.
A somewhat different application of technological forecasting
_methods-has-been-used—to-predict~the—effects on industrial location
of the introduction of a new transportation method, super-cargo aircraft,
during the 1970's. The impacts on plant location preference, industrial
economics and real estate values which stem from the innovation have been
explored in a program of self-sponsored research by Analytic Services,
Inc., an Air Force contract research center.
3. Using Delphi technique to anticipate future markets and
business conditions. Industrial firms using the Delphi technique in
1970 to forecast business conditions included Weyerhauser Co., to learn
the future of the construction business; TRW, Inc., to anticipate pro-
fitable future products and services; Smith, Kline, and French, to study
the long-range future of medicine; McDonnell Douglas, to anticipate
future commercial aviation conditions; and Du Pont, which retained the
Institute for the Future to project future employee fringe benefits
using Delphi.
4. Applying systems analysis to management control of a large
commercial electric power system. The Philadelphia Electric Company
provides electric power to a region in Pennsylvania and Maryland containing
about 4 million persons. The Company generates power in a variety of
plants having different technologies and energy sources (fossil fuels,
water power and nuclear power) and varying costs. For optimum management,
the Company needs to monitor its power demand almost continuously and to
direct power production to the most cost-efficient combination of generating
plants. Such calculations had been done manually, using "seat of the pants"
methods. The North American Rockwell Information Systems Company developed
a much improved control method using aerospace systems engineering
techniques. A computer system was designed to monitor power demand and
compute the most economical generating source. The system also plans
for contingencies (i.e., determines potential hazards in case any equipment
10
fails) and predicts loading demands in advance so that equipment can be
activated smoothly when needed.
5. Using configuration management to organize and control multi-
project production. The Avco Aerostructures Division in Nashville,
Tennessee now uses a computerized configuration management system
developed in its aerospace operations to control office equipment
^manufacture.- - This Di-v-i-sion-, -which-produces -aerospace_projiucts_ (aircraft
and helicopter components) on adjacent production lines, manufactures
all of the steel office furniture (except desk chairs) sold by Globe-
Wernicke. The computerized configuration control system controls matching
of modular parts through the production operations, permitting 6,600
possible configurations (model, size, color, style) of office equipment.
During a 1969 visit to the Division, it was learned that Avco management
has anticipated the use of proven techniques of project engineering/
systems synthesis in potential mass production of other commercial
(nonaerospace) products, such as medical equipment.
6. Using technological forecasting to direct R £ D planning
efforts. Technological forecasting has been used effectively by NASA,
the Navy, and some industrial firms to improve their planning of R § D.
NASA's Ames Research Laboratory uses ad hoc groups composed of scientists
of recognized stature (about 12 senior scientists representing several
disciplines) to study a research field, forecast what research efforts
can and should be accomplished, and whether Ames has the competence to
perform them. With contributions and participation by other interested
staff members, the ad hoc group (after 3 to 6 months of study) ranks
the research projects which show promise and provides estimates of time,
money and resources needed to accomplish these projects. These forecast
studies give direction to the future research programs, and provide a
form of quality control and method of resource allocation which are
palatable to the R 5 D sceientists. The Navy Department, also using
methodology directly applicable to industrial firms, has developed a
multi-step technological forecasting technique in sequence of "optimum
desirability," a measure which includes such factors as probability of
1/1
success, impact or value if successful, and even management environment
(i.e., acceptability to the policy-makers).
7.. using systems engineeering to redesign products for lower cost
or improved performance. An imaginative and deliberate__merger_of_aero^
space management techniques with innovative shipbuilding technology and
expertise has shown how other commercial industries might be revitalized.
Litton Industries, which acquired the Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation
in 1961, has in recent years combined advanced management and systems
technology with ship construction operations.
When the Department of Defense, attracted by the possibility of
lowering costs through the production of a large series of identical
ships at a single yard, announced their procurement plan for the Fast
Deployment Logistics ship (FDL), Litton organized a team in 1965 to
bid on this program.
Consequently, the company at Pascagoula, Miss., built a modern ship
manufacturing facility designed for the efficient construction of a
series of ships on a staged production line basis using subassemblies
and modules as basic building blocks, just as airframes are produced by
an aircraft manufacturer. Standardized kits are used for outfitting
and modification. These methods represent a complete departure from the
traditional stationary shipway method by which ships have been constructed
for centuries. (See Figure 2). •
The company went on to win the FDL contract, which subsequently
was not funded, and every major competition the Navy has offered since,
under their new series production procurement policy. These included LI1A
amphibious assault ships in May 1969 and Spruance-class destroyers (DD-963)
in June 1970 -- the largest ship manufacturing contract in history. All
these ships are to be built in the new Litton Ship Systems facility.
Before these new vessels can be manufactured, they must first be
engineered and designed at the company's advanced marine technology center
in Culver City, California. Through the use of computerized models, which
include both engineering system design and life-cycle costs, any desired
12
The assembly line method of ship production is one of the unique aspects of
the shipyard. Steel plate and shapes are brought to the material receiving
area (1) by ship, barge, rail or truck for translation by cranes to the raw
material storage area ( 2 ) . Material then is t ransferred by crane and
conveyor to the fabrication area (3) - - t o the fabrication shop for processing,
then to the panel shop or the shell assembly shop for further processing into
structurally-complete panels and shell assemblies. These panels and shell
assemblies are then t ransfer red through the staging and kitting area (4) to the
sub-assembly area (5) where sub-assemblies are completed and outfit ted.
Sub-assemblies then are moved to the module assembly area (6 ) . The
completed modules are translated to the ship assembly area (7) where they
are joined to form the structurally-complete and outfitted ship. The ship
then is transferred to the launching platform (8). After launch, the ship
is moved to the final outfitting dock (9) . Shop buildings and warehouses (A)
are conveniently located for e f f ic ien t translation of machinery and equipment,
and processed and packaged material, into the ship production flow.
Figure 2 . Shipyard Production, The Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp.
Pascagoula, Mississippi
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ship condition or characteristics can be simulated. Detailed computerized
economic models are integrated with the engineering models to learn the
cost effectiveness of systems, subsystems and hardware. The computer
enables Li_t,t.o.n—to_optimize—the—sh-i-p-desi-gn~for~th'e~Tnos't'~e'fficfient per-
formance and production.
The first of four container ships to be manufactured at the new
Litton Ship Systems facility was launched in June, 1971. These vessels
will be followed closely by the LHAs and the destroyers.
All the vessels will be produced using computer controlled pro-
duction methods to manufacture them on an assembly line basis with modular
techniques. A number of other advanced techniques (PERT and CPM Systems,
use of preassembled modular units, and mathematical lofting) also have
been used to improve shipbuilding efficiency. The boilers, turbines,
pipes, ducts and other components are standardized for each ship series,
manufactured in quantity and fitted into the modules as they move sideways
on wheeled platforms along rails through the fixed work stations to the
final integration area. Here the modules are fitted, welded together and
made ready for launching from a specially designed pontoon system.
8. Using systems analysis to increase efficiency of service operations.
In 1969, the New York and American Stock Exchanges retained the RAND
Corporation and the North American Rockwell Corporation to analyze operational
systems and methods of the securities industry. The exchanges announced
that RAND, "using long-range planning methods and advanced technologies
pioneered in its work for the U. S. Air Force, will develop programs aimed
at restructuring the system by which the securities industry processes
paperwork and transfers ownership of securities." RAND applied systems
analysis to find long-term solutions to restructuring stock exchange
solutions. The systems analysis studies investigated new management control
systems to improve operations of brokerage firms. RAND developed a computer
model to simulate actual trading and processing operations and recommended
several changes which would reduce the cost of uncompleted securities
o n
transactions from $125 million to $17 million annually. '
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9. Using management information systems to control supplier
operations. The Chrysler Corporation, an aerospace/defense contractor
as well as an automotive manufacturer, has developed a computerized ,
management information system similar in scope to that used on the
Apollo Program. Chrysler's system controls manufacturing operations
throughout a complex network of supplier plants. Altogether, the system
-integrates production_infqrmation for seven Chrysler assembly plants, 26
parts manufacturing plants, and 95 independent suppliers. A staff member
of the Aerospace Research Applications Center, Indiana University, reports
that it is the nearest thing to a total information system which has yet
appeared for manufacturing. The information system, which is fully
integrated into the production process, has been used for forecasting,
materials management, corrective action on defective products, line
balancing, manpower allocation, preventive maintenance, and other applica-
10tions.
10. Using "turn-key" project performance specifications for industrial
facility construction. The "turn-key" contracting concept, which began
in the construction of oil refineries and chemical plants, was widely and
successfully used by the aerospace sector during the 1950's and 1960's
for the rapid construction of missile and space rocket bases. Basically,
the owner-operator writes a set of performance specifications (i.e., what
the facility is to do, its quantity or quality of production output) but
does not specify the details of construction. The engineer-contractor is
responsible for feasibility studies, engineering design, procurement of
equipment and materials, construction, and shakedown operation. Once the
performance specifications are met the key to the gate is symbolically
turned over to the owner, hence the name. The turn-key concept relieves
the industrial owner of the concern for design and construction adequacy;
he contracts only for the result he needs--functional performance. A
paper on applications of aerospace techniques and a series of reports
from the Civil Engineering Department, University of Missouri, describe
how the turn-key concept can be used for large-scale construction of
urban housing to help solve a major housing shortage.
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11. using management information systems to get faster and more
accurate reports on operations. Information systems specialists have
successfully adapted the aerospace control room concept to commercial
use s. TRW' sC iv i 1 Inf ormation_Sy_stems_Department—has-contr act ed~wi"th
a California oil exploration consortium to create a management control
center which will quickly and accurately report information needed to
direct offshore oil development.
In another adaptation of management information system technology,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's Information Systems division has designed
a management information system for hospitals. The system, which has
been installed at El Camino Hospital in California after preliminary ex-
perience at the Mayo Clinic, involves a computer-based patient medical
record which can be retrieved and displayed either in printed copy or on
a video screen. The physician, having access only to a video terminal,
can use a light pen to control or select an immediate display of patient
clinical data from logical groupings of information from their medical
«
history. Lockheed information specialists stated in an interview that
an estimated third of a hospital's man-hours are spent in processing
information--writing, copying, verifying and recording medical orders and
other data. The hospital management information system is expected to
reduce the time expended and the incidence of error in information pro-
cessing.
12. Using VIS-A-PLAN to schedule development of consumer products.
After experiencing some difficulties among the R § D staff in implementing
a conventional schedule control technique, the Consumer and Technical
Products Division of the Owens-Illinois Corporation experimented with
VIS-A-PLAN, a space program modification of PERT. The VIS-A-PLAN system
was first used by Owens-Illinois in 1967 and after an orientation period
has been well received by both management and the R § D staff. The stated
advantages include speed in familiarizing new staff members with project
status, ready identification
 of areas of deficient performance, and ease
of updating.
13. Using PERT to improve schedule control. Among the' many applications
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of PERT/CPM techniques to commercial enterprises is an application which
improves the estimating of completion time for road construction projects.
Prepared at Mississippi State University, the methodology is based on
PERT network calculations and regression analysis. The systematic pro-
cedures promote more objective and accurate estimates-to-complete based
on the experience of 90 construction projects.
14-.—Adapting-aerospace^guality assurance techniques to commercial
manufacturing. Two firms in the Southern U. S., which helped develop
semi-automated quality assurance systems for the space program under
NASA contracts, have adapted these systems for use in commercial production.
SCI Electronics, Inc., of Greenville, S. C., has applied its quality
control systems engineering skills, together with automatic recording
and display equipment similar to that manufactured for NASA, to develop
an industrial monitoring system for textile manufacturing plants. Space
Craft, Inc., of Houston similarly has adapted a malfunction detection
system used at Goddard Space Flight Center to analyze and detect quality
defects in commercial magnetic tape recorders.
Conclusion
The 14 examples of transfer .in this chapter are intended to illustrate
the wide, variety of potential applications. The successful transfers of
aerospace management techniques to the commercial industrial sector
generally occur when economic barriers are overcome (the techniques
can be implemented within the budget of the adopter) and when the environ-
ment is favorable. Two factors appear essential to a favorable environment:
(1) true applicability of the management technique to the need of the
organization; and (2) an enterprising manager willing to try the new
technique, either because he has seen it work in aerospace or because he
is willing to take a calculated risk.
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CHAPTER III
APPLICATIONS TO NON-AEROSPACE AGENCIES
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Past and Present Uses of Aerospace Management Techniques
Of the 25 selected aerospace-related management techniques, only
a few have been extensively or systematically applied in nonaerospace
agencies of the Federal government. Among those that have been applied
are systems analysis (particularly as used in Planning-Pro-
gramming-Budgeting Systems), cost-effectiveness analysis, simulation and
modeling, and management information systems. In our judgment, other
techniques that might be expected to yield the greatest benefits to
Federal agencies would include policy analysis, project management, and
scheduling/status reporting methods. These judgments are not intended
to minimize the potential returns of other possible applications which
might have great impact on the management of specific agency problems.
Our research found fewer cases of acknowledged transfer of aerospace
management techniques to nonaerospace agencies of the Federal government
than were found in the commercial sector of state and local government.
Based on our interviews of directors of management and organization in
various departments and agencies, two indications are apparent; (1) there
are some management techniques in use or under study by Federal agencies
which resemble techniques used in aerospace; and (2) there is a marked
reluctance to acknowledge that management practices of aerospace agencies
and aerospace industry have had any great effect on the management practices
of these nonaerospace agencies.
The use of an aerospace-related management technique will not
necessarily have the same effect in a nonaerospace agency that was
obtained in an aerospace agency. In some cases the.application may be
made with less emphasis in the total scheme of management of the agency.
Or the application may be made with less rigor, sophistication, or per-
vasiveness. In some cases the impact of the technique would be diluted.
Overview of Potential Applicability
A matrix chart that indicates the potential applicability of aerospace
related management techniques to nonaerospace agencies of the Federal
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government is shown in Figure 3. The left axis lists some selected
management problems believed to be common to many managers in Federal
agencies, and the top axis lists the 25 aerospace management techniques.
The boxes at each intersection are shaded to indicate the perceived
degree of applicability of the technique as an aid to solving the
management problem.
Most of the aerospace management techniques seem to have present or
potential applicability to the Federal sector on a selective basis, even
though their present use is not extensive. Most of the documented at-
tempts to transfer these techniques have occurred among "Policy and
Program Analysis" techniques, although it should be noted that even these
attempts have achieved only mixed success and impact. There seems to be
considerable potential for those techniques classified under "Organizing,"
but as yet there have not been very many reported applications in non-
aerospace Federal agencies. A few applications are found among those
management techniques designed for "Administrative Planning and Control,"
but more extensive transfers may be dependent upon different organizational
arrangements or different management philosophies than now prevail.
A number of applications of aerospace management techniques in non-
aerospace agencies of the Federal government are described below. These
examples are keyed to the matrix chart (Figure 3) by numbers which appear
in some of the intersection boxes, thus illustrating some of the types of
applications that can take place. It will be noted that some keys refer
to more than one block, indicating that some management techniques cluster,
or that one technique may accomplish the solution of more than one problem.
Examples of Successful Applications
1. Applying simulation and modeling to forecast future environmental
conditions. Using simulation techniques pioneered in aerospace to predict
battle conditions, the U. S. Forest Service utilizes a forest fire model to
predict the combinations of events and conditions that would lead to a forest
fire. This model represents, insofar as possible, all of the factors that
might lead to the outbreak of a conflagration. Whenever a fire occurs within
the U. S. , the model is updated to include and account for the new information.
The model has very functional consequences in practice.
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MANAGEMENT
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Possibly Helpful
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SELECTED MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS OF
NON-AEROSPACE AGENCIES OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
PLANNING
Forecasting future environmental conditions
Planning and budgeting new and continuing programs
Predicting the results of operating policy alternatives
MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS
Improving and standardizing repetitive decision-making functions
Efficiently operating decentralized government services
Integrating one gov't service into other (Fed..State, Local gov't) jurisdictions
Integrating public and private resources in organizations
Reorganizing government structures in response to change
EVALUATION AND CONTROL ,
Getting faster, more accurate reports on programs and operations
Determining and measuring effectiveness of Federal agency programs
Controlling major procurement programs
POLICY & PRO- TECHNOLOGICAL ORGA-
GRAM ANALYSIS PLANNING NIZING
ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING
AND CONTROL
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Figure 3. Potential Applicability of Aerospace Management Techniques to Non-Aerospace Agencies of the Federal Government.
As a result [of the model], the Forest Service is now
able to issue 'early warnings' which serve (1) to
indicate the need for preventive measures . . . ,
(2) to alert local fire fighting authorities to an
impending hazard, or (3) to minimize the risk to lives
and property through prompt evacuation.
A similar kind of model has been developed by the Public Health
Service to simulate the spread of contagious diseases that cause epidemics.
—By— adjusting—the_var.iab_les_in the model and entering the conditions that
were present, the Public Health Service can chart the likely progression
of the disease from one city to another and issue warnings and provide
medicines that would combat the outbreak.
2. Applying technological forecasting and the Delphi technique to
forecasting future conditions. Technological forecasting techniques, which
extrapolate trends and gather informed opinion in a disciplined fashion,
have been used primarily within aerospace to predict the diffusion of
technology and to develop as accurate a picture of the future as is possible.
The use of these techniques has spread to'certain national commissions and
Federal government agencies outside aerospace. Five years ago, the
National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress
published its seven-volume analysis of Technology and the American
Economy which forecast the likely impact of automation on manpower
requirements of the future. Another national group, the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences' Commission on the Year 2000 was asked to forecast
what the country and the world would be like in the year 2000. The
fascinating deliberations of this committee are reported in Daedelus,
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and similar work appears in other sources. More recently, President
Nixon's National Goals Research staff used the techniques of technological
forecasting to analyze trends in national life and to set forth the key
choices open to the U. S. in shaping the future of the nation. The Report
of the staff includes projections of the impacts of changing technology
on the environment, the economy, education, population, and consumerism.
A NASA executive, familiar with the environmental forecasting methods
used by NASA's Mission Analysis Office to study physical impacts of the
cosmic environment on space missions, commented that the National Goals
Research Staff also used sophisticated environmental forecasting techniques
to analyze the effects of the complex domestic and foreign environments on
22
economic, social and political problems of the nation.
Other agencies, such as the General Accounting Office (GAO) , report
that they use this technique as a tool for predicting the development
rate of known but undeveloped technical inventions. One interviewee in-
dicates that the GAO has applied technological forecasting in the areas
of communication and construction.
3. Using systems analysis to plan and budget new and existing programs.
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) is probably the most widespread
application of systems analysis techniques in the Federal .government today.
Some persons say that it is nothing new, while others hail PPBS as the
greatest advancement in governmental budgeting in recent years. These
polar opinions reflect the differential success achieved by this technique
in non-aerospace agencies of the Federal government.
The term PPBS gained visibility under Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara. President Johnson ordered its general application throughout
all agencies of the Federal government. However, it is generally
believed that the successful implantation of this technique in all
agencies has not yet occurred.
The changes inherent in PPBS are significant in a number of ways.
Previous government budgetary systems focused either on operational control--
emphasis on control of expenditures for specific tasks, or on management
control — assuming that resources were already in hand and then spending
them efficiently and effectively to reach a predetermined objective.
Under PPBS a new focus is added to these; planning is emphasized--cost-
effectiveness and systems analysis are used to compare the relative out-
comes and costs of each action alternative. The movement is from using
the Federal budget primarily as an expenditure-oriented device to using
it as a device through which it can be decided which Federal programs,
at a specified cost, are worth most in terms of public objectives.
Interviews with management specialists or staff directors of most
Federal departments and independent agencies during mid-1969 indicated
mixed success in applying PPBS in non-aerospace agencies of the Federal
government. An administrator in the Department of Agriculture indicated
that its effort to apply PPBS have been largely successful. An interview
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with a director in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in-
dicated the initial impetus was on conducting analytical studies--cost-
effectiveness and pilot studies, particularly in the welfare area. Later
efforts in HEW have concentrated more oh the planning and evaluation as-
pects^f_jthe^tgchnictue_.__A_number^of^agencies-report~a~shortage of qualified
technically trained personnel to conduct the kinds of analytical and
informational activities inherent in PPBS. However, PPBS has made, and
will continue to make an impression on the management of agencies in the
Federal government.
4. Using PERT to plan and schedule social action programs. The use of
PERT/CPM sometimes is mistakenly considered limited to hardware development
or facility construction programs, which is its primary use in aerospace.
However, the Office of Economic Opportunity has used PERT widely to plan
and schedule its Community Action Program. The PERT principles are used
not only by OEO staffers but are intended also to be used by community
residents who receive OEO planning grants. OEO has published a two-volume
PERT programmed training course to explain basic PERT principles to
neighborhood residents and community leaders responsible for planning and
implementing Community Action Programs.
5. Applying simulation and modeling to predict the results of
operating policy alternatives. This use of simulation is perhaps the
strongest application of the technique, limited only by the ability of
the model builder to approximate the conditions of the real world in
his model. In many situations the duplication is almost exact. Simu-
lators such as are used to train astronauts are in daily use in industry
to train aircraft pilots, and the FAA uses them to train air traffic
controllers. Another variation of simulation is used by the Department
of State to train officials who will serve in foreign countries. In this
model of inter-country interaction a trainee can make decisions for the
country in which he is to serve and see what effect those decisions would have
on neighboring countries.
A different kind of model has been developed by HEW to simulate the
"product" of the U. S. school system. This model is essentially a man-
power model that indicates the output mix of the nation's high schools.
Such a model is of interest to industrial recruiters, as well as to the
colleges and universities in the country.
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TRW Systems has developed a simulator to help the National Air
Pollution Control Administration predict the effects of land use patterns,
transportation patterns, etc. on air quality. The model helps establish
standards and boundaries for air quality control regions.
6. Using government/private corporations to integrate one government
service with other jurisdictions. The International Telecommunication Satellite
Consortium (Intelsat.), is an open-end membership organization that owns
and operates an international network of space satellites used for numerous
types of electronic communication. Any member of the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), which includes every country in the world
except for Red China, North Korea, and one or two others, may join
Intelsat. The U. S. entry, the Communications Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT) acts as a manager in behalf of all participants in the consortium,
under the guidance of the Interim Communications Satellite Committee. It
is a pay-as-you-go plan in which a participant, without a prior investment,
can join at any time and pay a pro rata share of the costs and investment
according to its use of the facilities.
The international involvement is through a treaty-type organization.
The government/industry involvement in the venture makes possible commer-
cial use of internationally owned satellites. Uses include television,
telephone, teletype, facsimile, and computer data transfer from one
country to another on a real-time basis. The Intelsat agreement establishes
a successful pattern for integrating services for many governmental
jurisdictions which vary in technological sophistication, size, and degree
of economic development.
7. Using management information systems to provide faster, more
accurate reports on operations. The Department of State has worked for
several years to develop an information collection and dissemination system
concerning foreign affairs. The purpose is to gather information from all
over the world, sort it into meaningful categories, and then disseminate
it to those persons within State who might have need for it. Considering
the mass of information that might be pertinent to the operations of the
Department, and considering the many sources and processors who gather the
information, the job of collecting data and channeling it is.immense. Even
after this substantive information has arrived at the Washington headquarters
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there is a large and complex job of seeing that it gets to whomever might
need it for decision purposes.
Previous information systems categorized information into two categories:
political and economic. By^pElyJjig^principles^of—integrated-management
information system design, the new system fractionalized, expanded, and
reorganized these categories to give an ambassador information on all
resources available to him and how they were applicable to any given prob-
lem or mission. These data can be arranged by function, country, or
region. The substantive information system collects and processes both
narrative and quantified data. The purpose of the system is to provide as
quickly as possible all information pertinent to any crisis situation that
may arise anywhere in the world, to promote timely, knowledgeable manage-
ment decisions.
The Atomic Energy Commission operates a comparable management
information system (AEC/MIS) encompassing all AEC laboratories and pro-
duction plants.
8. Applying the systems approach, systems for procurement, and
quality assurance to meet the national housing problems. The United
States faces a gigantic housing shortage. Congress has set a goal of
creating 26 million more housing units, newly built or rehabilitated,
by 1978. Yet the largest builder in the country produces only about
6,800 per year. Even among prefab and mobile home producers no single
o
company has ever turned out more than 30,000 units a year. To meet
the challenge, The Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1969
initiated "Operation Breakthrough" to apply innovative techniques of
systems analysis and engineering to solve the housing shortage. Of HUD's
Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology who directs Operation
9
Breakthrough, Business Meek reports:
[To this] systems expert recruited from the space
program, . . . the systems approach to housing means
manipulating such subsystems as management, market,
land, capital, planning, design, and long-term
financing to produce the best possible environment
at the lowest possible cost. Several consortiums
formed to bid on Breakthrough combine these dis-
ciplines in ways entirely new to U. S. housing.
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Operation Breakthrough presents a great management as well as a technological
challenge. Not only are new. production techniques needed, but mass markets
must be aggregated. Local customs and regulations of zoning boards
must be contended with. So must the traditional practices of organized
labor. Long-term capital must be available, and problems of aggregate
economics and governmental bureaucracy must be taken into consideration
and dealt with. There is mixed sentiment toward the undertaking in
Congress, the housing industry, in labor, and in the Federal government. ;
Some people are extremely hopeful, while others are pessimistic that goals
can be met.
Some of the management techniques applied to Operation Breakthrough which
appear new to housing programs are systems analysis and engineering,
program management, systems for procurement, and quality assurance. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development described some of these
innovations:
o (Systems Engineering)--"The term 'housing system1
describes the total mechanism employed by a business
firm for the large scale production and sale of
quality, residential housing units. . . . Modern
management techniques are employed to direct the
sophisticated production, construction, and marketing
operations."10
° (Systems for Procurement)--". . . for the first time
there has been assembled a complete set of performance -
criteria for the testing and evaluation of housing."
The National Bureau of Standards assists HUD in
developing performance criteria and in monitoring
performance tests.H
o (Quality Assurance)--"Breakthrough introduced a new
emphasis on quality assurance in housing construction--
step-by-step control and testing, and if necessary,
redesign to meet top quality standards."12
If the application of certain aerospace management techniques to
Operation Breakthrough's hardware-oriented problems as well as to some
social problems (e.g., local zoning and labor relations) is successful,
it will probably result in the realignment of a major industry and it
will establish some new ground rules for government/industry relationships.
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9. Using reliability analysis, maintainability analysis, and value
engineering to improve production of products, or effectiveness of standards.
The techniques of reliability and maintainability analysis and value en-
gineering, which grew from advanced product development programs, have
a special applicability to certain Federal activities. The most obvious
are those programs in which the government itself controls product
development rather than utilizing contractors (e.g., certain Atomic Energy
Commission nuclear production). Perhaps less obvious but more widespread
are Federal programs concerned with development of standards for products.
The National Bureau of Standards, Food and Drug Administration,
General Services Administration, and other agencies are responsible for
the technological planning of standards for product development and utiliza-
tion; these agencies face many of the same type of management challenges
as do the managers of aerospace programs.
Agencies responsible for program regulation or control, such as the
Office of Management and Budget, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and
Securities and Exchange Commission, face analogous problems requiring
systems reliability and value engineering, even though they are not as
concerned with products as with the operation of service programs.
Conclusion
The management techniques which show the greatest promise of applica-
tion to nonaerospace agencies of the Federal government are those which
apply to programs with clearly defined goals, are more closely related to
hardware or technical programs (e.g., air pollution control), and problems
that are amenable to rational analysis. Because of the inherent nature of
government to be sensitive to public opinion, it is difficult to progress
rationally toward solution of social problems where goals are often in
dispute. The institutional nature of the Federal government, which tends to
resist change because administrators are more permanent than policy makers,
presents another barrier to innovation in management technique. These
factors indicate a need for selectivity in choosing applications for ad-
vanced management techniques adapted from aerospace.
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CHAPTER IV
APPLICATIONS TO STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES
The term "state and local public service sector" has been chosen
for the third potential sector where aerospace management techniques
might be applied. The sector includes administrators of state governments,
city managers and other local government officials. It also includes
managers of some non-governmental organizations providing essential public
services; for example, public utilities, transportation services, schools
and hospitals.
The use of aerospace management techniques has not yet penetrated
far into the state and local public service sector, although the use is
growing and certain applications are of great significance. Systems
analysis is the aerospace-related management technique which has
been tried most often by public service administrators, with mixed
success. Some public utilities and transportation services have used
operations research and modeling techniques, as have some of the larger city
and state agencies. Interviews uncovered some promising and imaginative
trials of aerospace management techniques by public administrators, and
several of these are described later in this chapter.
Overview of Potential Applicability
An evaluation of the applicability of aerospace management
techniques to the state and local public service sector is shown in
Figure 4. The potential usefulness of a particular aerospace management
technique in solving the management problem is indicated by degree of
shading.
Despite recognized barriers to transfer, this sector--state and local
government and other public services—now appears the most likely sector
to adapt and adopt aerospace management methods. Evidence for this predic-
tion came from interviews with numerous public administrators, most of whom--
not all — stated that they need management help and are willing to try new
ideas. The public administrators typically expressed skepticism, often to
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Note: Numbers within boxes refer to paragraphs in Chapter IV.
Figure 4. Potential Applicability of Aerospace Management Techniques to the State and Local Public Service Sector.
a considerable degree, but ended by saying that they need help badly enough
to try something new that shows a reasonable hope of success, if that
"something" can be afforded. Rational assessment shows the conventional
management tools to be inadequate to solve many problems of the cities.
The public administrators seem to recognize that major management in-
novations are necessary and seem to be willing to experiment during the
search for them.
There is of course a wide range of complexity in the duties of public
servants. Ninety percent of U. S. municipalities have under 5,000 people,
and their mayors and city managers have vastly different problems than do
administrators of the 60 or 70 largest cities. Arjay Miller of Stanford
University, former Ford Motor Company president, stated that the mayor of
any large city now has a much tougher job than does the president of Ford.
It is the administrator of the larger, more complex public service activity
who most needs management innovations and may be most likely to benefit from
this guidebook.
Some aerospace management techniques show rather widespread applica-
bility to state and local public administration problems. Examples include
management information systems, simulation and modeling, procurement source
evaluation, and cost-effectiveness analysis. Systems analysis, particu-
larly in its PPBS application, is frequently proposed for use in this
sector and has been the subject of considerable controversy. We recognize
potential useful applications of systems analysis but not an indiscriminate
applicability.
The following sections contain descriptions of several innovative
applications of aerospace management techniques in the state and local
public service sector. As before, the examples are numbered and the numbers
are keyed to the boxes in Figure 4.
•i
Examples of Successful Application
1. Applying systems analysis to planning urban programs. The deputy
mayor of a large city which spends over a million dollars annually on
systems analysis activities said in an interview that the systems analysis
work is largely devoted to three areas. Two of these directly involve
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planning, and the third area--information processing--improves planning in-
puts. One of the major areas where the city's systems analysis staff functions
is resource allocation, involving plant and equipment deployment. Their
analyses have, for example, found more effective ways to deploy fire and
police stations. The analyses found that better fire and police protec-
tion would result from a redeployment even after some stations were
eliminated. (The deputy mayor also noted that political barriers--neighbor-
hood objections—hampered implementation of the analytical results.)
The second area where systems analysis was applied in this city is
capital construction. Here, the systems analysts have concentrated on ways
to improve construction programs by reducing the delay between authorization
and completion of the construction project — a period in which costs rise,
the potential beneficiaries of the construction project grow impatient,
and the neighborhood is disrupted.
2
A 1969 doctoral dissertation described several useful applications
of systems analysis to urban management problems. These included analysis
of unemployment problems in a model city area of Dayton, Ohio; a firehouse
location analysis in East Lansing, Michigan (described later in the chap-
ter); and the well-known "California studies" in which aerospace firms
conducted systems analyses for the state of California on crime, govern-
ment information, transportation, and waste management. Other interview
sources mentioned successful applications of systems analysis to the prob-
lem of waste disposal in Detroit, to the planning of the Bay Area Rapid
Transit system around San Francisco, and to the creation of a decision
system for a model neighborhood program. A RAND Corporation staff member
has suggested that systems analysis has three major uses in urban planning:
to aid forecasting of impacts (e.g., of a new highway on land use); as a
research tool to study the process of urban change; and as an educational
or demonstration device.
Systems analysis, as applied to planning and budgeting, transferred
from RAND and the military services to the civilian departments of the
Federal government and from there to state, county and city governments.
The major impetus to local government use came from a 1966 plan (involving
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The George Washington University's State-Local Finances Project, the U. S.
Office of Management and Budget, and local government officials) for a
pilot study. The so-called "5-5-5 Project" involved a demonstration of
systems analysis for planning in five states (California, Michigan, New
-Y-orki^Wrsconsinl^Vermont) , in five cities (Dayton, Denver, Detroit, New
Haven, San Diego), and five counties (Dade, Florida; Nashville-Davidson,
Tennessee; Los Angeles; Nassau, New York; and Wayne, Michigan). An
evaluation of the 5-5-5 Project by Selma Mushkin of the Urban Institute
noted that insufficient time had elapsed to measure success in terms of
better decisions on program resource allocation, but she did find evidence
in numerous governmental jurisdictions of better, more analytical staff
work in support of policy officials. She also observed an aroused spirit
of inquiry and indications of more analytical problem solving, through
4
this demonstration of systems analysis.
2. Applying cost-effectiveness analysis to new city programs.
Cost-effectiveness analysis can readily be applied to "hard" programs
(i.e., those dealing with equipment or facilities). General Electric
TEMPO, however, has successfully applied the technique to a "soft" program
involving effectiveness of health programs for school children. TEMPO
systems analysts have developed measures of effectiveness of: (a) screening
school children for disease at various age levels, trading off the advan-
tages of early disease diagnosis with surer diagnosis at an older age; and
(b) various types of testing techniques. The results of the analysis
seem directly applicable to public health efforts. The technique may be
adaptable by analogy to still other social service programs.
An interesting application of.military cost-effectiveness analysis
techniques to public investments has been proposed by an Army systems
analyst. He developed a methodology for analyzing a proposed public
investment to determine its contribution to the welfare of some group, its
harmful effects on other groups, and an evaluation of alternative invest-
ment of the same resources.
3. Applying decision analysis to public programs. Numerous examples
can be found of using operations research/decision analysis techniques for
planning technical (e.g., resource allocation) aspects of public service
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programs. For example, the application of operations research to public
planning has been thoroughly explored by a team of researchers whose
report goes beyond describing current planning applications of 0. R.
It portrays in simulated case studies how certain techniques (decision
and value theory, simulation, cost-effectiveness analysis, sensitivity and
risk analysis) can be used. Applications include land use and transporta-
tion planning, urban renewal, and development of community facilities.
The use of operations research/decision analysis techniques appears
to be applicable also to the social planning aspects of public service
programs. A study published by the Space Sciences Laboratory, University
of California, proposed a systems strategy involving a continual learning
process. The strategy was proposed as having application to the solution
of social problems through improved decision-making in research and develop-
ment.
4. Applying simulation and modeling techniques to predict results-,
of policy alternatives. At least two cities have used models to simulate
future housing requirements. The City of San Francisco employed Arthur D.
Little and Company to construct a computer simulation of the city's resi-
dential housing. The simulation was based on a wide diversity of specified
detailed facts about housing units, the profits and investment require-
ments for each type of housing and each type of investor, zoning require-
ments in force and contemplated, and the housing preferences of various
types of households in the city. The program analyzes the demand and
compares it with the actual availability of space. The model then com-
pares the two, and if excess demand is present and financial conditions
warrant construction, it "invests" further funds in this type of housing.
The cycle can be repeated up to nine years with the model as programmed.
General Electric TEMPO has been retained to develop a model of the
Detroit housing market. A TEMPO spokesman stated that the completed por-
tions of the model draw upon economic theory and the behavioral sciences
(i.e., how people actually behave or respond to changes in housing patterns,
ethnic mix, etc.). The spokesman noted that he would work with city
planners to explain the interaction of the model and its internal logic,
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so the planners could operate the model to analyze the effects of various
housing policies and other factors on the Detroit housing situation.
5. Applying systems analysis to planning for municipal services
to meet changing needs. Some early experimental work was being done
during 1969-70 in adapting systems analysis techniques to municipal services.
TRW Systems, for example, was engaged with the City of Fresno, California,
in jointly developing a guidance plan for operation of the city government.
The project, heavily funded by the Federal government, was involved in
applying systems analysis through an iterative process to adjust municipal
program operations to changing citizen priorities. TRW Systems, according
to an executive we interviewed, provided about 60 percent of the systems
analysts in the program from its own personnel or from one of three sub-
contractor firms (one economic, one sociological, and one architectural
planning). The remaining 40 percent of systems analysts are city employees.
The TRW Systems executive stated, "The project conducts urban renewal
planning and economic development planning for the city. The operation
is very similar in function to an aerospace project office."
Another potential application of systems analysis to municipal
services was described by Dr. William H. Mitchel, then Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Management Systems of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare. Dr. Mitchel commented, "We can easily build a municipal
medical clinic but can we integrate the clinic into the lives of its users?
The need for integrative mechanisms is more important today than is the
creation of components. A systems analysis process using computer tech-
nology is a way of doing this."
6. Applying simulation and modeling to the planning of municipal
services. Several examples of imaginative applications of simulation to
urban services are briefly noted in Chapter VI. These include Jay
Forrester's theoretical work in Urban Dynamics and the Bay Area Simulation
Study (BASS). Still another application was made by the Boston Regional
g
Planning Project. A land use model was developed to give policy makers
information on the probable results of public policy decisions concerning
urban development. The model, used as a predictive tool, tested alternate
36
development plans against a framework of community values and functional
physical development.
7. Using systems for procurement to manage interjurisdictional
and interdepartmental programs and task forces. In its management of the
U. S. space program, NASA chose to develop a highly competent, but
small, in-house headquarters staff and to procure goods and services
by contract from other sources that already had competent technologists.
This mode of operation was dependent upon rigorous systems for procurement.
It is believed that other agencies or authorities could also benefit from
this arrangement, especially when they need research, or the development
and deployment of highly complex equipment or programs.
A number of large cities are faced with problems that require research
and study far beyond the limited capabilities (resources) of their perma-
nent staff. Contract research might prove to be valuable, especially if
it is properly procured and controlled. The Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA) reports that it has an organization similar in concept to that
described above, and further that they have used contractors to conduct
specialized research. Although their initial attempts to contract for
the design of a Community Renewal Program were disappointing, other studies
that have been contracted out have had more success. One BRA official
stated that more planning and design work should be done under contract
rather than with in-house staff, and that the agency would need to continue
to develop more expertise in managing contract research and design studies.
8. Applying systems engineering management to improve the efficiency
of operating decentralized services. Several universities, notably the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have undertaken experimental urban
research programs attempting to apply systems engineering techniques to
problems of cities. M. I. T., which in 1969 reported involvement in 32
urban research projects, has successfully demonstrated the usefulness of
systems engineering approaches to improving three decentralized services
provided by local government organizations. The first of the three is a
bloodbank service, in which systems engineering techniques were used to
improve the nonmedical aspects (i.e., control and distribution) of regional
bloodbank operations. The second service improved (in cooperation with
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the Boston Police Department) is the system by which a citizen obtains
police assistance. The systems engineering approach showed that minor
and inexpensive changes in the dispatch system could reduce response
time. A systems model was developed which a.l.s.o__was_used—to-eva-l-uate—new
methods proposed for police dispatching, such as computer routing and
automatic car locator systems. A third decentralized urban service,
emergency ambulance services, also was shown to be amenable to the systems
9
engineering technique.
9. Applying procurement systems to efficiently operate decentralized
services. A systems consulting group working with the administration of
a large city has been exploring the application of certain aerospace/
industrial procurement systems to simplification of city problems. One
small but promising example of success involved the contracting out of
a decentralized city service: towing away abandoned automobiles found on
city streets. It was found that the costs of maintaining and operating a
fleet of city tow trucks could be significantly reduced by contracting
the work to private tow companies scattered about the city. There may be
many similar examples of potential cost savings available to municipalities,
which seem not to take full advantage of opportunities to profitably con-
tract out their functional activities.
10. Applying simulation and modeling in operating fleets of service
vehicles, mobile service groups and equipment. Cities are involved in
providing many municipal services which are amenable to management tech-
nology analyses that may save money and/or improve service. The kinds
of services that might be dealt with include: refuse disposal; transpor-
tation systems; fire station and other service locations; and so on. The
International City Management Association (ICMA) has used small, technical
assistance models to solve several municipal service problems. Using a
standard model, ICMA representatives teach city employees to operate the
model in a couple of weeks. Data concerning peculiar local conditions
and judgments are then put into the model (often using weightings by vote
of the people operating the model), and then the model is run with current
data.
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An experienced city manager pointed out during an interview that
the East Lansing, Michigan experience (in which he participated as a
consultant) was a successful example of applying simulation to municipal
services. East Lansing wisely began with a small technical assistance
model—locating fire stations—rather than attempting, as some cities
have, to solve all of the city's major problems at once. East Lansing
set up a project team including the City Manager, Assistant City Manager,
Fire Chief, and building inspectors. The project team evaluated fire
records and fed data on specific local conditions into the station loca-
tion model. Then the team operated the model, using weighted judgments
of team members, simulating coverage of fires in various parts of the
city by available units that might respond to a call. The model that was
used in this instance was a standard transportation model, not very complex,
and easily adaptable to the local conditions to which it was applied. The
result of this exercise was to save the city the cost of a proposed fire
house that could be shown not to be necessary. The simulation span time
was about six months from model design until the final location plan was
completed.
11. Using configuration management in operating and maintaining
networks of utility lines and terminals. One standard application of
configuration control, used in the production of missiles and complex
aircraft, is the charting of paths and destinations of the miles of wires
necessary to the electronic equipment. Later, before launch or opera-
tion, it is possible, using a computer printout, to check each of the
connections and assure its proper performance. The analogy to electric
utility lines or telephone lines is exact. At present most cities are
forced to use hand methods to accomplish these checks, and in practice
this method is often highly unreliable and imperfect in its results.
12. Applying automated data processing systems to improve municipal
operations. On March 30, 1970, a Federal interagency group led by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development announced the signing of
contracts with, six cities to develop prototype automated data processing
systems for municipal operations. The projects have three major purposes:
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To improve municipal government data processing and decision-
making capabilities;
To encourage the standardization of government data at each
level of government;
c. To develop automated data processing systems which have a
maximum capability to transfer from city to city.
The scope of the management information system to be developed can be seen
best by the illustration in Figure 5, which was supplied by the Urban
Information Systems Inter-Agency Committee.
Although results of this program had not been reported in 1970, a HUD
official familiar with the program goals stated in an April 1970 interview
that he hoped to have an early demonstration of a significant segment of
the integrated system by the early part of the second year. Hopes for
transferability are high because the system is to be relatively free from
organizational relationships. Cities, which differ widely in organizational
patterns, often are common enough in function to permit use of standardized
data processing systems.
In addition, transfer efforts are planned. Both Washington, D.C., and
Fresno, California, have sent personnel to Wichita Falls, Texas, (one
of the two cities developing a total system) to work alongside Wichita
Falls developers and learn details of the evolving system. Also, the
State of Pennsylvania committed its own funds and personnel to assist
transfer of the system from Reading (one of the four cities developing a
subsystem) to other cities in the State. The projects however are long
range efforts involving a minimum of two years for a subsystem and
three years for the total systems. As a result final results of these
efforts will not be available for several years.
13. Using simulation to enhance the quality of educational programs.
Lockheed Education Systems has developed, for use in public school
curricula, several learning programs which rely heavily on simulation and
models of life experiences. One such program, called "Drug Decision,"
has been used extensively in California and elsewhere to teach junior high
school students of the effects of drugs on a community and themselves.
An important part of the program is a game called "Drug Attack" which allows
the student to simulate the role of the law enforcement agent, health
40
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officer or mayor. In the assumed role the student is confronted with a
simulated drug attack, and is called upon to stop the attack and treat
its victims.
In another example, Lockheed also has developed an "R-3" educational
program designed for underachieving junior high students from disadvantaged
backgrounds. The program exposes students to a number of potential career
fields through role playing and simulation, and is intended both to moti-
vate and to broaden their career horizons. The program involves simulated
participation in career activities through Monopoly-type board games (e.g.,
Rock, Sand and Sea, a marine biologist simulation) to reinforce knowledge
of various careers. Its core content is gaming/simulation, a highly
A
structured representation of a real world situation which can be carried
out in the environment of the classroom. The "R-3" program has been imple-
mented in a demonstration program in the San Jose, California, Unified
School District. A staff evaluation found the program resulted in marked
improvement in reading and mathematics skills over selected comparison
groups, as well as marked improvement in student attitudes toward parents,
school and society.
A third Lockheed program uses a simulated learning environment—an
electronic data processing (EDP) installation—as a means of stimulating
student performance in a ghetto-area school in San Francisco. Selecting
underachieving students (up to 3 1/2 years underachievement) in mathematics
and reading, the program provides compensatory education in these skills
in a vocational environment. The program places students in a computer-
oriented situation where reading and math,,,are seen as essential tools to
work.effectively with EDP .equipment. Each problem.of lesson is^modeled
on an EDP, application. '"The students not only.-receive compensatory'train-
ing in Jifiath, and reading rbut also acquire valuable EDP trade ski,lls which
make them employable in' a computer installation even if they drop out of
school, but employable in a; m!ore«-advanced-rpoiitibn if they graduate.
14. Applying'aerospacew'procurement expertise to municipal
procurement of goods and services'.'"John Feild of The Conference of Mayors
commented during an interview that one of the biggest problems of manage-
ment of large cities'wasthemanagement of expenditures. He deplored the
rigidity of municipal procurement practices which place traditional
.measures of economic efficiency (e.g., low bidding) over accomplishment of
-objectives. Mr. Feild speculated that cities might profitably learn from
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aerospace contractors some flexible method of procurement promoting accom-
plishment of objectives.
An imaginative procurement technique transfer was accomplished through
the cooperation of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the Los Angeles Police
Department. JPL, from its work on NASA space programs, had considerable
experience with the NASA source evaluation board process, used to select
a specific contractor for a high value contract where technical capability
is an important factor in the selection.
The City of Los Angeles had in 1969 planned to procure an improved
command control communications system to serve the emergency service
departments: Fire, Police, and Receiving Hospital. An improved system
was desired which would meet the City's needs for the next ten years.
Because of the lack of experience which any city faces in a highly techni-
cal once-in-a-decade procurement, Los Angeles asked JPL for technical
advice and assistance. Drawing on space program expertise, JPL managers
reviewed the Request for Proposal and helped the Los Angeles Police
Department prepare a statement of work. Next, JPL ran a series of seminars
in Source Evaluation Board techniques to increase the purchasing sophisti-
cation of the police department officials who would be directly involved in
the evaluation of the equipment. While JPL took pains to avoid any direct
involvement in the evaluation process itself, it did provide assistance
considered most valuable by the city representatives.
The successful JPL-Los Angeles interaction is an excellent illustra-
tion of a promising solution to a widespread urban problem. American cities
have no clear set of technological requirements for products. Further,
city administrators do not have, and cannot reasonably be expected to
have, a capability for understanding the complexities of modern tech-
nological systems. Lacking the indigenous capability to evaluate
technological equipment and match it to urban needs, city officials have
sought external help. To meet the need, certain specialized semi-govern-
mental agencies have evolved—agencies with sophisticated capabilities
to understand and evaluate high-technology systems—to serve as con-
sultants to city administrators.
The Urban Institute, the International City Management Association,
the RAND Corporation, the National Science Foundation, and the New York
State Urban Development Corporation are among the organizations pioneering
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in providing specialized management techniques to strengthen state and
local government capabilities. The Urban Institute, for example, is
helping the city of Fort Worth analyze impacts of new police fleet
plans; in Nashville, the Institute is bringing systems analysis to
bear—on—t-he-complex—problems-of-dependent-chrldren-;—The~Nat ional^ Scienc e
Foundation's new RANN (Research Applied to National Needs) program
will sponsor research to assist and help evaluate development of solu-
tions to long-term city problems.
Perhaps the most significant innovation in bringing technological
expertise to bear on the management problems of the cities is the Tech-
nology Application Program, a joint effort of the International City
Management Association and NASA. Under this program, a more technically
sophisticated acquisition process is being developed for city govern-
ments. A NASA management authority, particularly concerned with urban
problems, recently stated that:
With new procurement policies and mechanisms,
bolstered by a small but highly competent tech-
nical evaluative capability, cities can widen
the field of competition and encourage the
joining and participation of high technology
firms with manufacturing firms. This will in-
evitably lead to a series of new options for
city and state governments. The options will
permit them to trade off costs, performance
schedules on a technical basis, as well as on
a simple cost and schedule basis.10
Conclusion
The severe management problems faced by administrators of state and
local public services are causing these administrators to become in-
creasingly receptive to innovative techniques that show promise in solving
their problems. Despite formidable barriers (e.g., a socio-political
rather than a technological tradition of problem solving; financial con-
straints; a fragmented market for new technology) local governments and
services are illustrating by innovative applications that some advanced
management techniques can be transferred with success.
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CHAPTER V
THE 25 SELECTED AEROSPACE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
The next four chapters contain short summarized descriptions of 25
management techniques which have been selected as (1) aerospace-related
and— C2)~potentiaHy valuabTe to o'ther sectors of economic activity. We
use the term technique in the sense of a method to accomplish a desired
goal. However, we do not mean to limit our attention to technical
procedures for solving individual problems. We include as techniques
some major areas of management knowledge (decision analysis/operations
research), broad concepts (systems analysis), and some specialized pro-
cedures or tools (the Delphi technique, one of several methods for
technological forecasting).
Although they vary widely in scope and in significance, we have
chosen these subject areas of management for attention because numerous
managers and administrators have already found them useful and we believe
others also can do so. We have left out some candidate techniques (e.g.,
induced creativity, or Synectics) because their connection with aerospace
is relatively minor; to include them would risk expansion of this guidebook
into a general management encyclopedia, which is not our intent. We have
left out other techniques (e.g., evaluation of facility locations) because
the aerospace contribution is too specialized or too limited in significance
to make it worth the attention of a general audience of managers or ad-
ministrators.
We have categorized the techniques according to the most likely way
they will be used; that is, for:
o program and policy analysis
o technological planning
0
 organizing
0
 administrative planning and control.
These follow only roughly the historical functions of management, which
include: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling. The
major reason for using non-traditional categories is that aerospace is much
stronger in certain management functions (e.g., planning) than in others
(e.g., staffing). This emphasis results from the rapidly changing nature
of the aerospace missions and the frequent need to hire new talent rather
than developing personnel from within through training and motivation.
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A second reason is that in the systems environment of aerospace,
more and more of the management techniques span several of the traditional
functions. For example, systems analysis is used conceptually for selecting
among alternative programs and policies, for administrative planning, and
even for providing a framework for a program control mechanism. Thus, we
have retitled the categories and placed the 25 techniques into the category
where they seem to fit best. The 25 techniques, arranged by category, are:
Program and Policy Analysis.(Chapter VI)
Systems Analysis, Policy Analysis and Related Techniques
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Decision Analysis (Operations Research)
Heuristics
Simulation and Modeling
Technological Planning (Chapter VII)
Technological Forecasting
Delphi Technique
Systems Engineering Management
Reliability Analysis
Maintainability Analysis
Value Engineering
Organizing (Chapter VIII)
Proj ect Management
Matrix Organization Structure
Government/Private Corporations
Administrative Planning and Control (Chapter IX)
Systems for Procurement
Source Evaluation Board Process
Incentive Contracting
Contractor Performance Evaluation
Management Information Systems
Management Reporting and Display Systems.
Scheduling/Status Methods
PERT/CPM
Configuration Management
Logistics Management
Quality Assurance
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CHAPTER VI
TECHNIQUES FOR PROGRAM AND POLICY ANALYSIS
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS. POLICY ANALYSIS AND RELATED TECHNIQUES
Systems analysis came out of wartime problem solving where intuitive
decisions~were~ofren^too costly and"o^ ften~ine~ffecTive^  Methods, usually
quantitative, were developed for better describing an operational pro-
blem, determining what information was needed to solve it, and analyzing
this for good answers.
During the World War II experience, the operations analysts in the
armed services were able to help use existing resources to solve tactical
problems: how to use radar countermeasures, how to design effective
bombing patterns, how to deploy destroyers around a convoy. From this
experience, systems analysis was developed to select and evaluate proposed
new weapons systems for development. This required integration of re-
search (on what was technically feasible) with information on defense
requirements (which were sometimes not technically feasible).
Thus, systems analysis can generate information to help select a
preferred set of space boosters to be developed. It can assist in deter-
mining the need for Army airlift, or the desired mix of airlift and sealift,
for delivering a fighting force to an overseas point. The analysis does not
include the design of the boosters or the transport aircraft; it does cover
the performance requirements they should meet.
Systems analysis for management* helps in making choices among
policies or among competing spending or development programs (either in-
vestment spending or operations spending). It requires systematic examina-
tion of the future cost and effectiveness of the various alternatives.
To do this, " . . . such an analysis requires, in the most general
view, three sorts of inquiry, any of which can modify the others as the work
proceeds. There is a need, first of all, for systematic investigation of
the decisonmaker's objectives and of the relevant criteria for deciding
among the alternatives that promise to achieve these objectives. Second, the
*Systems analysis is a term sometimes applied to paperwork systems
and procedures simplification, computerized management information system
development, and engineering analysis. Systems analysis for management
.should not be confused with any of these.
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alternatives need to be compared, usually in terms of their cost, effective-
ness, timing, or risk—using a quantitative or logical model insofar as it
can be made representative of the situation. Finally, there must be an
attempt to design better alternatives and select other goals if those ex-
amined are found wanting."
The vital words here are objectives, criteria, alternatives, cost,
effectiveness, timing and risk, model, and design.
The objectives are what a problem solving system (or policy) must
specifically accomplish to solve the problem. The criteria are the standards
by which the alternative means of solving the problem are compared. The
alternatives are the different means (including the present system) which
might be used. Cost measures the resources required by each alternative.
Effectiveness tells how well the objectives would be achieved by each al-
ternative.
Timing and risk deal with what's going on outside the system under-
study; how the environment may change over time, and what you may lose if
the system doesn't work. The model is some sort of simulation of reality,
in a computer or on the back of an envelope; it shows the relationship of
inputs and outputs, objectives, alternatives, and external or environ-
mental forces. Design is the end product: some means for solving the
problem, and some information helping the decision-maker to choose among
them.
The key to the analytic process is iteration. As new alternatives
are generated, the objectives can be made more responsive to the problem.
As the objectives are better described, the cost and effectiveness measures
can be improved. As timing and risk factors are better defined, the model
is improved, and then more refined decision alternatives can be generated.
All of these improvements lead to better information for the decision-
maker; this is the purpose of systems analysis.
As the analysts grew more experienced, they began to include national
policy and strategy in their analysis, and policy and strategy became topics
for special study. This led to higher level systems analysis (or policy
analysis): determining the role of space systems in national defense; or
comparing policies of military superiority vs. military parity with the
Soviet Union. The mix of forces needed, as related to their defense functions,
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e.g., strategic forces vs. general purpose forces vs. airlift-sealift,
etc., has probably been the most intensively analyzed example of policy-
oriented systems analysis. Policy analysis is analysis of a complex
-topic,—deal-ing—w-i-t-h—r-i-s-k-r-une-eF-ta-in-t-y-y—techno logical— change~and-polrtical
forces.
One of the most ambitious efforts to introduce analysis into govern-
mental decision-making is also called issue analysis. This procedure
is an adaptation of systems analysis developed for New York City, with in-
tensive treatment of the legal and political constraints usually facing
local government officials.
Application of these techniques outside aerospace and defense is
particularly difficult. The objectives are harder to identify than in
aerospace, and it may be almost impossible to get agreement on them
because of different values and perceptions of social needs. Typical
analysis topics like big city housing, criminal justice systems, and
environmental protection, all stimulate the imagination on the harrowing
arguments inevitable in sorting out the specific objectives to be ach-
ieved in solving these problems. This pushes policy analysts toward
working with alternative sets of objectives in addition to alternative
means to achieve each set of objectives.
A major defense-sponsored systems analysis study, published in 1971,
has direct application to civilian public services at the state and local
level. This is the systems analysis of a new generation of military
hospitals, sponsored by the Office of Defense Research and Engineering
and conducted jointly by Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Arthur D.
Little. The systems analysts have investigated the complex system of
health care delivery and have proposed significant innovations in facilities
and services which improve the quality of health care provided.
One of the best known applications of systems analysis outside aero-
space is PPBS (planning-programming-budgeting systems) which will be dis-
cussed in the remainder of this section. A subsequent section briefly
describes cost-effectiveness analysis—a crucial component of most systems
analyses.
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The aerospace/defense experience in choosing among alternative
policies and allocating resources to carry out specific governmental
functions or activities offers the hope of better management than the
traditional organization-by-organization or unit-by-unit policy-making
and budgeting. This hope is reflected in the Planning-Programming-
Budgeting System (PPBS) which is being adapted and modified for Federal,
state, and local government operations throughout the world.
The PPB system was first established in the Department of Defense
in 1961, and the President pushed it into most other Federal executive
departments in 1965. Adoption by other governmental agencies has pro-
gressed sporadically since then. The systems integrates three activities:
control, management efficiency (through evaluation), and planning. The
addition of the systems-oriented evaluation and planning to the tradi-
tional control function of budgeting makes a more powerful management
tool—particularly in the public sector.*
4
As used in the non-defense Federal agencies, Jack W. Carlson
identifies five basic elements:
(1) Program structure—a group of agency activities
(program categories) contributing to a common ob-
jective. For instance, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare categories in Fiscal 1970
are Education, Health, Social and Rehabilitation
Services, Income Maintenance, and Executive Direction
and Management. The efforts (subcategories) lumped
under Health are: development of health resources,
prevention and control of health problems, provision
of health services, and general support for these
efforts. The subcategories would be further broken
down into detailed elements; the program category,
the subcategories, and the elements are the basis
for budget decisions and fund allocations.
(2) Issue letter--definition of major issue which--an
agency is requested to analyze. These are originated
by the Budget Director, after negotiation with the
agency, and are chosen to focus analytic resources
on issues important to both the agency and the chief
executive.
*This is described by Hitch: "Moreover, in contrast to the private
sector, where competition provides an incentive for efficiency, efficiency
in government depends on the conscious and deliberate selection of tech-
niques and policies. And wherever the relevant factors are diverse and
complex, . . . unaided intuition is incapable of weighing them and reaching
a sound decision." Charles J. Hitch, Decisions for Defense. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1965), p. 28.
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(3) Program memorandum—summarizes major decisions made
by an agency on the primary issues in a program cate-
gory, and justifies the decisions. It notes related
analysis, identifies the alternatives considered, and
explicitly states the assumptions underlying the
decisions.
(4) Special analytic studies—almost any analysis. Some
may be done in advance of need, many are done on questions
which must be decided during current planning.
(5) Program and financial plan—these lay out for the next
five years the funds committed to various program areas
(including those committed by past decisions), and the
outputs or accomplishments expected to result from this
spending. This is the basis for implementing the plan-
ning; for using the one means, chosen from the alterna-
tives, for reaching the objectives. The plan also trans-
lates the program budget (oriented toward achieving ob-
jectives) into the format preferred by Congress (oriented
toward offices and agencies).
The annual revision of the program and financial plan faces the
decision-makers with questions of "How did we do?" and "Did we get our
money's worth?" It also offers incentive to raise the key planning
questions: "Should we do something differently?" and "What might happen
if we did?"
PPB has pushed the use of quantitative analysis, and has also en-
couraged more precise qualitative analysis, in parts of government. On
the other hand, it has not been easily put to use; it has been hard to
find analysts, and the planning activities often have been weak.
Unfortunately, little public interest is manifested in improving most
governmental services. Resources are usually more readily available for
increasing the level of current operations than for changing the nature and
improving the quality of operations. This may change as PPB or related
systems are used, as more competent analysts are trained or hired, or as
sound analyses are made known to the public, if all of these potential
results of PPB can acquaint the public with comparisons of what they are
getting for their tax dollar vs. what they might get.
A further discussion of applications of PPBS is found in Chapters
III and IV.,
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COST/EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
"Which is the best, among the alternatives?" is a basic question when
making choices in a systems analysis context. Cost/benefit calculations
have been used for several decades to compare the returns offered by
different proposed investments. The costs of the resources required are
related to the market value of the flow of benefits expected.
In comparing the kill-capability of alternative fighter aircraft
designs, or the relative merit of alternative population control programs,
however, this technique is hard to use. These investments and expendi-
tures really don't fit the cost/benefit framework because the outcomes
can't be measured in dollar terms. In such cases, cost/'effectiveness
comparisons are more useful. This latter technique has been developed
during the systems era, and its measurement concept may be best for com-
paring policies or programs furnishing many governmental or social ser-
vices.
Effectiveness, then, becomes a key variable to be measured. L. D.
Attaway relates it to the systems analysis process in a series of definitions:
Objective: What we desire to achieve
Alternatives: Competitive means for achieving
the goal
Costs: Expenditures to acquire each al-
ternative
Effectiveness Scale indicating degree of
Scale: achievement of goal
Effectiveness: Position on effectiveness scale
assigned to each alternative (by
measurement)
Criterion: Statement about cost and effec-
tiveness which determines choice.
He goes on to describe several scales of effectiveness for designing
an interceptor force for air defense of the United States, including the
probability of a bomber kill per interceptor attempt, average number of
kills per interceptor sortie, number of U. S. survivors in a complete air
defense campaign, etc. Obviously, estimates of such outcomes depend on
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various contingencies, and the contingencies become variables, too. There-
fore, cost and effectiveness must be calculated for each of a set of con-
tingencies .
Such non-market-value measures of output or effectiveness are used
in other areas of analysis besides aerospace. Seidman describes different
levels of effectiveness measurement for family planning programs: percent
of unwed and high risk (by age and family size) mothers enrolled; continua-
tion rates (in the program); births averted (difference between predicted
vs. actual births in target area); expected increase of educational level
of mothers due to avoidance of premature pregnancy.
In each case, effectiveness is measured by the extent to which the
objectives can be achieved by a given system (or program). There are
usually several effectiveness scales (as in the examples above), and they
may be arrayed together to help choose among the competing alternatives.
Cost/effectiveness analysis techniques, thus provide a useful structure
for evaluation of programs which combine social and economic goals. For
example, the technique has been used to evaluate government manpower
training programs in New Haven. Other analysts have applied cost/
effectiveness techniques to such complex topics as child health care and
artificial kidney systems.
NASA and its contractors have used cost/effectiveness analysis ex-
tensively in the space program to select launch vehicles and unmanned
probes for space exploration. The process involves selection among
possible space missions that will gather data on the solar system, and
subsequent trade-off decisions involving instrumentation parameters
(weight, reliability, and accuracy vs. cost), trajectory parameters
(flight time, energy requirements), and vehicle parameters (payload
weight, reliability and booster cost).
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DECISION ANALYSIS (OPERATIONS RESEARCH)
The terms decision analysis, applied decision theory, and operations
research are used somewhat interchangeably. They describe not merely
a technique but a major area of management--probably the most revolu-
tionary advance in management practice in many years. Accordingly,
some explanation seems necessary for treating a major management area
as a single entry in a chapter devoted to management techniques. This
is done because our purpose is to provide only a brief overview and an
appreciation of the power and effectiveness of decision analysis tech-
niques. An adequate explanation of a field so complex and growing so
rapidly is far beyond the scope of this study.
Operations research (the original term) is generally agreed to
have originated in World War II, among British scientists mobilized in
interdisciplinary teams to solve military problems frequently unrelated
to a single academic specialty. 0. R. techniques soon spread to the U. S.
The Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group was formed in 1942 at
Columbia University, and both the U. S. Navy and Army Air Corps became
enthusiastic users of operations research. Some of the wartime 0. R.
organizations still function as adjuncts to the military services, and
several new military 0. R. groups have been formed. After the war,
the techniques of 0. R. were soon applied to non-military problems, and
the 0. R. concepts have grown steadily more sophisticated as they have
spread through many sectors of the economy.
Decision analysis (the term chosen here) uses a variety of scientific,
mathematical, or logical means in an attempt to use rationality (rather
than instinct) to solve problems facing a manager. Managerial problems
basically are decision problems, so decision analysis affects the full
scope of managerial functions. Basically, decision analysis provides a
structure, and tools, for the thinking process needed to reach a rational
decision.
The problem-solving process begins with an objective, which is
identified and chosen (perhaps from a group of conflicting objectives) by
the manager or his superior. Once the objective is established, the
various possible problem outcomes are determined and arranged according to
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some measure of utility.
Next, the problem is analyzed to determine all the variables which
may affect the outcomes. Those variables which are beyond the control of
the manager (e.g., weather conditions, competitor's actions) are termed
states of nature. Those variables which are within the manager's control
(e.g., actions he can take, including the decision to do nothing) are
termed strategies. Next, through analysis (or perhaps by trial or simulation),
the outcome which will result from all possible combinations of strategy
and states of nature are determined. The manager's measure of utility
(termed payoff measure*) for each outcome is then associated with each
combination of strategy and state of nature.
At this point, some technique of decision analysis is used to help
the manager select the strategy most likely to result in the outcome with
the most desirable payoff measure. Reference 12 describes one useful tech-
nique: the decision tree.
4
Decision analysis can help the manager in four distinct ways:
1. When the manager does not know the important
variables affecting the decision, decision
analysis techniques can help him discover
them;
2. When the manager knows the important variables
but does not know how to relate them to each
other, to the outcome, and to the payoff measure,
the necessary problem-solving method can many
times be provided through use of decision analysis
techniques;
3. When large numbers of strategic possibilities and
states of nature exist, too large for a rational
search for the best solution, they can be handled
through the mathematical representation used in
techniques of decision analysis;
4. When the manager cannot possibly search the in-
numerable payoff measures in order to apply his
decision criterion, mathematical methods can
frequently be devised to do this for him.
Decision Making. Under Certainty
One of the three categories of decision problems a manager can face
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involves certainty (i.e., he knows what the state of nature will be, or
what his competitor's strategy will be). The decision can be made simply
in theory, though not always in practice: select the strategy which pro-
vides the largest payoff measure in terms of the manager's objective.
The difficulty arises when the number of possible strategies (and thus
of outcomes) is so vast as to make conventional calculation impossible.
For example: determining the least-mileage routing for a salesman who
must visit all 50 state capitals in a single trip; or scheduling several
production jobs in a machine shop having several machines of different
speeds and operating costs, to achieve a minimum total cost yet meet
delivery commitments. Problems of this type can be solved satisfactorily,
although not always perfectly, using techniques of decision analysis such
as linear programming.
Decision Making Under Risk
Another category of decision problems involves risk (i.e., the states
of nature or competitors' strategies are not known, but can be predicted
according to probability theory). Given knowledge of the probabilities,
decision analysis calculations can establish a predicted outcome—one which
weighs all probabilities and determines a composite "expected value" on which
to base a strategy selection. Decision problems of this type occur
frequently.
Typically, the probabilities are determined on the basis of past
experience ("objective probability"). If records are maintained of
past states of nature or of competitors' strategies selected, and if the
process is considered stable (i.e., if the future experience is expected
to be similar to the past), the expected future probabilities can be
readily determined. However, even if no past experience is available, the
decision analysis techniques can usefully be applied. Here, estimates
of risks should be made based on general knowledge of the problem, and
by. comparison to somewhat similar problems for which experience is
known. These "subjective probabilities" are nearly always a better
basis for decisions than ignoring entirely the probabilities of states
of nature or competitive strategies.
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The concept of risk analysis is a useful adjunct to probability theory
in decision analysis. This technique permits a manager to understand the
ranges of possible gain and loss from a proposed action, and to avoid
actions which may lead to disastrous outcomes even where the predicted
(probable) outcome is favorable.
Decision Making Under Uncertainty
The third category of decision problems involves uncertainty (i.e.,
when it is not possible to estimate, even subjectively, the probabilities
of states of nature or competitive strategies). That is, the range of
possible outcomes is known but not the likelihood of their occurrence.
In this case, the decision-maker selects a strategy based on one of
several criteria he chooses as most appropriate:
° The Laplace criterion (lacking any definite
knowledge, assume that one outcome is as
likely as any other);
0
 The criterion of optimism, or maximax (ex-
pecting to be lucky enough to get the best
payoff from any strategy, choose the strategy
for which the best payoff is largest);
° The criterion of pessimism, or maximin (ex-
pecting to be unlucky enough to get the worst
payoff from any strategy, choose the strategy
for which the worst payoff is largest);
o The criterion of regret, or minimax regret
(knowing that we may not choose the best
strategy and will thus regret that the pay-
off is not as large as it might have been
had we chosen the best, select the strategy
that will minimize the amount of regret re-
gardless of state of nature. That is, choose
a strategy having the minimum difference be-
tween its payoff and the best possible pay-
off from any other strategy, for any state of
nature.)
Decision Making Involving Rational Opponents
The decision analysis process described above applies to problems
in which the manager's decision has no effect on the state of nature nor
on the competitors' strategy. That is, there is no interaction between
the decision selected and the conditions of nature which will affect the
outcome. A valuable extension of decision analysis involves
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situations where the manager confronts a rational opponent, perhaps a
business competitor, who consciously acts to frustrate the manager. This
interactive decision process, involving strategy and counterstrategy,
is known as game theory.*
The major applications of game theory have been made in military
analysis, either by aerospace contractors such as the RAND Corporation
and Institute for Defense Analyses, or by the Department of Defense it-
self. Howeverj there are notable exceptions. Ref. 1 (pp. 257-58)
mentions applications of game theory "to analyze problems of bidding
policy, advertising allocation, purchasing, capital budgeting, choice
among alternative new products, research strategy, production scheduling
(in the light of uncertain demand), and setting prices." Ref. 1 also
describes the use of game theory by the Boeing Airplane Company to
set prices for the first commercial jet transports, in competition with
the Douglas Aircraft Company.
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HEURISTICS
The word heuristic is an unfamiliar term for a familiar concept. It
is used to designate techniques which simplify the effort of solving re-
petitive problems. We often use the term "rule of thumb" to describe
heuristics used in everyday life or in business. An example is the pro-
cedural rule, "Accept customer checks under $50 but obtain managerial
approval on checks of $50 or more," used to simplify credit decisions.
Another example is "Use the oldest stock first," to simplify inventory
management. These procedural rules are based both on intuitive judgment
and on experience. They do not always provide the best solution to
every problem--rarely would a simple rule do that—but they do provide
a satisfactory solution to most problems. You score much higher than by
chance, by using a sound rule of thumb to aid problem-solving.
In modern management thought, heuristics refers to the use of a
combination of simplifying rules to aid in the solution of highly com-
plex decision-making problems. Precise solutions to these problems in-
volve the elaborate statistical techniques of operations research and
decision theory, normally requiring the use of an electronic computer.
Yet, certain complex decision problems cannot be solved efficiently even
with these sophisticated tools if they are of two types:
1. Problems which are too large to process. Certain problems
of resource allocation may involve millions of possible solutions. One
example is the problem of scheduling production in a large "job shop"
with many types of milling machines, drill presses, etc. In selecting
the most efficient sequence of production, the computer would test, in
turn, each of the million or more possibilities to find the production
plan which minimized cost, machine "down time," operator set-up time,
etc. But to do so would probably require more expensive computer time
than the information is worth. Also, it could require so long to dis-
cover the best solution that the information would be obsolete.
A practical way to solve the problem is to simplify it by making
some heuristic assumptions: "Put all production runs of under 50 units
on the least efficient drill press;" Run the closest-tolerance items
on the tape-controlled milling machine." By making these fairly logical
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decisions, the otherwise cumbersome machine allocation problem is greatly
simplified. The resulting problem can be processed quickly on a computer
according to an optimization goal such as "minimize machine set-up costs."
Thus the use of heuristics is a trade-off. By settling for a satisfactory
solution rather than insisting on the absolutely ideal solution, the
problem becomes conveniently workable. And usually a much better solution
can be obtained than would be true if no computer solution had been
attempted.
2. Problems which are difficult or impossible to express in
mathematical terms. Often problems of management involved qualitative
values rather than quantitative values. Numerous examples occur in the
area of human safety. For example, a manufacturer's decision to install
safety equipment is not based on an assumed quantitative value of human
life, but instead on a qualitative respect for human safety. In the
complex interrelationship of contingent decisions which underlie aerospace
program planning, certain key values override the general rule of "least
time" or "least cost." Such decisions are made heuristically by applying
qualitative value-oriented decision rules. The remaining decisions, however,
can be made on quantitative grounds. These ill-structured problems are
truly solvable only by developing computer programs that simulate the
processes of the human mind. A human considering a chain of contingent .:
decisions may decide between A and B quantitative (lowest cost) grounds.
Then he may choose between Al and A2 on grounds of other values (A2 is not
ethical). Then between Ala and Alb on quantitative grounds again (greatest
probability of profit).
The simulation of thought processes through use of the computer is
called "artificial intelligence." It involves the combination of quan-
titative statistical techniques with judgment-oriented heuristics. By
adapting it for computer application, the process becomes extremely useful
to managers in all fields who have the organizational resources to utilize
computers and management planning staffs. Even managers who do not have
internal resources may find it desirable to employ outside consultants
occasionally to process solutions to complex, recurring problems, to
establish efficient operating patterns.
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Heuristics (in its present sophisticated meaning) began to be mentioned
in management literature during the late 1950's. Heuristic programming
was used at least by 1958 in the RAND Corporation to solve highly complex
operations research problems connected with its work for the Air Force,
Department of Defense and NASA. These included research on Strategic Air
Command operational effectiveness and use in designing a space rescue
capability for the manned space program.
Other aerospace sector applications include the following:
a. A heuristic model (see Ref. 5 below) was used in a
space vehicle development project to establish a
manpower loading schedule. This schedule replaced
a conventional PERT-type schedule which called for
heavy manpower loading at the start of the project,
then manpower reductions and layoffs. The heuristic
model, designed to balance manpower allocations more
evenly through the life of the space vehicle program,
reduced peak manpower requirements considerably while
shortening total schedule time by five months.
b. In the air transportation industry, heuristic pro-
grams have been shown suitable for simplifying the
preparation of airline schedules, satisfactorily
balancing passenger demand, equipment availability
and service needs, CAB regulations, effects of
competitors' schedules, etc.
c. A heuristic computer program developed at the
University of Southern California forecasts the
corrective maintenance workload for electronic
equipment, based on its design configuration.
The program permits aerospace managers to plan
manpower needed for maintenance tasks, even before
production occurs.
Heuristic programs have been applied successfully to a wide variety
of complex management decision-making problems both within and outside
the aerospace industry. Applications have included: job-shop pro-
duction scheduling; balancing work loads at each work station of an
assembly line; controlling inventories to minimize total costs; selecting
warehouse locations; determining the most efficient layout for equipment
in a factory; designing "custom-made" products from standard components;
scheduling large construction or development projects (in connection
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with PERT/CPM, see pp.148-151); and even the selection of optimum stock
portfolios, simulating the human judgment (decision rules) of a trained
investor.
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SIMULATION AND MODELING
Simulation—the development of and experimentation with a model
which represents a real situation--is a powerful management tool used
to solve problems or to improve understanding of reality. Although
physical reality can be modeled, the most common application to manage-
ment involves a computer model which simulates a management system.
Simulation is particularly useful for the solution of problems of
systems design and systems analysis, when the systems under consideration
cannot be analyzed using direct or formal analytical methods.
Models can vary widely in their form and purpose, from children's
toys (which visually represent a real object) to mathematical models
(which abstractly portray the behavior of a system under varying
conditions). Even line graphs and profit and loss statements are
forms of models used by managers. Generally, models involve
simplifications of reality which nevertheless adequately portray one
or more important features of the real object or system.
Predictive Models
The computer simulation models used in management systems analysis
are predictive models which determine the performance of the real
system when subjected to various stimuli, or when changes are made in
certain aspects of the system. Typically, the predictive management
model determines variations in operating performance or output
corresponding to variations in resource cost or input.
The use of predictive models to simulate military operations (war
gaming) is over 100 years old, and more primitive models were used in
antiquity. Major advances were made in military simulation when digi-
tal computers came into use after World War II, and elaborate
simulations have been used by the Department of Defense and its research
contractors to establish military strategy and to efficiently manage
military operations. In logistics policy research conducted for the
U. S. Air Force, The RAND Corporation conducted two major simulations:
one to compare the current system for procurement and distribution of all
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Air Force equipment with a proposed system involving changed policies;
the second to develop and evaluate alternative policies for logistics
support of the intercontinental .ballistic missile system, based on new
operational policies.
Some of the NASA applications to management simulation have included
the designing and scheduling of complex space missions, probabilistic
long-range planning for resource requirements, and cost estimating and
control.
The many publications on simulation using predictive models indi-
cate a great variety of applications in business and government. They
include applications in planning of products and services, resource
allocation, operations scheduling, marketing, and many more. Simulation
is particularly valuable in testing the impact of new policies to
determine the possibility of undesirable results. The behavior of
decision-makers in complex organizations has been simulated in predictive
models, permitting experimentation with many variations of policy. ' ' ' '
Training Models
War games have been used to train military officers for many years,
and simulation devices (e.g., the Link Trainer) were used for pilot and
other training during World War II. Present astronaut training relies
heavily on simulation because of the obvious difficulty of providing
actual experience. The use of simulation in management training, however,
is relatively recent. The American Management Association's Top Manage-
ment Decision Simulation (1957) and other games which have been developed
since then have been used to give managers involvement in a decision
making process which simulates the experiences of a real management en-
vironment. Such games promote a sense of emotional involvement by the
manager and lead to a better understanding of the many factors which
affect the outcome of a certain decision. Interactive games, in which
managers compete with each other, are particularly useful in training
managers in the decision-making skills faced in competitive market
situations. ' Games furthermore stimulate an appreciation of the need
for good long-term planning, and of the need for better information on
69
which to base decisions.
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center has developed GREMEX, a computer-
based management simulation game designed to provide experience in R § D
project decision making from a management rather than a technological
perspective. The players take the role of aerospace project managers,
charged with making the management decisions which influence the cost,
schedule, and performance outcomes of a hypothetical space satellite
program. Each player has the opportunity to test his management judgment
at small risk, thus gaining experience which can make him a better manager
in real life, whether managing an aerospace program or another type of
development project involving the uncertainties of contract administration.
Information describing GREMEX is available from Goddard.
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CHAPTER VII
TECHNIQUES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL PLANNING
TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING
Technological prophecy, related to aerospace, dates back to Greek
mythology where the legend of Icarus' flight too close to the sun drama-
tized the critical temperature problems of airframe materials. More
detailed prophecies continued up to the time of manned flight, but with
little improvement in scope or reliability.
Technological .forecasting, as a less intuitive but more disciplined
effort, was given major impetus during World War II as the U. S. Army
Air Forces (later USAF) began planning for the future. In 1944, Toward
jtetv Horizons was publi_sh^d_by__yon_Karman_and_other.S-._relating—expected
technological capabilities to future Air Force roles.
In the next two decades the Air Force (and the Army and the Navy)
pursued technological forecasting programs. These were oriented toward
threat analysis--what will be the enemy's technology capabilities in 19XX?--
and toward R $ D resource allocation.
The latter use has become important in solving the problems of gap-
bridging: what gaps between present technological capabilities and future
needs are most critical, and which R § D programs need support to solve
the priority problems? For example, if a certain thrust-to-weight ratio
in a jet engine is needed in 1980, and if achieving this ratio depends on
increased combustion temperatures, can existing alloys be used for turbine
blades in such temperatures? If not, research funds must be allocated to
developing new blade materials (or toward alternative propulsion systems).
Most of the military forecasts are classified, but some of the method-
ology is openly described. These may be useful both to those interested
in technological change (e.g., new product planners) and to others interested
in economic, social, or environmental forecasting and planning. Two of
the aerospace-augmented techniques offering such possibilities are trend
extrapolation and Delphi, which are further described below.
Trend Extrapolation
Extrapolation of indexes of productivity of materials or systems is
probably the commonest form of technological forecasting. This can be a
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useful method where the subject technology usually advances incrementally
rather than in grand breakthroughs. In these cases, accumulating progress
often comes at a geometric rate; thus, fairly consistent growth in tech-
nological capability can be anticipated and extrapolated. However, natural
(or social) limits to progress may interfere and should be identified.
Also, there is a possibility of unexpected discontinuity which impairs
confidence.
The crucial choices for effective forecasting include selection of
the index of productivity and the correct units of measurement of produc-
tivity. Examples of productivity indexes may include watt-hours per pound
for batteries, or watt-hours per cubic inch; for computers, capacity over
add time; critical temperatures of refractory alloys; for transport aircraft,
passenger miles per day; etc.
Trend extrapolation is well explained by Ayres in his book and in an
2
article in the Bright book. These references also deal with other tech-
niques such as morphological analysis and relevance trees, heuristic fore-
casting, and the application of forecasting methodology. All of these
methodologies are useful in such planning and analytical tools as scenario
writing and gaming.
Trend extrapolation and Delphi (described next) also offer tools for
forecasting economic and social change, and may be useful in anticipating
changes in the social and managerial environment.
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DELPHI
Forecasting of technology (and other streams of action depending on
human decisions) inevitably depends on human, anticipations of human actions--
intuition, in a word--as well as informed judgments on what is likely.
Delphi is a method, first attempted at RAND and subsequently developed
there and elsewhere, for soliciting informed judgments on such topics as
what will happen and when in the stream of events it will happen. As
applied to technological forecasting, it is most often applied in developing
consensus on major technological events and their timing.
Delphi is essentially the repeated interrogation of respondents
_(usual.ly__identified_as_l!-experts—)—on—t-hei-r—ex-pe e-t-at-ions-or-under stand ing ST
They are queried separately, to avoid bandwagon effects or authority biases.
The median or distribution of responses is then fed back to the respondents,
who may alter their judgment or repeat it. In some cases, justification
statements are sought for deviant opinions, and these also are fed back
to the panel as further stimuli for reexamining the original judgments of .
the individual respondents. Finally, the estimates are stated in the form
of a consensus judgment.
The use of Delphi avoids some common problems of group decision-making
(as with a committee or special task force). The technique eliminates
judgments based on "he who shouts the loudest," and it eliminates the inhibi-
tions faced by group members of lesser rank or lesser reputation. Further,
it allows members of the group to gracefully abandon earlier judgments
without the need to reverse opinions publicly expressed during face-to-face
debate.
While much of the work with Delphi has been experimental, the results
of the experiments show considerable promise. Dalkey (a co-inventor of the
technique) has found in experiments with college groups that the group
opinion improves after Delphi iteration whereas the consensus becomes less
Q
accurate if group discussion is allowed.
Delphi has been used predominantly within aerospace thus far; the
U. S. Air Force funds RAND's research and has conducted experiments of
9 1 1its own. The Air Force Systems Command ' and Office of Scientific
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Research have conducted pilot studies of social and technological fore-
casts. Dalkey has planned a series of experiments applying Delphi to
Q
value judgments.
Other efforts are underway to identify impacts of future technological
events. TRW has used the technique for planning R § D strategies and for
4identifying new product opportunities. Delphi also has been adapted to
such business-related matters as the impact of increased leisure time on
industrial product lines.
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SYSTEMS ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT
The origins of systems engineering have been traced variously to
RAND's work in systems analysis for the Air Force, to RCA's work in tele-
vision, and to Bell Telephone Laboratories' work on^a nation-wide microwave
radio system. The systems engineering concept, while hard to define
because of its complexity, has become the accepted way to attack major
aerospace systems development programs.
As a philosophic extension of systems analysis, the concept of systems
engineering is just as applicable as is systems analysis to the design and
engineering of complex systems outside aerospace. However, the prospective
adopter of systems engineering should be cautioned early that there are
important practical barriers, largely economic, to the transferability of
the formal systems engineering technique. Formal systems engineering
8 9
management requires substantial technical resources and expertise. '
Definitions
Systems engineering can be defined as:
A cyclic and iterative process applied to integrate activ-
ities directed towards definition, design, and evaluation
of a system.
A system is an assembly of interacting elements
designed to carry out jointly a predetermined
function.
The function to be performed is based on
a set of objectives—with measures of
performance defined related directly to
these objectives.
A definition of systems engineering management, i.e., management of
the systems engineering process, based on one given by the Department of
Defense,* is:
* Early draft of MIL-STD-499, "System Engineering Management,"
Department of Defense, 10 September 1965.
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The integrated application of scientific, engineering
and management techniques through an iterative process
of analysis of requirements, synthesis of solutions,
evaluation of alternatives and decision-making to:
a. Transform ah operational need into a descrip-
tion of a complete system in terms of required
performance parameters and a technical approach.
This is the System Definition function. It pro-
vides the product elements of the work to be
performed and the basis for technical perform-
ance measurement.
b. Construct the technical program requirements
based on the system performance parameters and
the—t-eehn-iea-1- approach-;—Th rs~ rs-the~TechTFiclil
Program Definition function. It provides the
task elements of the work to be performed and
the basis for schedule and cost performance
measurement.
c. Monitor and evaluate the progress of the planned
technical program, adjusting system and techni-
cal program requirements as necessary. This
couples technical performance measurement with
system and technical program redefinition as
required.
This process is illustrated in Figure 6.
Applicability
Because of the resource investment required, the primary question
for managers and administrators considering a formal systems engineering
effort is: when is it applicable? The Air Force requires systems engi-
neering on all programs for which a formal contract definition phase is
applicable (i.e., programs having a cumulative R § D cost of $25 million
or a total production cost of $100 million*) but notes that the systems
engineering procedures can be readily adapted to benefit programs of lesser
9
scope.
Systems engineering principles also can be usefully applied to problem
solving even where a true systems engineering effort is inappropriate. For
* DOD Directive 3200.9, 1 July 1965.
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SYSTEM
DEFINITION
T
PROGRAM
DEFINITION
What are the technical
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the requirements-i.e.,
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L_
T What tasks must becompleted to accomplish
the program
When and how are the
tasks to be performed
MONITOR
EVALUATE
Technical performance
measurements
0
 Schedule and cost
performance
measurements
SYSTEM OR PROGRAM
REDEFINITION
(AS REQUIRED)
_J
Figure 6. Systems Engineering Management Functions
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example, Air Force systems engineering principles can be applied to the
development of software (computer programs and related data) for elec-
tronic systems.
Steps in the Systems Engineering Process
A systems engineer in the Department of Defense describes the concept
of systems engineering as a methodology to solve complex problems — a method-
ology involving the following steps:
1. Statement of the problem to be solved.
2^ Establishment of quantitative objectives_in_o,T.der
of importance.
3. Identification and quantitative description of all
significant elements (subsystems) and their inter-
relationships (interfaces)--e.g., the important
technical, legal, contractual, organizational,
social, and political parts of the system and their
effects on each other and on the objectives.
4. Design of the system, including the tradeoffs among
the competing characteristics of the system, subsystems
and interfaces.
5. Detailed design, construction, and test of the
subsystems.
6. Integration, test, and evaluation of the system.
These steps are iterative and cyclic. In other words, to carry
out any single step it may be necessary to backtrack, modify
the preceding steps, and then proceed forward again. Moreover,
system evaluation may lead to establishment of a new set of
objectives for a better over-all solution to the problem.
A systems engineer at General Electric has elaborated on the logic of
the systems engineering process, as involving phases of reasoning activity:
translation, analysis, trade-off, and synthesis. These phases are explained
in modified form below:
1. Define the problem--the mission; the environment;
constraints (time, budget, performance standards,
policy); and measures of effectiveness of the solution.
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2. Translation--Determine the functions and the
functional requirements to satisfy the mission
requirements.
3. Analysis—Analyze candidate approaches for attain-
ing the functional requirements within constraint
limits.
4. Trade-off--Perform trade-off studies applying
decision criteria to select the optimum approach.
5. Synthesis--Integrate all elements of the selected
approach into a final system, program, or solution
to the problem.
Usefulness of Systems Engineering
In a world of growing complexity, systems engineering management
appears to be an increasingly necessary part of development programs, to
assure subsystem combinations that balance and mesh, and to accomplish
physical system integration.
Some measure of the potential usefulness and scope of the systems
engineering concept can be obtained by listing subjects of some recent
study projects used (at Stanford-NASA Ames and at M.I.T.) to provide
training in the systems engineering concept. All of these studies are
based on existing technology:
° A metropolitan air transit system for commuter
travel in the San Francisco bay area.12
0
 A high-speed (350 mph) ground transportation system
in the Northeastern Corridor of the U. S., using
air-supported, electrically propelled vehicles.13
° An urban transit system using fully automated
moving roadways to transport vehicles, with traffic
patterns controlled by a master computer.14
° An all-purpose orbital shuttle spacecraft capable
of performing many space missions, including astro-
naut rescue.IS
o Elimination of an asteroid threatening the earth,
by interception with spacecraft armed with hydrogen
bombs.I6
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RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Reliability analysis is a technique—or more accurately a group of re-
lated techniques of management and of engineering—to promote the concept
of reliability. And reliability, as a concept applied to any system or
product, means the identification and correction of failure risks so
that the system or product:
° Functions without failure for a specified time period.
o Operates within established performance limits.
Reliability is not limited to physical products, although nearly all
books and articles on reliability concentrate on engineering and manufac-
turing aspects. The concept of reliability can and should_.be_app.l.ie.d_a 1 so_
to the furnishing of services, which makes the techniques of reliability
analysis important to public administrators and to managers of service
businesses.
As a concept, reliability is related both to quality and to main-
tainability, though these terms have quite distinct meanings. Some
definitions are needed to clarify these terms:
Design Quality—the specifications of the product designer as
to physical and performance characteristics. These include
characteristics such as speed, power, and appearance.
Product Quality—the degree to which the designer's product
specifications are met, or achieved, during production.
Quality control (or quality assurance) is intended to
achieve production quality, not design quality.
Availability--the degree to which the product exists in
operating condition. Availability is dependent both on
reliability (mean—i.e., average—time between failures) and
on maintainability (mean time between repairs). A product
is considered "available" if it has not failed, and is not
undergoing repair or maintenance (scheduled or unscheduled).
The physical performance of a product is, therefore, determined by a
combination of design quality and production quality—the designer's
intention, as modified by the manufacturer's ability to achieve the
intended characteristics of performance during the process of production.
*Quality Assurance is described in pp. 162-167, and Maintainability
Analysis in pp. 92-96.
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The availability of a product (which can be thought of as the opposite
of "downtime") is primarily a function of its design, for both reliability
and maintainability must be considered in the early conceptual stages of
the design process. Generally, the performance characteristics of the
product are intimately related to the availability characteristics, and
these must be balanced and conceived together.
The Significance of Reliability
The reliability requirement is a powerful spur to technological pro-
gress. A knowledgeable aerospace reliability engineer* pointed out that
two major technological achievements of the last 15 years can be traced
to the impetus of reliability: the modern, transistor-based electron
industry and automated electronics parts production lines.
During the development of the Minuteman, a second-generation inter-
continental missile, Boeing and Autonetics engineers found that the ex-
tremely high systems reliability requirement simply could not be met
because the best parts then available introduced too great a failure risk
into the complex system. To correct this dilemma, the Minuteman Parts
Improvement Program was begun. Suppliers (including Transitron and Texas
Instruments) were asked to develop better electronics components that, would
perform much more reliably than any existing components would. Industry's
response was the development of an array of highly reliable electronic
parts, including improvements to such elemental items as capacitors and
resistors. The concurrent advent of the lightweight, compact transistor
led to its consideration and use as a superior replacement for the vacuum
tube. In subsequent NASA- and Defense-sponsored programs, these semi-
conductor devices were developed to yield long lifetime reliability coupled
with light weight and compact volume. Today's modern electronics industry
owes its compact solid-state circuitry to these government programs.
* Mr. Arnold A. Rothstein of Martin-Marietta, Chairman of the
Reliability .Division of the American Society for Quality Control, to whom
we are indebted for these examples.
86
Aerospace reliability analysis also contributed significantly to the
availability of modern-day electronic consumer products, as the following
illustration shows.
Although transistors were generally reliable, there were individual
differences in their performance characteristics which were incompatible
with the special needs of government aerospace programs. Texas Instruments
developed automatic?testing equipment which screened and graded all tran-
sistors into a range of performance categories, with specially'screened
items reserved for Minuteman use or for NASA's Hi-Rel (High Reliability)
Program. Automatic testing brought reliability to the concept of automated
-product ion^ l'ines—which-have~become~the~basrs~for~ma"ss^ produceci—r'ad'io
and television receivers, and other consumer electronics.
The Nature of Reliability
Reliability is a concept based on probability, because the occurrence
of failures can be determined (or assumed) to follow one of two statistical
probability distributions: the normal distribution (true of failures
caused by wearing out of critical components, thus primarily applied to
mechanical parts) or the exponential distribution (true of failures
which occur at random over operating life rather than through fatigue,
thus principally applicable to electronic parts and equipment).
A major cause of low reliability is system complexity. Although
designers seek simplicity whenever possible, their efforts to improve the
performance of a system frequently result in an unavoidable increase in the
quantity and complexity of components. If a system is 90 percent reliable,
doubling its complexity will reduce reliability by the square of the simple
reliability coefficient, or 81 percent. Tripling complexity reduces
reliability to (.90) or 73 percent.
Achieving Reliability
There are three possible positive actions to increase reliability:
eliminate mode of the failure and hence its effect; reduce the effect; or
accept the failure effect with knowledge of its risk.
One obvious way to increase reliability is to simplify systems--
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reduce the number of components. Another solution is to increase reli-
ability of the components or subsystems at a rate greater than the growth
rate of complexity. The increase in reliability can be achieved by:
(1) improved quality or selection of components; (2) derating, or operating
components below the maximum performance levels for which they are de-
signed; and (3) improving their operating environment.
Special design techniques also can increase reliability. One obvious
design technique is the reduction of the quantity of linked components
which operate in series, since any failure of a component causes system
failure. The use of redundant systems, such as parallel electronic
circuits, can markedly improve reliability. If a single subsystem has a
reliability of 0.9, adding a duplicate parallel subsystem increases
overall system reliability to 0.99, and a third parallel system increases
it to 0.999. However, redundancy of a system requires the addition of
equipment to detect failure and to switch operation to the surviving
system. All of this adds complexity, cost, and weight, which offset
some of the advantages of the calculated reliability increase.
Another design technique is to accommodate a typical degree of
component deterioration without causing failure (i.e., allow some reduction
in performance before the component or system falls below its essential
performance limits). This is a form of overdesign to incorporate wider
safety factors in the system.
Techniques of Reliability Analysis
Reliability analysis has reached a high level of refinement in
aerospace, as was required for the successful operation of vastly complex
product systems containing many thousands of physical components. In
recent years, aerospace reliability analysis techniques have come to rely
heavily on the use of a digital computer. Computer techniques have made
practicable and efficient the use of a trial and error approach and the
use of various mathematical optimization techniques. However, this
summary will discuss the basic techniques of reliability analysis and will
leave the explanation of sophisticated computer methods to the referenced
publications.
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Reliability prediction involves a number of computerized techniques
for determining the expected reliability of a system or product. These
techniques are applied during the early design stages, when corrective re-
design can still occur. They also have proven of value when design changes
are proposed on existing hardware. In such cases computerized prediction
techniques are used to ensure that proposed hardware modifications will
not degrade reliability. Aerospace experience has developed several
predictive techniques which are described and compared in Reference 4
(e.g., comparison of similar systems, simulated operation, active element
group count). Reference 4 also discusses the accuracy of each technique
_and__the__preferr.ed_application_of__each_dur-ing_program_development Reference-
5 describes a Failure Effect Management System (an iterative process
ranging from conceptual design through use) that uses both qualitative and
quantitative approaches to reliability.
Probability design review is a basic aerospace project technique
which embodies the evaluation of reliability analyses as part of the overall
review of the system design. After a system is first conceived, and at
planned intervals thereafter in the development process, comprehensive
reviews are made of the design configuration from components through
assemblies through the total system. Correspondingly, these reviews
incorporate the results of reliability predictions coupled with review.of
the use of redundancy concepts, safety factors, and operation at derated
performance levels. The design is compared, during review, with approxi-
mately similar designs for which actual failure experience exists. Human
factors affecting reliability also are considered.
Failure mode and effects analysis is another major reliability
activity which is a necessary part of any design review. The analysis
asks: "What can go wrong? How can it go wrong? What is the significance
of this kind of failure?" This requires judgment as to the potential
modes of failure introduced by any new design. Critical modes of failure
are, where possible, eliminated .through redesign to modify or to eliminate
certain components or subsystems. The true value of failure analysis
is derived when it is combined with an operational or test program and
a coordinated design feedback effort, to achieve a cost-effective relia-
bility. Properly coordinated test and failure analysis efforts have in-
creased reliability by as much as ten times over a development cycle.
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Worst case analysis is self-descriptive--an analysis of what will
happen if everything in a subsystem behaves in the worst possible way.
This analysis frequently is made with computer techniques. Usually if
a subsystem passes a worst case analysis, the designer is assured of
reliable performance with adequate safety margins.
Minimal-state system reliability analysis involves determining
mathematically the "upper bound" and "lower bound" of a system's
reliability. This rather complex concept involves tracing paths
through a logic diagram of the system. The upper bound is determined
by a path through a minimum number of essential components (i.e., the
system functions if these components function, even if all other com-
ponents fail}. The lower bound is determined by a path through a "fault
tree" of failure states (i.e., the system fails if these components
fail, even if all other components operate perfectly). Computerized
exact procedures for minimal-state analysis have been developed, based
on the SCOPE (System for Computing Operational Probability Equations)
computer program.
Major References
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York, 10017.
91
MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS
The concept of maintainability is technically defined as the average
(mean) time between repairs. The following definition may be more useful
to managers: "Maintainability is the degree of facility with which
equipment is capable of being retained in, or restored to, serviceable
operation. It is a function of parts accessibility, internal configuration,
use and repair environment, and time, tools, and training required for
• *. ,,13maintenance.
Some persons become aware of maintainability—or lack of it — after
a minor collision with a personal automobile. Growing recognition of the
need for more maintainability has led automobile manufacturers to consider
design improvements: stronger bumpers to minimize damage and wider use
of throw-away parts to reduce repair costs, both improvements which would
also reduce repair downtime.
Maintainability, like reliability, is determined by the designer.
The design goal should be to promote cost-effective product availability.
Thus reliability (reducing the frequency of failure) and maintainability
(reducing the effect of failure) must be balanced by the designer to
establish an optimum (least-cost) combination.
Most of the progress in maintainability has come from the aerospace
sector. The military services specify it as part of the integrated logistics
support system, and the space program requires a high level of maintainability
for space vehicles. The concept of maintainability was formally recognized
by the U. S. military services in 1954, and the first formalized program
specifications (e.g., Air Force MIL-M-26512) were issued in 1959.
NASA has publicized two reports generated by contractor (Boeing
Company) engineers engaged in analyzing and developing maintainability
methods for space vehicles. The maintainability techniques used by NASA
for space vehicle logistics support systems have been studied and adapted
to a much different type of operational system: a midwestern fire and
casualty insurance firm has adopted the principles of maintainability
analysis in the design of a complex, decentralized system of communications
and data transfer.
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The technique of maintainability analysis may be better understood
as the early stage of a product maintainability program which encompasses:
0
 The specification of system-level maintainability
requirements (normally established by the customer,
in an aerospace program).
° Maintainability analysis (the process of translating
system-level requirements into specific qualitative
and quantitative equipment-design requirements, or
design criteria).
o The accomplishment of maintainability production. '
0
 The design review (actually a series of integrated
design reviews involving reliability, human factors,
etc., as well as maintainability).
o Analysis of a specific design configuration to
determine maintenance support requirements.
0
 Formal maintainability demonstration. ' '
Within this program framework, maintainability analysis is an
activity which occurs during the program definition phase, when customer
maintainability requirements are converted to specific criteria, before
the start of actual equipment design. The design and performance
specifications resulting from maintainability analysis serve as con- .
straints on the design engineer. The overriding design constraint is
the assurance that the downtime (mean time to repair, or MTTR) of each
component, when combined in a statistical mean, is no greater than the
overall system requirement for MTTR. A maintainability allocation process,
part of the maintainability analysis technique, accomplishes this.
Maintainability analysis involves a sequential development and
review of data to establish the optimum characteristics of the product
system, considering such factors as:
o Quantitative performance requirements
o Maintenance support available
o Cost
o Operating objectives
0
 Safety
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A trade-off technique of decision-making is used to formally analyze
maintainability. Although the trade-off decisions (described in detail
in Chapter 7 of Ref. 1) vary with the product consideration, they may
include such alternatives as:
° Man vs. machine maintenance
o Built-in vs. external test equipment
o Manual vs. semi-automatic operation
o Repair vs. throwaway parts
o Reliability vs. maintainability
o Depot-level vs. intermediate-level maintenance
0
 Provision of spare parts vs. provision of
support (repair) equipment vs. a mix of both
o Modular vs. nonmodular packaging
° Make or buy
Recently, attention has been given to a concept of large-scale
integration (LSI) which has significant implications for maintainability
analysis. LSI, primarily visualized as a concept for avionics (i.e.,
airborne electronics systems), promises great potential advances in
maintainability. Through integration of operating and corrective
maintenance subsystems, LSI makes possible automatic self-testing, fault
isolation, self-repair, and throwaway maintenance. LSI potentially
combines high reliability with a low-cost maintainability—cheaper than
conventional repair techniques.
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well-illustrated book, designed for industrial as well as
college use. Includes pertinent extracts from military
specifications.]
2. Goldman, A. S., and T. B. Slattery [General Electric
TEMPO], Maintainability: A Major Element of System
Effectiveness, New York: Wiley, 1964, 282 pp. [A
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11. Bird, George T., "MIL-STD-471, Maintainability Demonstration,"
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51 (March 1969), pp. 66-75.
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VALUE ENGINEERING
Value engineering, also known as value analysis, is a step-by-step
method for improving product value (i.e., the ratio of its functional
worth to its production cost). The method consists of quantitatively
comparing the elements of product worth to their corresponding elements
of product cost, and by selecting least-cost alternative means of
accomplishing the required function.
Though value engineering requires technical skill in the
determination of function, and in judging substitutions in product
-element-ST—i-t—i-s-basieally-a-management—teehnique-for-assur ing—orderly
evaluation of alternatives. It is important to understand that value
engineering involves no reduction in the quality of a product, and no
reduction in safety, operating features, or in attractiveness. Value
engineering does not mean "cost cutting" or "cheapening" in the custom-
ary sense of these words—reducing cost by reducing value. The cost
reductions which result from value engineering occur because unnecessary
costs are avoided.
The concept and techniques of value engineering are generally
attributed to the innovations of Lawrence D. Miles in the General
Electric Company, during and just following World War II. Miles, who
has written the classic book in the field, drew on certain principles
of industrial engineering and scientific purchasing in establishing his
principles of value engineering.
Miles first defined two kinds of "value" as a basis of value
engineering studies: use value (the properties or qualities which
accomplish a use, work, or service) and esteem value (the properties,
features, or attractiveness which cause us to want to own it). He then
outlined three basic steps in the process of obtaining lower-cost engi-
neering and manufacturing solutions and alternatives, without lowering
either kind of value:
a. Identify the function. The prime function of a
useful product or service often can be described
simply (e.g., provide light, support handle).
Secondary functions (e.g., look attractive,
resist shock) also must be considered.
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b. Evaluate the function by comparison. All evaluation
of value results from comparison of some kind: with
standards; with similar or partially similar items;
with alternative materials or manufacturing processes
c. Cause value alternatives to be developed. Thirteen
value engineering techniques have been identified
as helping to identify unnecessary cost, remove
obstacles, and ensure the development of good value
alternatives:
° Avoid generalities which hamper inquiry.
° Get all available cost figures, including
overhead and secondary costs.
0
 Use information from only the best source.
0
 "Blast" (i.e., critically analyze the basic
function and focus on extremely simple al-
ternatives to it); "create" (i.e., modify
the first-chosen alternative to provide
elements of increased function); and "refine"
(i.e., replace all needed elements of function,
at least cost, until the full function is
achieved).
0
 Use real creativity.
o Identify and overcome roadblocks.
o Use industry specialists to extend
specialized knowledge.
° Determine the true cost of key tolerances
specified in the design.
0
 Utilize vendors' available (standard)
functional products.
° Utilize and pay for vendors' skills and
knowledge.
o Utilize available specialty processes
(i.e., uncommon casting or shaping
processes available commercially).
o Utilize applicable standard materials
and components.
0
 Use the criterion, "Would I spend my
money this way?"
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The aerospace industry has been heavily involved in value engineering
for many years, since the Department of Defense (DOD) has promoted its
principles in it's procurement of equipment from its suppliers. DOD has
documented dozens of examples of new products or techniques that have
benefited from value engineering. An incentive system built into Armed
Services Procurement Regulations provides a share of value engineering
savings to the contractor.*
The impact of value engineering on product characteristics was
investigated by a Department of Defense-sponsored study, partly
__to_determine_whe.ther_the_financial_incentiv.es_of__value_engineering ___
resulted in any reduction of product quality. The study found that a
sample of value engineering change proposals provided substantial im-
provements (and only rare reductions) in such characteristics as reliability,
maintainability, producibility, quality, weight, and performance.
The head of RCA's value analysis program believes the primary
benefit of the program is neither cost reduction nor improved products,
but the generation of earlier and better information and communication
about a company's operations. He added, "Value analysis brings together
the originators and the users of information so they can jointly evaluate
8individual project functions."
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CHAPTER VIII
TECHNIQUES FOR ORGANIZING
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Although project management systems are not unique to aerospace,
the aerospace environment has profoundly influenced such systems. In
the process, traditional management theory has been significantly affected,
with the aerospace sector's management techniques interwoven with the
project management concept.
The terms project management and program management are almost
interchangeable: the concept is the same, and in common usage there is
considerable overlap of the terms. In precise usage, projects are smaller
elements which make up a major program. However, where the concept
is described in this section, the more common term project management
is used.
The project management system as developed in aerospace permits a
far greater degree of detailed control of operations than conventional
management methods do. Project management also promotes rapid identification
of and response to potential deviations from plan. By necessity, the
system places great demands on the project manager:
Project management, particularly in the management
of major R 5 D projects, is undoubtedly one of the
most complex and demanding management concepts in
existence. . . . The project manager's task is
enormously complicated and diverse; ... He deals
with technical and administrative disciplines in
pulling together a project team to act as a team
rather than as a fragmented group of functional
experts.1
As a result, the selection of a competent project manager is quite important
to the success of this management system.
Lt. Gen. Sam C. Phillips, NASA's Apollo Program Director who had
earlier managed an Air Force ballistic missile program, states that "the
Apollo management process is to integrate people into an organized re-
lationship with one another, and to provide them with the assignments, the
environment, the means, and the processes .and disciplines that are re-
quired to insure progress at a planned rate and cost to attain that
specific objective."
As it has evolved in aerospace, the project management concept has
several striking characteristics which differentiate it from the traditional
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concept of managing operations. This subsection will briefly describe these
characteristics. However, an examination of the effectiveness and
significance of the concept are beyond the scope of this subsection. (For
a fuller description, see Chapter X and the references at the end of this
subsection, particularly Refs. 1, 2, and 4.)
Close-knit Organization
Normally, aerospace project assignments involve a substantial emotional
commitment. The aerospace employee is not merely given a work assignment,
he is placed in a new environment. There is a physical move of working
location and a relatively long-term assignment to a new supervisor. The
employee is made both to feel a dedication to the project goals and to
recognize the close relationship between project success and his personal
career advancement. The project staff is made to feel that personal
sacrifices are expected. The employees often are carefully selected for
homogeneity in background, education, or skills, as with the all-engineer
staffing program of the Apollo Program Office. A sense of teamwork and
mutual support and enhancement is stressed, although the cooperation is
goal-oriented. That is, the cooperation among project workers does not
extend to covering up deficiencies which threaten project success.
Deliberate Conflict and Its Resolution
The project management system deliberately fosters conflict among
organizational groups, as a means of attaining project goals. This is
done through the matrix organization concept (see next subsection) which
promotes tension and rivalry between groups which have different subgoals,
although they share the same primary goal. Typically, the conflicting
group subgoals correspond with basic philosophic conflicts in the project
itself (e.g., a need for high quality vs. a need for faster production).
The resolution of these conflicts involves a bargaining process and
intergroup rivalry which have two results: (1) the facts of the con-
flict become visible very quickly, and any possibility of a harmonious
settlement is quickly explored; and (2) the conflict quickly escalates
through the appeal process to the project manager's level for resolution.
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The results are generally favorable to the program:
o Action to solve the conflict often brings desir-
able change to the organization and the project.
0
 Inherent defects in the organizational system or
in resource allocation are spotlighted.
° A system of checks and balances pervades the
project, so that trade-offs are achieved among
project cost, schedule, and performance.
0
 Resolving the conflict reinforces the authority
of the project manager.
Rapid, Thorough Communication
The reporting system used in a project management system is typified
by very frequent and thorough discussions of project status. The Apollo
Program had its "Breakfast Club"--daily 30-minute meetings in the Apollo •
Action Centers during which, "Mission status and all constraining problems
are reviewed based on real-time information (telephone, travel, personal •
contact) . . . [and] problems are given the proper management attention as
they are developing, thereby permitting timely corrective action to be
initiated." Most aerospace projects use weekly cycles for administrative
reporting meetings, with comprehensive management reviews by higher ranking
offices often scheduled monthly.
Highly Visible Management
Aerospace project staff meetings have such names as "Black Friday"
because they commonly expose managerial deficiencies in a candid manner.
The free exchange of ideas on project problems is encouraged, and the
discussion of problems is designed both to make managerial failure visible
(the embarrassment is intended to prevent repetition) and to establish a
plan and assign responsibility for corrective action. The emphasis in staff
meetings is on problem identification and problem solving.
Painstaking Attention to Detail
During the contract definition phase of program management, the
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2
amount of detailed data required has been termed "incredible." The
9
attention to detail carries over to the development of a project plan and
(allowing for personal variations among individual project managers) to
the thoroughness of control methods employed.
When deviations from the project plan are detected, the project
control system focusses detailed attention on the deviant area. A
prospective delay in availability of a contractual end item is analyzed
to determine the pacing work package, production item, or purchased com-
ponent responsible. Rigorous corrective action is applied to compara-
tively tiny portions of the project activity. Such attention to detail
pervades the successful project management system.
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MATRIX ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
The matrix organization structure, named for its resemblance to a
rectangular grid when shown on a chart, is a product of the aerospace en-
vironment. It is quite effective as an organization pattern for aerospace
R & D programs, where the emphasis is on project completion rather than on
conventional production, but it also is effective in a commercial environ-
ment where product lines are varied and numerous. The matrix organization
promotes flexible and adaptable use of resources to achieve project
objectives. The matrix structure is so frequently utilized in aerospace
project management that it could be considered as a subset of project
management technology.
In a typical matrix organization structure (Fig. 7) there are two
lines of authority running from the chief executive: a functional line
and a project line.
MANUFACTURING
MANAGER
Figure 7 - Matrix Organization Structure
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Each functional manager (e.g., engineering, manufacturing, finance)
is responsible for supporting the project organizations of the company.
He sets technical and professional standards, policies, methods and guide-
lines for the conduct of his function. Also, he maintains long-term
responsibility for the adequacy of functional personnel assigned to pro-
jects.
Each project manager is responsible for management and control of all
phases of a project from inception to completion, including contract nego-
tiations, establishment of project requirements and criteria, identification
and authorization of work performed, establishment of direct budget and
-schedule-requirements—monitor ing-and-reporting~to-management~of~pro~j~ect
status and performance, and maintenance of prime customer contact on
project matters.*
In effect, a matrix organization creates a continuous controlled
tension throughout the organization. The inherent conflicts between
functional and project responsibilities are emphasized, and each manager
is constantly pushed to recognize the conflicts among design performance,
cost, and time. The matrix can be viewed as a mechanism to promote
decision-making, where conflicts are faced and resolved either by compromise
(trade-off) or by intervention of the chief executive. In either case, the
conflicts are expected to be resolved in the organization's best interests.
Advantages
The matrix shares several advantages of the project system of organi-
zation: (a) a team spirit and sense of competitive enthusiasm is established
for each project; (b) the customer is able to recognize a point of contact--
the project manager--who represents the company to him and his interests
within the company; and (c) interfunctional rivalries (as between engineering
and manufacturing) are minimized by the intervention of the project manager.
* NASA is sponsoring management research studying in depth the authority
and organizational role of the aerospace project manager. The National
Academy of Public Administration is analyzing the work of NASA program and
project managers. A Syracuse University group is investigating the use of
authority by the project manager.4
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Still, certain advantages of the functional organization are re-
tained: each functional manager supervises a pool of functional talent
to fill the shifting needs of the various projects; he directs assignment
and reassignment and arbitrates conflicting project demands; and he is in
a position (because of the employee's long-term career dependence on his
functional manager) to promote adherence to desired technical standards.
A matrix organization is designed less around power and more around
possession of useful information, so it encourages innovative ideas
throughout the organization.
NASA has found, in using the matrix structure, that good organiza-
tional communications are essential to the success of the system.
The space program also has learned that the matrix system of organization
is not a comfortable place for the man who insists he can be responsive only
to one boss. Also, the matrix organization can be a jungle of frustration
to people who think that ease of administration is the same thing as
effective management.
Applications
John F. Mee, in an early description of the matrix structure, stated
that "although the matrix organization emerged to improve work performance
in the aerospace industry, other alert industrial managers can adapt the
concept for uses in new product or market developments in a marketing
dominated economy." The matrix is used also in the Office of Emergency
Planning, in the Executive Office of the President,* and has clear relevance
to governmental as well as commercial projects.
Recently, it was suggested that the matrix organizational form is an
Q
on-going characteristic of colleges and universities. With the growth
of interdisciplinary academic programs, this seems increasingly true. The
authors have successfully implemented an aerospace-derived matrix organiza-
tion structure for an interdisciplinary research program involving five
9
colleges of the University of Denver and Denver Research Institute.
When the matrix structure is applied to commercial firms,
*Prof. George A. Steiner, co-author of Ref. 2, pointed out this
application during an interview with us.
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the checks and balances which are created to assure tradeoffs of cost,
schedule, and performance supersede the conventional functions of the
organization. Thus the traditionally strong cost controls of a commercial
firm tend to be balanced by an equal emphasis on quality, reliability, and
performance. For conventional commercial firms this may mean a major
change in competitive effectiveness.
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GOVERNMENT/PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
When new enterprises are created they tend to follow traditional
patterns of legal form. Typically, the public sector problems are
handled by an executive agency or a task force; private sector problems
are handled by a corporation. There is little experience in combining
the responsibilities of the two sectors. Yet some novel problems of
aerospace have stimulated a search for new organizational patterns to
better coordinate governmental and private sector work efforts.
Two innovative organizational forms have evolved from the aerospace
experience, both government-private corporations in structure. One is
the treaty-type organization, by which several governmental jurisdictions
join in a consortium to sponsor a corporation which provides a technological
service to all of the jurisdictions. The other is the Federal contract
research center, which marshals private-sector technological skill to serve
as an adjunct to a governmental agency. Both organizational forms show
promise for solving difficult problems faced by public administrators at
local and regional as well as Federal levels.
Treaty Consortium (INTELSAT)
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) is
a unique international joint venture. Through the INTELSAT agreement, most
of the world's governments (62 as of 1968) have combined to finance and
manage a space satellite system utilized by earth stations owned either
by private corporations or by government agencies. INTELSAT is a
technological, financial, and above all a political success. It has
brought together in common purpose a great number of governmental organi-
zations, varying widely in size, technology, and wealth, and it is flexible
enough to accommodate changes in membership. It is financed on a "pay as
you go" basis which minimizes both initial investment and investment risk.
INTELSAT was formed in 1964 by two international agreements, one an
intergovernmental treaty and the other a "Special Agreement" among the
public or private telecommunications organizations designated by their
respective countries. The Special Agreement provides specific guidance
on contracts, payments and cost allocations, and the use of patent rights
and technical data. In principle, the INTELSAT agreements allowed the
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organization to be created with only a few participants, and for others to
be added later. The growth of membership brought in new investments and
allowed operations to expand. In this way, INTELSAT resembles an open-
ended mutual investment fund.
There were several innovative features in the INTELSAT agreements
which contributed to its success:
° There was recognition that the technological
resource could be developed most efficiently
through international cooperation, rather
than through a proliferation of competitive
systems. (This would appear to be true also
for most metropolitan utility services: _
communications , transportation,
sanitation, pollution control, etc.) Thus
INTELSAT encouraged broad membership .
o The form of organization accommodates a
diversity of public and private membership,
corresponding to the diversity of economic
systems of the members.
o Economic considerations (i.e., operating
efficiency) are emphasized more than
political considerations; thus rationality
rather than emotion underlies operating
policy.
o The organization provides for wide variances
in degree of investment and ownership; in-
vestment quotas are determined for each
member based on its degree of utilization
of the total system (i.e., by each nation's
percentage of international communications
traffic).
° Each member's vote in the .policy making of
INTELSAT is weighted according to its in-
vestment quota.
° The pay-as-you-go plan lets new participants
enter without a prior investment (which
would tend to serve as a barrier to entry
at the local government level, if a bond
issue authorization were needed to obtain
investment funds). Collections from
telecommunications operations help offset
costs each accounting period. In this
sense, INTELSAT functions like a non-profit
cooperative. It avoids the problems which
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might arise if a few countries owned the
system and sold services to other countries.
o A professional management organization is
hired for a fee to operate the consortium.
In the case of INTELSAT, the management is
provided by a well-known firm in the U. S.,
the Communications Satellite (COMSAT)
Corporation.*
The INTELSAT concept would appear to set a useful pattern for obtaining
needed cooperation from groups that are quasi-sovereign in authority yet
interdependent in actuality. For example, an INTELSAT form of agreement
seems well suited for such regional applications as management of a river
basin to supply municipal and industrial water and waste disposal services
to both public and private jurisdictions. The local governments surrounding
San Francisco Bay (now associated in ABAC, the Association of Bay Area
Governments) might find an INTELSAT-1ike compact useful in maintaining
the desired environment of the bay. Local water districts in a metropolitan
area dependent on a single water source, and metropolitan Councils of Govern-
ments, also may find the INTELSAT pattern useful.
Dealing with environmental problems, particularly air and water
pollution, may call for the creation of new governmental or quasi-govern-
mental organizations. The Tri-State Compact, being considered by New
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware, may create an interstate air pollution
control agency covering parts of the three states. To be effective, the
agency also must maintain sufficient flexibility to expand its membership
to cover new areas where air pollution problems arise.
The INTELSAT concept appears to have the greatest promise when applied
to activities requiring technical expertise; there is some question whether
the INTELSAT concept would work as well on the local government scene where
the direct interest group is the general public rather than an expert group
of technical specialists.
*COMSAT, itself an interesting government/private administrative
mechanism, also may serve as a model for application elsewhere. COMSAT
is funded entirely from private sources (half'from individuals, half from
communications carrier firms) yet operates under U. S. Government controls
and has 3 of its 15 directors appointed by the Government. COMSAT functions
somewhat in the manner of a regulated, privately owned, public utility.
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Federal Contract Research Centers
Many of the 40 Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRC's) (such as
the AEC's Oak Ridge and .Los Alamos, the Air Force's RAND, and NASA's
Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Bellcomm) were formed in response to an
urgent national need. The FCRC provides a fast start-up device when
government has limited internal talent and must quickly meet a pressing
requirement.
.FCRC's are nonfederal in the sense that their employees are not part
of the Civil Service system, yet each of the FCRC's has a special, con-
tinuing relationship with a single Federal agency that supplies all (or
nearly all) of its funding. Typically, the Federal agency also owns
most of the facilities used by the FCRC. The work done by FCRC's includes
basic research, applied R £, D, systems analysis and planning (e.g., RAND),
and systems engineering and technical direction (e.g., MITRE).
NASA, for example, has used the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to
direct development of automated space vehicles and operation of worldwide
tracking and data acquisition networks. Bellcomm, managed by AT§T and
Western Electric, performs studies, technical fact-finding and evaluation,
analytical investigations, and related activities in support of manned
space flight and related NASA programs.
Examples of the extension of the FCRC concept to new sponsors, Federal
and local, are:
o The Urban Institute, sponsored by HUD to do
R § D in urban problems.
o The New York City-RAND Institute, formed by
RAND to conduct policy research studies in
such areas as public safety, housing, health,
and welfare.
0
 The Los Angeles Technical Service Corporation,
funded more by private foundations than by
the City of Los Angeles, which contracts with
industrial firms for performance of R § D on
city problems.
0
 The regional education laboratories formed by
the U. S. Office of Education to conduct
educational R § D.
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CHAPTER IX
TECHNIQUES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING AND CONTROL
SYSTEMS FOR PROCUREMENT
This subsection introduces a family of aerospace-related management
techniques and concepts for performing a common management function—the
procurement of goods and services. While all organizations engage in
purchasing, and a considerable amount of expertise has been developed in
the craft of purchasing agents, the aerospace sector has pioneered new and
highly complex concepts. It is one thing to evaluate products, prices,
It~i~s~~quire~a~ncrth~!r
thing to procure a unique weapons and space system, involving billions
of dollars and several years development time, on which depends the
success of a major national program.
To a great degree, the space program has demonstrated the feasibility
of contracting for goods and services for a large-scale enterprise. Even
though under its legislative charter and presidential encouragement, NASA
could have built up a large and highly centralized department, it chose
instead to keep a relatively small headquarters staff and to procure goods
and services from others. James Webb commented on this:
A major NASA policy has been to rely on contracts
with non-governmental establishments and institutions
for the work they were qualified to do. Over ninety
percent of all funds invested in the NASA program
have been spent outside the government. In some
years this has reached 95 percent. . . . The NASA
program has involved about 20,000 industrial prime
and sub-contractors and suppliers, 200 universities,
and almost 400,000 non-governmental workers. . . .
[This] has forced us to extend into new dimensions
the art and practice of administration and manage-
ment.*
Quite possibly the highly developed procurement systems of the Department
of Defense and NASA may be usable in other large-scale enterprises,
* James Webb, "NASA As an Adaptive Organization," address at Harvard
Graduate School of Business Administration, September 30, 1968, p. 42.
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particularly those dependent on research, development and deployment
of highly complex equipment.
Cities, for example, are both large in scale and increasingly in
need of R § D efforts and high-technology systems. One observer, ex-
perienced in application of technology to urban needs, recently wrote:
Practically every American City has had under
way for some time one or more special programs
involving the procurement and utilization of
technological intensive products or services.
These programs, largely funded by the federal
government, relate to housing, health services,
transportation, education, environmental quality,
welfare, labor, police effectiveness, and general
community development and well being.
These programs are mostly conducted and managed
by the same people who manage other city affairs . . .
and they are generally handled like other city
programs requiring outside products and services--
by a simple contracting process usually accepting
the lowest bid.
Cities have not made a particular effort to develop
an in-house scientific-technical capability to
determine what is actually needed in the way of
technological products or services, and how they
can be most effectively acquired, or to evaluate
the results achieved by industry and university
contractors, or to ensure that the technological
products or services being supplied are utilized
in a way to secure optimum results and benefits
both in the solution of specific problems and from
a systems standpoint.*
The need for innovation in city management and in the procurement of
technology is great. The author of the article calls for "new approaches,
new ways of doing things, new and different skills and competences."
The aerospace management experience may provide some of the needed ideas.
The aerospace innovations in procurement include the following
concepts and techniques:
0
 Source Evaluation Board Process
0
 Incentive Contracting
° Contractor Performance Evaluation.
Each of these innovations will be described in a following subsection.
*Ronald J. Philips, "Technology Utilization: Supplying the Blueprints,"
Putilic Management, February 1971, pp. 18-19.
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SOURCE EVALUATION BOARD PROCESS
In aerospace procurement, a formal Source Evaluation Board (SEE)
process is used whenever the total cost (including prospective follow-on
items) is high—NASA specifies SEB's when the total estimated cost is
$1 million or more. The purpose of the SEE process is to provide a
sound basis for judging the selection of the contractor having the
highest probability of best performing the contract tasks within the
specified price.
The Source Evaluation Board does not select the contractor, but
decides on the particularly important criteria that affect the selection
and determines the most appropriate way of applying these criteria. The
Board determines what expert knowledge is required and assures that it
is available and used. Finally, the SEE sees that all competitive
proposals are judged fairly to the same significant criteria, and ranks
the proposals in order of preference.
The value of a Source Evaluation Board process is not limited to
the selection of the most competent contractor, although that goal
(if attained) should be sufficient justification for its cost. A study
which has evaluated the SEE process found it to be an effective
measuring device used by the chief executive to determine how well
contractors are developing their capabilities and to gauge the quality
2
of the thinking of top officials in his own organization. Another
evaluator, although pointing out evidence that major procurement decisions
frequently are not made in accordance with formal source evaluation
recommendations, nevertheless writes:
These data do not suggest that the formal evalu-
ation systems are without value. Indeed these
methods seem to stimulate a more thoughtful and
more orderly planning process that enhances
management effectiveness.3
Organization
In a typical aerospace program, the SEB is composed of members
appointed by top management. Their service takes priority over their
regular jobs. Besides a chairman and secretary, the Board includes
representatives of the procurement and contracts functions and (1m-
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portantly) of the technical divisions who must later supervise
operation of the procured system. The Board usually operates with
three, committees, each taking leadership in evaluation of a major
aspect of .the procurement decision: technical expertise of the con-
tractor; management ability; and cost. A typical organization of an
SEE is shown in Figure 8, below.
TECHNICAL
DIVISION
MEMBER
SEB CHAIRMAN
1 1
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT AND PROCUREMENT CONTRACT
DIVISION LEGAL SECRETARY DIVISION
MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES MEMBER ADMINISTRATOR
I i
1 ° l\° l\° | ° 1 ° | ° ljS
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE COST COMMITTEE
4 10 MEMBERS 4-10 MEMBERS 37 MEMBERS
TECHNICAL
SUBCOMMITTEE
TECHNICAL CONSULTANT CONSULTANT
SUBCOMMITTEE (ACCOUNTANT!
CONSULTANT
Figure 8. Source Evaluation Board Organization
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Procedure
A typical SEB procedure involves the following steps:
0
 The SEB is organized, isolated from personal
contact with potential contractors, and a
board work schedule is established.
o Qualification criteria, defining the minimum
capability of potential contractors, are es-
tablished to eliminate unnecessary effort
in writing and evaluating proposals.
0
 The SEB reviews the Request for Proposal and
determines the major subject areas on which
propo-sal-s-wi-1-l-b-e-eva-l-ua-t-ed-
0
 Committees are appointed to study in depth
the evaluation areas (e.g., technical
ability, management ability, and cost). Each
committee recommends specific evaluation
criteria that will indicate significant
differences between proposals.
° The SEB reviews and approves committee recom-
mendations on evaluation criteria, and estab-
. lishes a system for weighting and scoring
proposals according to these criteria. This
occurs before receipt of proposals.
o Proposals are received, screened and scored
by the respective committees, and weights
applied to determine total score.
o The proposals are ranked in order of score, and
the proposers in the top competitive range
are contacted by the SEB for discussions and
surveys of their facilities and capabilities,
to identify other strengths and weaknesses.
0
 The SEB, judging all factors, makes a final
ranking of the proposers and prepares a report
of findings.
0
 The SEB report is given to the official respon-
sible for making the final selection of the
contractor.
An evaluation of the SEB process as used by NASA finds that the use
of SEB ensures the selection of the best contractors in terms of NASA
objectives, stimulates competition, provides for fair and impartial review,
insures review flexibility, and maintains a desirable balance between top
2
management authority and decentralized operational responsibility.
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INCENTIVE CONTRACTING
Incentive contracts are designed to provide a special financial
motivation to the contractor, so that he (or his product) will perform
more efficiently, or that he will control costs more carefully. The
contracts can involve performance incentives or cost incentives or some
combination of both.
The use of incentive contracts has grown rapidly throughout aero-
space in the last few years, primarily as a result of the policies of
the Secretary of Defense. During the 1961-68 period, the use of incen-
tive contracting doubled (from 14 to 28 percent of total contract
dollars) in the Department of Defense. However, the concept of in-
centives in military procurement contracts is not new. Performance
incentives were used by the Navy in the Civil War (the Monitor had
to float, attain a specified minimum speed, and win its first battle
against the Merrimac, or the contractor would not be paid) and by the
Army Signal Corps when purchasing a flying machine from the Wright
Brothers (with a reward/penalty of $2,500 for each one mile per hour
over or under the target of 40 m.p.h.). Cost incentives (50-50 cost
sharing of cost reductions) also were offered shipbuilders during
World War I.2
How well do incentives work? It is difficult to say, because the
completed studies of incentive contracting are based on early experience
believed unrepresentative of current incentive contracts. The findings
of six major studies compared in Ref. 1, confirmed by Ref. 2, conclude
that incentives do not appear to accomplish their intended goal of
motivating contractors to lower costs or better product performance.
This is not to say that incentives are harmful (except in added adminis-
trative cost) but merely that they are ineffective. However, the nega-
tive findings of comparative studies are admittedly based on an analysis
of early and poorly-structured contracts which would not show incentives
to be effective motivators even if they actually could be effective.1
A manufacturing executive with space program experience who reviewed
the draft of this report made an enthusiastic defense of incentive contracting
as a performance motivator. Mr. J. Thomas Markley, Vice President and
Assistant General Manager of the Raytheon Company's Equipment Division,
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commented that the incentive contract worked on Apollo and continues to
motivate him in his present role in industry. He added that Raytheon has
experimented successfully with cost award fee incentives in commercial
contracts with software firms. Mr. Markley also commented that the subtle
financial incentive of relating progress payments to technical performance
milestones under a contract also successfully motivates contractors to
improve schedule performance.
While none of the major studies of incentive contracting ' ' could find
satisfactory evidence of the effectiveness of incentives as motivators, still
none of them suggested that incentive contracting should be eliminated. They
suggested changes in emphasis and more selectivity in using them, but not
abandonment of incentive contracts.
Even if incentive contracts do not consistently serve to motivate
contractors, such contracts have several other important advantages:
0
 Incentives provide a planning discipline for the
buyer's employees. When an incentive contract is
to be negotiated, the analysis of requirements is
more thorough and the work statement is more pre-
cise. Thus, incentive contracts provide the buyer
with better program cost information than do cost-
reimbursable contracts. Because target costs are
more realistic, they permit better financial
planning and budgetary control, and reduce the
likelihood of large cost overruns.
o Incentive contracts tend to make both the buyer
and the contractor more cost-conscious, which
probably results in indirect cost savings.
o Incentive contracts clearly communicate the buyer's
objectives to the contractor. They attract special
management attention to the objectives and explicitly
show their relative importance. Of course, this can
be accomplished without a variable fee.
o When it is possible to associate activities of
individuals with specific contracts, incentives
(regardless of their amount) provide a useful
tool for motivating contractor employees.
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CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The complex procurement tasks of aerospace have prompted the buying
agencies to develop detailed systems for evaluating contractor performance.
Intuitively, it would seem to be part of every purchasing agent's respon-
sibility to keep performance records on vendors and contractors from
which to base judgments on the award of new contracts. Yet an American
Management Association survey found that such records were relatively
rare. The AMA survey report commented:
The pressures of defense and space-age projects,
together with the increasing complexities of in-
dustry, are highlighting the need for knowledge of
vendors' capabilities and performance.1
The survey goes on to describe several methods for contractor performance
evaluation and points out that they serve a dual purpose: (1) to evalu-
ate the potential ability of prospective vendors to meet the company's
requirements; and (2) to evaluate the actual performance of the vendor
after the purchase has been made. The more complex performance
evaluation methods used by aerospace also have both purposes, plus an
extension of the second--to recognize the need for corrective action by
the buyer who may need to rescue the contractor to avoid a failure of
the program.
Evaluation of Prospective Contractors
The Department of Defense Contractor Performance Evaluation (CPE)
program is a continuous, systematic method for collecting centralized
information on prospective DOD contractors. Data on total past performance
by contractors, for any of the military services, are correlated and
made available to procurement officers. The Assistant Secretary for
Defense (Procurement) indicates that CPE is integrated both with source
selection and with contract financial incentives: "It is the intent to
see that buyers utilize CPE information in determining which sources
are good and which are marginal and that they reward good performances
with higher profits."
Evaluation During Performance of the Contract
The Department of Defense has pioneered a formal system designed to
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integrate the information necessary for management decision-making on
procurement contracts. This system (which NASA is helping to develop
and adapting for use) is called Selected Acquisitions Information and
Management System (SAIMS). SAIMS, whose component systems are briefly
described below, consolidates the following information elements:
o An integrated financial management reporting system.
° A specification defining essential criteria for the
contractor's planning and control system.
o An integrated work breakdown structure, used jointly
by DOD and the contractor to identify contractual
work elements.
SAIMS [AF Regulation 375-6] itself is subdivided into four sub-
systems, which will be described only briefly. (Ref. 2 contains a
more complete discussion.)
o Program Performance Measurement System (PPMS) [DOD In- ";
struction 7000.2] specifies that contractors' internal
management control systems must provide data which [a)
indicate work progress; (b) closely relate cost, schedule
and technical performance; (c) are timely, accurate
and possible to audit; and (d) supply DOD managers
with summarized reports appropriate to various review
levels.
o Cost Information Reports (CIR) [DOD Instruction 7041.2]
provide data on actual or estimated future costs to
complete programs through their entire acquisition
cycles.
0
 Economic Information Systems (EIS) collect data for
analysis of the economic impact of defense spending
by industry and by region.
o Contract Funds Status Report [DOD Instruction 7800.7]
provides data to defense managers to help plan funding
requirements by program, by year.
In total, SAIMS is a management tool that provides early visibility
to potential problems of cost, schedule, and technical performance. By
doing so in a rapid and consistent manner, SAIMS promotes clearer
communication between Government and the contractor, more accurate
analysis of corrective actions, and a more comprehensive evaluation of
program status.
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MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Presumably every organization has some form of management information
system to observe or measure the results of operations and to provide a
basis for managerial control. In many organizations, the information
system is quite simple: the manager requires periodic written reports
from his subordinates, the branch heads or chiefs of sales or production.
On a regular basis he reviews profit and loss statements and sales records.
The manager tours the organization's facilities occasionally and holds
_staff meetings to learn of_o_p_erat.ing_pr.o.b.l.ems ~—
Some organizations, however, have developed far more detailed systems,
using computer techniques, which rapidly and accurately tap sources of
data that are meaningful to management decision making. The term
Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) is used to describe a
system which is highly flexible, able to accommodate many diverse kinds
of data, and to serve various levels of managers having differing needs.
The modern concept of integrated management information systems grew
from the World War II efforts of the U. S. Army Air Corps in developing
statistical control models for logistics systems.* After the war, The
RAND Corporation further developed these concepts for the U. S. Air
Force. A RAND executive commented: "The task of simulating a management
system is strikingly analogous to the task of building a management in-
formation system. . . . The data which are needed to make a simulated
system behave realistically in essential respects are identical to the
Q
data which the manager needs to determine how his system is performing."
The Air Force and Department of Defense have developed some of the more
advanced generalized management information systems.
An integrated management information system first collects useful
data, generally as a by-product of operations, then stores the data in
such a way that they can be retrieved automatically in a form usable by
* The origin of IMIS was described during a conversation by Dr.
William H. Mitchel, then of the Department of HEW. Dr. Mitchel, a pioneer
in development of management information systems for municipalities,
served with the U. S. Bureau of the Budget and was assigned to the Pentagon
during WW II when the Air Corps logistics systems were being developed.
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other systems (i.e., integrated with related data generated from other
sources). In military or aerospace logistics systems, IMIS provides
integration of system effectiveness data, system cost data, and informa-
' ' ' • " • ' • " •• 8
tion concerning the management and adaptability of the system.
Perhaps because aerospace firms are involved in and thus familiar
with the management information systems of the Pentagon, and perhaps
also because numerous'aerospace firms themselves are involved in the
development of such systems (e.g., G. E. TEMPO, TRW Systems, Lockheed,
MITRE, SDC) the use of IMIS appears more common within the aerospace
14 15
sector than in other sectors of the economy. ' A Fortune article
mentions IMIS applications at General Electric, Litton Industries, and
North American Rockwell, and comments:
A substantial boost in the state of the art of
management control was one by-product of Project
Apollo. The staggering requirements and liberal
government funding led to a number of management
control systems in some aerospace companies and in
government organizations.9
The extension of the IMIS concept to other sectors has been spotty.
A few industrial firms have instituted systems which quickly and
accurately provide top management with key information needed for the
decision process. In evaluating the success of the General Motors
management system, a prominent management consultant remarked on "the
development of the elaborate central office, with its responsibility
for feeding into the general decision-making process all of the in-
formation necessary for corporate-wide major policy and strategic
decisions."* A more recently implemented (1968) system was designed
to consolidate United Air Lines operations in 116 cities into the
13**
world's biggest commercial IMIS.
In the municipal government sector, information systems progress
has been slow. The U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
commented in 1969 on the need for improvements:
Approaches to the design and implementation of
*Harold Wolff, "The Great GM Mystery," Harvard Business Review, 42
(September-October 1964), p. 195.
**This integrated management information system should not be confused
with the airlines' automated systems for making passenger reservations,
such as American Airlines' SABRE, which are mentioned in the next section
(p. 139). However, a "data bank"-type management information system can
be constructed from an existing reporting/display system by deciding what
management needs to know and developing a simple program to retrieve such
data.
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urban information systems to date have been
diffused and fragmentary, and have yielded a
level of benefits well below that which was
anticipated. The potential benefits are
widely understood to include a superior
foundation of social, environmental, and
governmental information from which a broad
spectrum of users could make better decisions
in their respective fields of interest. For
example, municipalities would be better able
to identify problems, conduct planning, ad-
minister the routine affairs of government,
monitor the progress of their programs, and
evaluate their effectiveness.*
"However,the HUD document also criticized other sectors:
Other levels of government would similarly
benefit from the availability of more consistently
structured, aggregatable data for the evaluation
of their program activities which operate in
municipal environments. Private enterprise
would be able to function more efficiently were
its planning and operating decisions based upon
a more complete and accurate description of its
environment. However, these benefits are not
likely to be realized for many years, if ever,
given a continuation of past methods and low
resource investment.**
In the Spring of 1970, HUD announced it had signed contracts with
six municipalities to develop prototype integrated municipal information
systems. The systems will be computer-based and they will be designed,
documented, and programmed in COmmon Business-Oriented Language (COBOL).***
One example of a statewide information system is that of the State
12
of Hawaii, developed with the help of General Llectric TEMPO. Hawaii's
system calls for a single master data bank, centrally located, that pro-
vides broad-based support for operational and managerial control of the
State's resources. The system is integrated so that:
0
 Data files are standardized and compatible so
that data from various subsystems are readily
interchangeable.
* U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Request for
Proposals No. 11-2-70 for Municipal Information Systems," July 51, 1969,
p. C-10.
** Ibid., pp. C-10, 11.
*** U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD News., March
50, 1970.
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0
 Data files are analyzed and structured to
facilitate access for decision-making.
o Total system cost-effectiveness criteria
have been developed and applied.
o Data collection, editing, and updating
have been facilitated.
A management information and control system developed by NASA for
use in the Apollo Program Office, called Forecasts and Appraisals for
Management Evaluation (FAME) uses statistical techniques to develop trend
forecasts from masses of data flowing from many contractor sources.
As a NASA report points out, FAME is a data handling and analysis system
which has a wide potential for application to urban government problems:
air pollution control, public transportation, health, and municipal budget
control.
Barriers to IMIS
If integrated management information systems are as valuable as indi-
cated, why have they not spread more widely? There are three major reasons:
the software gap, a lack of widespread managerial understanding, and input
data inaccuracy.
The gap in software ("the array of languages, programs, data, and
special internal operating procedures") is clearly described by a Fortune
writer who said in part:
Four years ago, Burroughs Corp. and U. S. Steel
announced that they were going to develop a
centralized data-processing project that would
perform a variety of tasks . . . This ambitious
project ran into trouble and has now been
curtailed. . . . according to computer industry
sources the trouble was that while the hardware
for so complex an endeavor could be designed, the
software could not.
To compound industry's problems, the engineers
of software--programmers, systems analysts, and
management scientists — are a scarce and highly
paid breed. ... A textile manufacturer . . .
reluctantly abandoned ambitious plans to estab-
lish a management information system because the
salaries required by the senior systems analysts
would have exceeded the salaries of vice
presidents in charge of the entire plants.
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The managerial problem is even more difficult to overcome. An
article by Melvin Anshen in the Harvard Business Review states:
[Recent management thinking] has been marked by
a superficial popularization of the concept of
the integrated information system which calls on
the storage, retrieval, and manipulative capabi-
lities of large computers to bring the total
information requirements of a business within an
integrated decision network. (This does not
imply a computerized decision system, but simply
an organized information system, computer-based,
to assist comprehensive human decision making.)
While the notion of the integrated information
system has been widely described and explored
in technical and management journals, several
probes of management practice suggest that few
companies have made a sustained attempt to
operate in this way, and few managers have any
real grasp of what the concept means in either
theoretical or operating terms. . . .
It would be a gross misconception to view this
gap as the familiar one between software and
hardware. The primary task ahead is not to
develop programs that will utilize the capa-
bilities of the machines. Rather it is to
develop management concepts that define
integrated systems. ...
At present, most top managers have yet to approach
even the initial stage of developing basic con-
cepts.
In summary, IMIS is a concept of great promise, yet one requiring
considerable management skill and vision. Also essential to success are
the systems design and software skills which normally must be purchased
at substantial cost from specialized organizations.
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MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISPLAY SYSTEMS
Management information systems result ultimately in some form of
reporting to managers. The report form may be a written document or one
of many techniques of audiovisual display. While reporting and display
techniques are not management methods in the usual sense, still they
affect significantly the effectiveness of communication.to managers. In
turn, this affects the speed and accuracy of management decisions. For
these reasons, this section discusses some aerospace-related advances in
reporting and display—advances which may be of value to other sectors.
The reporting and display systems having the greatest potential
management usefulness elsewhere are in one of three categories: (1) the
management control center which uses a variety of audiovisual components
to provide management meetings with significant data; (2) the computer-
driven display system which links human intellect with electronic data
computation capacity. (One form of this system, the interactive display
system, provides a two-way man-machine interchange.); and (3) the on-line
display system which permits instant access to stored information. A
fourth type, the simulation display, is extremely useful as a training
device but as such is not part of the management decision-making process.
NASA has prepared a comprehensive survey of visual information display-
systems, including discussions of each category of system.
Many of the advances in reporting and display have been stimulated
by military (and later space) requirements, first for military command
and control and later for management of program operations. The first
applications of computer-driven displays were made about 20 years ago
by Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers, in work which led
to the development (by The MITRE Corporation) of SAGE, the first military
command and control display system. SAGE, an air defense system, trans-
mits remote radar signals to a central command location for processing
and display on computer-linked consoles. In a highly developed form,
it now is used by the North American Air Defense Command, Colorado Springs,
Colorado.
As the NASA survey points out, "although it may be thought that most
display technology is a spinoff from the television industry, it should be
remembered that much of that industry has stemmed from military radar develop-
ments. Almost all of the hardware display developments in use today have
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descended from a military predecessor."
Management Control Center
Perhaps the most dramatic example of management reporting and display
technique is NASA's Apollo TIE (technical integration and evaluation) sys-
tem. TIE is a communications network which links Apollo Program managers
and engineers at six locations throughout the U. S.* Each location has an
identical management control center containing communications equipment,
backlighted charts showing current program status, and screens for rear
projection. In a daily status meeting, and on an unscheduled basis
when program crises occur, the Apollo Program Director can confer simul-
taneously with program managers located elsewhere. Communication links
allow spoken comments in any location to be heard in all other locations.
Because the status charts are maintained in identical fashion, they are
projected and viewed simultaneously in all locations. Furthermore,
charts and sketches which are drawn in one location can be transmitted
over a long distance xerography system in about two minutes, then projected
on screens in the other locations. The result is a real-time system of
management communication, permitting broad participation by specialists
while eliminating much of the need for time-consuming personal travel.
The management control center concept has several advantages for indus-
trial managers and public administrators: it provides a focal point for
management communication, where managerial attention is drawn to problem
identification and resolution; it promotes management by exception, so
that status data which deviate from a predetermined norm are spotlighted;
and it permits tracing a deviating or suspicious signal through related
operational status information to determine its potential effects.
The adaptation of management control centers from the Apollo Program
to nonaerospace activities has been successfully demonstrated by Midwest
Research Institute (MRI). As part of a NASA-sponsored technology utilization
*The use of management reporting systems as a control technique is
closely interrelated with the project management organization technique
(see pp. .101-102).
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program at MRI, effective application of management control centers to
local government has been achieved.
A management information center modeled directly on the NASA control
room at Kennedy Space Center has been installed in Kansas City International
Airport. (See Figures 9 and 10.) The Kansas City center is being used to
control a $200 million airport development program.
Another, similar management center has been installed in the Jackson
County (Missouri) Courthouse to assist local officials to control a major
capital improvements program: hospitals, juvenile facilities, parks, a
sports complex, and roads. The capital worth of the improvements being
developed is $102 million. (See Figures 11 and 12.)
In the Fall of 1971, MRI completed plans for still another management
control center for local government, this for an Alcohol Safety Action
Project within the city hall of Kansas City, Missouri. The center is to
serve as the planning and control headquarters for the project, which is
designed to implement countermeasures to reduce the threat caused by the
problem drinker who drives. The project is sponsored by the U. S. Department
of Transportation.
John E. Stacy, Jr., Midwest Research Institute's Manager of Technology
Utilization pointed out the following benefits which a management information
center provides to local government users:
0
 It is the catalyst for a total project management
approach which includes organization, management
systems, and reporting methods.
0
 It is a convenient repository for easily referenced
data on the project—goals, responsibility for tasks,
and progress.
0
 It stimulates a real team management spirit with
free exchange of data about plans, status and
problems.
0
 It is a "programmed" conference room that makes
periodic project review meetings both productive
and well attended.
0
 It allows decisions to be based on consistent and
current information.
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NASA Kennedy Spa.ce Center photograph
Fig. 9 - Apollo Spacecraft Manager's Control Room at Kennedy
Space Center
Midwest Research Institute photograph
Fig. 10 - Kansas City International Airport Management Information
Center
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NASA Kennedy Space Center photograph
Fig. 11 - Apollo Program Manager's Control Room at Kennedy
Space Center
Midwest Research Institute photograph
Fig. 12 - Capital Improvements Management Center, Jackson
County (Missouri) Courthouse
138
Computer-Driven and Interactive Display Systems
The modern-data display field is fundamentally concerned
with the assembly, transformation, and presentation
of information that provides meaningful communication
between man and machine. In computer-based systems, the
display provides effective coupling between man and
machine combining the creative and adaptive qualities
of the man with the storage and high-speed computational
characteristics of the machine.2
The power given to management planners by computer-driven display systems
reaches its highest potential through interactive systems, which: "extend
the capabilities of a man to perform complex and time-consuming tasks by
giving him a direct view of computer outputs and allowing him, in turn,
to provide inputs to the computer."
One of the data display concepts of potential value to management
planners is the "sketchpad" or computer-linked graphic input device now
used in computer-aided design. Although computer graphics (Ref. 1, pp.
57-71) are primarily aids to design engineers, they have been explored also
as an aid to planning. ' Basically, the computer graphic device is a
television-like screen linked to a computer. Drawings appear on the screen,
corresponding to a design formula stored in mathematical form in the
computer's memory. The planner or designer, using a tiny flashlight "pencil,"
can draw or erase lines on the screen, and thus automatically modify the
design formula.
The interactive display technique also can be extended to management :'
analysis, through display of management data in graphical form on a screen.
A manager can change scales on the graph, enlarge a section of it, or other-
wise manipulate the display through a keyboard or other input device.
On-line Display System
In a rapidly changing, dynamic enterprise, management is handicapped when
it must rely on static information on operational status. When management
reports are prepared remotely and sent through editing channels, the
decision-making levels of management find themselves relying on obsolete
information. Sometimes the task resembles steering a car while looking
out the rear-window at the traffic which has passed.
Faced with an analogous problem of reservation control, the U. S. airlines
have pioneered systems for on-line information storage and retrieval. These
139
systems allow data updating to occur continually, with access from
many points. Also, they permit a console operator to query the system
and obtain instantaneous status data without interrupting the updating
process.
Applications of on-line display systems have been used by stock-
brokers (permitting instant access to the latest price of any stock)
and by police departments for instant review of wanted criminal files
and stolen car reports. Further applications have been proposed for
automatic dispatching of urban transit vehicles or police cars and for
determining machine loading in factory "job shops."
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SCHEDULING/STATUS METHODS
The art of scheduling is known to have been substantially influenced
by military needs for logistics planning and troop movements. The extreme-
ly comprehensive Scheduling Handbook related the development of scheduling
methods by the Roman Legions and the development of the Gantt chart for
production scheduling during World War I. The most significant scheduling
advance in many years, PERT/Critical Path Method (described later), was
developed concurrently about 1957 by DuPont engineers (CPM) and by a task
force directed by the Navy special projects office for the Polaris program
(PERT).
This subsection describes three aerospace-related methods for
scheduling and status recording: the Line of Balance method developed
by the Office of Naval Material; the program trend chart used by NASA;
and a job-shop scheduling technique evolved at Hughes Aircraft Company.
Line of Balance
The Line of Balance (LOB) method is a technique for graphically showing
the essential components of a production process from raw materials and
parts through assembly to end product completion, against a time schedule.
It is a management-by-exception tool, showing only the critical facts
(lagging items) which require corrective action. LOB can be used to
establish the initial schedule of production operations, then to monitor
progress and predict whether or not deliveries will be made on time.
LOB is a simple, non-mathematical method which can be done manually,
yet is readily adaptable to a computer. The method involves the following
steps:
1. A time-scaled network plan of production operations
is prepared, working backward from final assembly.
2. An objective chart, or cumulative calendar schedule
of end item deliveries, is prepared.
3. A progress chart showing program progress in terms
of program milestones is prepared, to the vertical
scale of the objective chart. A stepped line (the
line of balance^ is drawn,, showing the required level
of components at any point in time. The height of
bars above and below the line readily illustrates
ahead—and behind--schedule conditions.
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Program Trend Chart ,
In managing a complex R 5 D program containing a large number of
unknowns and a substantial (multi-year) time span for accomplishment,
there is a high degree of uncertainty with respect to scheduled comple-
tion and to the cost overruns involved in a program delay. Yet top
management must have a realistic evaluation of the completion date, one
which allows for certain slippages in the program working schedules.
One technique used by NASA is the program trend line analyses by
which successive changes in completion schedule are plotted and analyzed
to determine the trend of slippage, or schedule/trend factor, of the
program.
For example, the status report of the October 1960 Mercury program
predicted that the first manned orbital flight (MA-6) would occur in June
1961. However, during the previous 22 months, the predicted flight date
had slipped a full year. When the sequential predictions were plotted
on a time/time chart (Fig. 13) and the program trend line projected, an
ultimate flight date of April 1962 was forecast. The actual Mercury pro-
gram history (Fig. 14) shows that status report schedule dates continued
to slip and that the MA-6 flight ultimately took place much nearer the
predicted trend line than the October 1960 status report's predicted
date.
Exhibit 1 describes the construction of program trend charts.
REPORT DATE
PtOGMM
SCHEDULE TIEID
SCKDUt KC1DBS
SOURCE IS) :
PROJECT WOBKING SCHfOUEES
REPORT DATE
Fig. 13 - Mercury Plot (Partial)
REPORT DATE
PROGRAMSCHEDULE TIEN
MMCUtY
SCKOUJ (ncrais
SOURCE IS) :
PROJECT WOOKIkG SCNEDUUS
mjUHHB UXtxlQBE • Mltmttp tnlxJJSBC IllUmtf^
Fig. 14 - Mercury Plot (Complete)
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EXHIBIT I
CONSTRUCTION OF PROGRAM TREND CHARTS*
By T. E. Jenkins
As used by NASA, the Program Trend Chart used for trend line analysis
is simply a "time-time" plot of periodically reported scheduled completion
(or launch) dates (see Figure 15). The date on which the plotted data is
"as of" is indicated on the horizontal axis. The scheduled completion date
for the event (s) being monitored is plotted along the vertical axis.
Chronological sequence progresses to the right along the report date
(horizontal) date axis and vertically for projected completion dates.
Both of these factors are plotted on scales of the same dimension.
After the proper dates have been selected for the report date and
schedule date axes (for optimum display and appearance of the trend line
being plotted) an "Equal-Time" line is added to the chart. This is
done by connecting all points on the chart that represent the same
dates (or "equal time") on both axes. For example, if January 1, 1965,
appears on both axes, plot that point on the chart (see point "A"). Then
plot another "equal time" point "B" which represents December 31, 1968.
Then connect the two points, extending the line, if necessary, to its
longest possible length. This line will always have a slope of 45°
since the axes are equal in scale. The "Equal-Time" line is a graphic
technique which helps to visualize the progress of the trend toward
completion of the event being trended.
The trend is then plotted starting with the first "firmly" reported
schedule, although prior "under study" or tentative dates may be shown
for historical purposes (usually depicted by a dashed line). In the sample
chart, the first firm schedule (point "C") was found in a report dated
August 21, 1965, and the event completion date in that report was scheduled
for February 19, 1966.
* Reprinted by permission of the American Astronautical Society from
Vol. 12, The Management of Aerospace Programs, AAS Science and Technology
Series, Tarzana, California, 1967, pp. 257-260.
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Job Shop Scheduling
A job shop scheduling system based on simulation has been developed at
78Hughes Aircraft Company. ' Here is how such a system works: following
studies of the operating pattern of the specific job shop and its past
history of orders, a computer simulation is developed. Beginning with
current status information on all jobs in the shop, a short-run, one-shift
computer simulation is run, integrating current orders (with associated
processing times and work priorities) with expected orders that will
arrive during the shift. The computer analyzes this work load according
to established decision rules and priority strategies. It then provides
a computer printout at the start of the next shift, containing instructions
for foremen on job priorities.
Major References—Line of Balance
1. O'Brien, James J. [MDC Systems Corp.], "Line of Balance,"
Chap. 10 of Scheduling Handbook, New York: McGraw-Hill,
1969, 605 pp. [A clearly-written handbook of operational
scheduling techniques showing applications to many types
of enterprises.]
2. Office of Naval Material, Line of Balance Technology,
Washington, D. C., 1962, 41 pp. [NTIS, AD-672029]
Supplementary References—Line of Balance
3. Levitt, Harry P., "Computerized Line of Balance Technique,"
Journal of Industrial Engineering, 19(2) (February 1968),
pp. 440-48.
4. Turban, Efraim, "The Line of Balance--A Management by
Exception Tool," Journal of Industrial Engineering, 19(9)
(September 1968), pp. 440-48.
5. Bostock, D. J. [Union Carbide, Oak Ridge], Tabular Line-of-
Balance Production Control Technique, Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
1966, 25 pp. [NTIS, N67-26827]
Major Reference--Program Trend Chart
6. Jenkins, T. E. [NASA Hq.], "Program Trend Line Analysis, An
Aid to General Management," The Management of Aerospace
Programs, Walter L. Johnson, ed., vol. 12 of AAS Science
and Technology Series, Tarzana, California: American
Astronautical Society, 1967, pp. 229-60.
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Major References—Job Shop Scheduling
7. Colley, John L., Jr., "Three Principles for Scheduling Job
Shops," Systems and Procedures Journal, 19(4) (July-August
1968), pp. 8-12.
8. Colley, John L., Jr., "Implementing a Job-Shop Scheduling
System," Systems and Procedures Journal, 19(5) (September-
October 1968), pp. 28-33.
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PERT/CPM
Perhaps the most widely used and best known of the advances in
management science in recent years is a system of scheduling known as
Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT). An important constituent
of PERT is its use of networks to analyze interrelationships of activities
and events and to determine the critical path (i.e., time-controlling
series of activities) through a network. This constituent of PERT is
shared with, and evolves from, a closely related system: Critical Path
Method (CPM). While PERT is the most common method used in aerospace,
and the method preferred by NASA and the Department of Defense, the
similarities of the two methods are much greater than the differences.
This section will treat PERT/CPM as a single concept.
The advantages of PERT/CPM as a management system for program plan-
ning and control include the following:
° Planning of the program is made orderly by the
use of a logic network diagram which shows both
the sequence and dependence of activities and
events (that is, which activities must be
complete before others can start).
o The network provides a framework for establishing
time estimates for the completion of each activity.
The time estimates are based on multiple fore-
casts which consider the probability of chance
occurrences, and are therefore generally believed
more accurate than a single estimate of the most
likely time. (In practice, the "estimated time"
calculated by a statistical formula is a few
percent larger than the "most likely time.")
0
 By tracing paths through the network, the critical
path which controls completion of the program
can be determined. This permits concentration
of corrective action on the actiyities which lie
along this path, with a consequent greater
effectiveness of the resources expended.
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o An extension of the time-oriented PERT ("PERT/
Time") system allows cost estimates associated
with each activity to be superimposed. This
PERT/Cost system integrates financial and
schedule data so the program manager can
readily learn their interrelationships.
0
 While the PERT/CPM system is simple enough to
be calculated manually, it is well-fitted for
programming on a computer. In aerospace
applications, computer programs are used to
trace paths and prepare printouts of financial
and schedule status.
° Actual or proposed changes anywhere in the pro-
gram can be traced to determine the ultimate
effects on the cost and time of program
completion.
0
 The tasks which must be started immediately
are identified and the key decision points
in the program are determined.
PERT/CPM is applicable to a wide variety of activities. It is used
throughout aerospace to schedule and control major development programs.
The technique has been extended to multi-project and functional manage-
ment by the U. S. Army Electronics Command to provide management data •
in varying degrees of detail and in specially-tailored format to meet
the needs of headquarters policy makers as well as local field offices.-
PERT/CPM now is widely used in construction projects to control the
interrelated activities of subcontractors and materials suppliers. The more
complex the project, the more useful PERT/CPM appears to become. PERT,
when used in R § D organizations, has a significant effect in improving
cost and schedule performance, according to a NASA-sponsored study at
M.I.T.7
As PERT and CPM have been adapted to many industries and areas of
activity, there have grown up many variations with their own nomenclature.
As early as 1964, about 50 variations of PERT were known to exist. Some
of the modifications relate to the method of visual display, to make the
schedule status easier for managers to understand, or to emphasize the
9
impact of critical items. Three such modified systems are PERTREE,
VIS-A-PLAN, and GERT (Graphical Evaluation and Review Technique).
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VIS-A-PLAN, developed by a NASA contractor, is a bar-charting techni-
que for representing and evaluating project activities on a performance-
time basis. This technique may be used in development planning without
need for sophisticated machine programming and computer analysis. The
technique has been applied by Owens-Illinois in new product development,
by an eastern aviation firm, and by several other organizations.
Despite its general applicability, PERT/CPM still is not well known
or widely used in small manufacturing firms. For example, a survey of
South Dakota industrial firms in 1969 found that less than 10 percent
were utilizing PERT and that only 14 percent of South Dakota production
managers were familiar with its techniques and objectives.*
Major References
1. O'Brien, James J. [MDC Systems Corp.], Scheduling
Handbook, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 605 pp.
[See Chapters 2, "Networks;" 3, "Critical Path
Method;" 4, "PERT;" and 7, "Cost Scheduling:
PERT/Cost."]
2. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA
PERT and Companion Cost System Handbook, Washington,
D. C., 1962, 87 pp.
3. Air Force Systems Command, USAF PERT, Washington,
D. C., 1963. Vol. I, PERT Time System Description
Manual, 257 pp.; Vol. Ill, PERT Cost System
Description Manual, 176 pp. [NTIS: Vol. I,
AD-436253; Vol. Ill, AD-436255]
4. Martino, R. L., Project Management and Control,
New York: American Management Association,
1964-65. Vol. I, ."Finding the Critical Path,"
144 pp.; Vol. II, "Applied Operational Planning,"
184 pp.; Vol. Ill, "Allocating and Scheduling
Resources," 143 pp. [An introductory treatment.]
5. Miller, Robert W., Schedule, Cost, and Profit
Control with PERT, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963, 227
pp. [A more complete treatment drawing on aero-
space experience.]
* Gray, Walter K., The utilization of Quantitative Methods and
Controls by Selected South Dakota Firms, Bulletin 102, Business Research
Bureau, Vermillion, S. D. : University of South Dakota, 1970.
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Supplementary References
6. O'Brien, James J., CPM in Construction Management, New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 254 pp. [Applications to
facility construction.]
7. Seelig, Wyckham C., and Trwin M. Rubin, The Effects of,
PERT in R s D Organizations, Cambridge, Mass.: Sloan
School, MIT, 1966, 17 pp. (Working Paper #230-66)
[Concludes that in R 5 D organizations PERT leads to
better schedule performance without affecting technical
performance.]
8. Hayya, Jack C., PERT and Procurement Policy, Los
Angeles: UCLA Graduate School of Business Administration,
1966, 119 pp. (NASA Research Paper No. 8)
[Recommends principles for use of PERT in procurement
contracts. NTIS, N67-81734]
9. Aerojet-General Corporation, Graphic Visualization
of Program Performance Aids Management Review
(PERTREE), 1969. [Available, along with AEC-NASA
Tech Brief 67-10568, from Technology Utilization
Officer, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office,
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C.
20545.]
10. Ranck, Nathan H. [Trans World Airlines], vis-a-Plan
(Visualize-a-Plan) Management Technique, 1967, 20 pp.
[Available, along with NASA Tech Brief 67-10240,
from Technology Utilization Officer, NASA, John F.
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899.]
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CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Configuration management can be thought of as the disciplined manage-
ment of engineering changes. In a complex program which advances the state-
of-the-art, change is both inevitable and desirable. Yet the program
manager is challenged by the evident need to systematically control change
so that its impact on other program elements is foreseen and that the
changes are smoothly implemented and fully documented. (See Chapter X,
p. 176.
As configuration management is practiced in aerospace, a rigorous
2 3 4
system discipline is established. ' ' This includes creating a configura-
tion management organization to monitor the status of prospective and actual
changes, and a change review board which approves or disapproves proposed
changes. The change review board's actions include analysis of changes
proposed by any part of the organization (e.g..engineering, quality con-
trol, manufacturing) or by the customer,. subcontractors, or suppliers.
The board categorizes changes as follows:
o Mandatory changes: those changes which affect
mission success (e.g., flight safety), correct
errors in design or mismatches in assembly, or
otherwise are considered essential by the cus-
tomer. These changes must be implemented imme-
diately on items being produced, and implemented
by retrofit on items already delivered.
o Improvement changes: those changes which increase
the effectiveness or lower the cost of the product.
A further categorization separates prospective changes into Class I (which
affect the product performance, interchangeability, safety, contractual
requirements, etc.) and Class II (all other changes).
The change review board determines: (a) whether or not the change
is to be made; (b) the effectivity (i.e., the point of introduction) of
the change, depending on whether it is mandatory or an improvement, and
its ease of incorporation; and (c) the impacts of a change on other
elements of the product.
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The following characteristics are considered necessary to a success-
ful configuration management program:
0
 A formal configuration management system relying
on total top-management support and on clear,
enforced procedures.
0
 An independent central organization responsible
for all aspects of engineering change, including
authorization and accountability.
0
 Well-defined configuration baselines (i.e.,
. complete specifications documenting the design
or configuration of each product end item as
of a particular time) from which changes can
be measured and compared.
0
 A quick reaction capability for processing
mandatory changes.
0
 A single control and status system (normally
maintained by computer) which accounts for all
changes in process, specifies the schedule of
their accomplishment, and documents precisely
the actual configuration of each product.
Configuration management appears appropriate for use on major
construction or development programs where changes can significantly
affect cost or schedule, or cause a potentially serious impact to other
parts of the program which is not recognized by the person initiating
the change. It may also have application to small manufacturing firms
producing new and improved products. It is particularly important
in a systems acquisition program characterized by concurrent development,
production, and site deployment, where changes among subsystems are
critical and errors expensive.
Can configuration management techniques be applied to program policies
and administrative decisions, as well as to a program's physical equipment
and facilities? This interesting analogy was suggested during an inter-
view by William Davis, a former NASA executive and currently Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Administration for the Department of Trans-
portation. Davis commented that he wished the Department of
Transporation had a configuration management or similar system to
monitor the status and interrelationships of its programs. He
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noted that, because of the complex relationships of the programs and the
inevitable quantity of changes in program decisions, it is not possible
to trace or predict the sequential effects of that changed decision on the
total system. Although the creation of a program policy configuration
management system may seem visionary, it would be a tremendously powerful
management tool for any large and complex organization.
Major References
1. Veith, Walter [Pan American World Airways, Patrick AFB],
"Configuration Management," Mechanical Engineering, 89(2),
(February 1967), pp. 20-25. [A clear summary of the aero-
space configuration management system.]
2. U. S. Air Force Systems Command Manual 375-1, Configuration
Management During Definition and Acquisition Phases, 1964.
3. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Apollo Config-
uration Management Manual, NHB 8040.2.
4. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Apollo Applica-
tions Configuration Management Requirements, NHB 8040.1, March
1969.
5. Schmissrauter, John M. [Douglas Aircraft Co.], "Interface
Management of Aerospace Systems," in The Management of
Aerospace Programs, Walter L. Johnson, ed., vol. 12, AAS
Science and Technology Series, Tarzana, California: American
Astronautical Society, 1966, pp. 261-85.
Supplementary References
6. Feller, Melvin, "Configuration Management," JEEE Transactions
on Engineering Management, EM-16, No. 2 (May 1969), pp. 64-66.
[A brief summary of configuration management elements.]
7. Steiner, George A. and William G. Ryan, Industrial Project
Management, Toronto: Collier-MacMillan Canada, Ltd., 1968,
pp. 61-64.
8. Bellis, Benjamin N. [USAF, DCS/Systems], "The Requirements
for Configuration Management During Concurrency," paper 5-24
in Proceedings, U. S. Air Force Systems Command Management
Conference, Monterey, California, May 2-5, 1962, 13 pp.
9. Wood, Lysle A. [The Boeing Co.], "Configuration Management,"
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paper 5-23 in Proceedings, U. S. Air Force Systems Command
Management Conference, Monterey, California, May 2-5, 1962,
13 pp.
10. Samaras, Thomas T., "Configuration Management for Small
Companies," Management Review, 59 (July 1970), pp. 32-39.
155
LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
Logistics sometimes conveys a different meaning to managers in
commercial industry than in aerospace. The aerospace sector and the
military services use logistics to mean the science of planning and
carrying out:*
0
 Design, development, acquisition, storage,
movement, distribution, maintenance, and dis-
position of materiel;
0
 Acquisition or construction, maintenance,
operation and disposition of facilities;
° Acquisition or furnishing of services.
Military and aerospace programs have made substantial advances in
the science of logistics. The construction and activation of remote
bases (e.g., arctic radar bases for the DEW Line, and intercontinental
ballistic missile sites in unpopulated areas) have presented difficult
challenges in facility construction and field support. Field operation
of sophisticated equipment still under development has required new
techniques of modification, spare parts provisioning, maintenance, and
repair. Several logistics advances having potential applicability in
other fields are described in the following paragraphs.
Logistics Planning—Through application of systems engineering principles
to logistics, an integrated logistic system can be designed. Such a
system coordinates several aspects of logistics (supply support, trans-
portation, support and test equipment and facilities, spares and repair
parts, maintenance planning, data control, etc.) so that equipment
availability is maximized and support costs are optimized. Proper
logistics planning requires a realistic consideration of the total life
cycle for systems and system hardware, planning for contingencies, and a
reassessment of logistics support concepts based on the new needs of
, . 1,2
advanced programs.
* Adapted from Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint
Usage, Publication 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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Logistics Forecasting--The needs of the military services to maintain an
adequate yet not wasteful quantity of resources for maintenance and re-
placement of equipment has led to considerable research in forecasting
demands for logistics support. Methods have been formulated at RAND for
the U. S. Air Force to forecast work volumes of repair depots serving
several operational weapons systems, and thus to improve forecasts of
maintenance manpower requirements at these depots. Statistical re-
search conducted by the U. S. Army Inventory Research Office and by the
University of Michigan under Army contract have resulted in methods of
detecting trends and forecasting shifts in demand for spare parts, based
on analysis of past orders received at National Inventory Control Points.
Inventory Control--Several inventory control and management techniques
which recently have been reported by aerospace agencies appear to have
applicability elsewhere. An inventory control computer program has been
designed for a small electronic system development group which is suitable
for on-line, multiple access operation. A computerized parts list
system which coordinates engineering releases, parts control, and manu-
facturing planning has been developed as part of an AEC/NASA program.
Decision rules are given for an inventory control manager on whether to
retain or dispose of stock in excess of normal stock quantities. An Army
Logistics Center report discusses policies for stocking insurance items--
items which rarely if ever need replacement but require a few spares
because of their critical nature and long lead time for reorder.
Ref. 8 and the nine papers of Vol. 11-4 of Ref. 2 discuss other advanced
aspects of mathematical theories of inventory control.
Maintenance and Repair Concepts--In aerospace operations, as elsewhere,
the decision as to whether to repair an item of equipment or to discard
it is normally based on economic criteria. There are exceptional cases
where non-economic factors govern (as when a sufficient quantity of
replacement equipment is not available). However, a policy on repair
vs. discard can be rationally established based on several cost/use
factors: replacement cost, repair cost, support costs, disposal value,
remaining life expectancy, obsolescence, and maintenance downtime. A
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complete decision logic network for repair/discard decisions has been
9
developed, using repair expenditure limits based on economic rationality.
Other papers on maintenance and repair concepts are found in Ref. 2,
Vol. II-5. (See also the sections on Reliability Analysis and Maintainability
Analysis in Chapter VII, above.)
Retrofit concept—The military services and their suppliers appear to have
led in the development of the retrofit concept of equipment modification.
That is, as design improvements to equipment are developed during an
R § D program, it is generally thought desirable (and even essential
in cases where mission success is threatened) that the improvements be
made on all equipment items, not only those in production but also com-
pleted items which have been placed in operation. One way to do this
is to return the completed equipment to the manufacturer for refitting.
But this is undesirable in the case of operationally deployed aircraft
and missiles whose effectiveness is lost during the refitting. Another
solution is to prepare a retrofit kit of replacement parts and modification
instructions for shipment to the operational site, permitting the
modification to be completed there or in a convenient field depot with
minimum loss of operational status. An aerospace contractor has described
a system for retrofit accountability and configuration control designed
to assure accurate records of retrofit operations.
Logistics Information Systems—The earlier section on Management Informa-
tion Systems stated (p. 127) that modern integrated management information
systems grew from early statistical control models for logistics systems.
Logistics information systems themselves have advanced to more sophisticated
networks which integrate forecasting systems and decision-making systems
which involve marketing and customer service with distribution and storage
operations. Reference 13 gives a good summary of these systems.
Logistics Evaluation—Techniques for the evaluation of effectiveness of a
logistics system are basically the same as other techniques for cost-
effectiveness analysis (see p. 53). However, those interested in applying
cost-effectiveness analysis to logistics operations may profit by reviewing
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four papers in Ref. 1 (pp. 71-79), vols. II-7 and II-8 of Ref. 2, and
Ref. 17, all of which discuss evaluation of military/aerospace logistics
systems.
Logistics Simulation and Afodeling--Simulation and modeling techniques
described earlier (p. 68) are widely applied to logistics systems. Vol.
II-9 of Ref. 2 contains eleven papers on the application of computer
simulations to logistics operations (including food service facilities,
spare parts depots, wholesale distributors, etc.). Analytic models and
techniques developed at RAND appear general enough to be used by medium-
sized companies engaged in manufacturing and distribution. The
models relate broadly to the management of a firm's assets, analyzing
such questions as when to buy supplies, where to stock them and where
and when to repair equipment. The U. S. Navy has designed a computer program
analyzer to supply the inventory manager with pertinent statistics for
comparing alternative management policies (e.g., on stock levels, reorder
18points), replacing the risks of policies based on intuition.
Major References
1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Marshall
Space Flight Center, First Annual Logistics Management
Symposium, 16 January 1967. [Includes several papers
on the management of logistics support and on the
development of integrated logistics support systems.
NTIS, N67-21962 11-11.]
2. Department of Defense, Proceedings of Logistics Research
Conference, Warrenton, Virginia, May 26-28, 1965, 2
vols., 11 parts (Abstracts,; Vol. I; Vol. II in 9 parts).
3. Fishman, George S., Improved Forecasting Methods for
Item Management and Maintenance Manpower Requirements,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1969, 109 pp.
[NTIS, AD-691809]
4. Gajalo, S. [U. S. Army Logistics Management Center],
NICP Forecasting Techniques, Fort Lee, Virginia, 1967,
131 pp. [NTIS, AD-822934]
5. Pryor, C. Nicholas [Naval Ordnance Lab.], A Computerized
Inventory Control System, White Oak, Md., 1967, 52 pp.
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6. Westinghouse Astronuclear Laboratory, user's Manual for
the List of Parts, (Report WANL-TME-1598), 1967, [46 pp.].
[Available, along with AEC-NASA ,Tech Brief 67-10348, from
Technology Utilization Officer, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear
Propulsion Office.] U. S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D. C., 20545.
7. Kaplan, Alan J. [U. S. Army Logistics Management Center],
Economic Retention Limits, Fort Lee, Virginia, 1969, 51 pp.
[NTIS, AD-691731]
8. Campbell, Harrison S. [RAND Corporation], "Procurement
and Management of Spares," Chap. 11 of Defense Management,
Stephen Enke (ed.), Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1967, pp. 186-212. [A statistical treatment
of inventory analysis.]
9. Logistics Management Institute, Guidelines for Making
Repair Expenditure Decisions (Task 68-6 Report), Washington,
D. C., 1968, 86 pp.
10. Shelbrooke, Craig C. [RAND Corporation], Resource Allocation
Techniques for Logistics Management, Santa Monica, Calif.,
1969, 16 pp. [NTIS, AD-690847]
Supplementary References
11. Axtell, George C. [Brig. Gen. USMC], "Designing an Inte-
grated Logistics System," Defense Industry Bulletin, 5(7),
(July 1969), pp. 30-33, 44.
12. Nowlan, F. S. [United Air Lines], "Spare Engine Manage-
ment—An Example of Current Airline Practice in Logistics
Planning and Management," in Annals of Assurance Sciences,
Proceedings of the 7th Reliability and Maintainability
Conference, San Francisco, July 14-17, 1968, New York:
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1968, pp. 405-410.
13. Gepfert, Alan H., "Business Logistics for Better Profit
Performance," Harvard Business Review, 46(6), (November-
December 1968), pp. 75-84.
14. Magee, John F., Industrial Logistics, New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1968, 353 pp. [A systems approach to industrial
logistics problems.]
15. Deemer, Robert L. [U. S. Army Logistics Center], Insurance
Items Stockage Policies, Fort Lee, Virginia, 1969, 44 pp.
[NTIS, AD-691732]
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16. Faini, V. A. [Martin Marietta Corp.], "Retrofit Accountability--
Now and Tomorrow," in Proceedings, Fourth Space Congress,
Cocoa Beach, Florida, April 3-6, 1967, Canaveral Council of
Technical Societies, 1967, 14 pp.
17. Blanchard, Ben S. [General Dynamics Corp.], "Cost Effective-
ness, System Effectiveness, Integrated Logistic Support,
and Maintainability," IEEE Transactions of Aerospace and
Electronic Systems, AES-3 (March 1967), pp. 186-194. Also
in IEEE Transactions on Reliability, R-16 (December 1967),
pp. 117-126.
18. Kohlhass, Philip, Variable Operating and Safety Level (VOSL)
Analyzer Operating Manual (Report No. ALRAND-59), Mechanicsburg,
Pa.: Navy Fleet Material Support Office, 1968, 75 pp.
[NTIS, AD-670750]
19. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Logistics), ideas for Managers,
Washington: GPO, 1970, pp. 1-21. ($1.00).
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QUALITY ASSURANCE
Quality assurance, as the term is used in aerospace, is a far more
pervasive program than typical inspection> quality control and quality
assurance programs which exist to some degree in almost every production
or service operation. This is particularly true in the space program
because:
o The cost of failures in space missions is
measured in tens and hundreds of millions of
dollars.
o More important, the loss of even one astronaut
in manned space flight is unacceptable.
The formal, intensive, and rigorous quality programs used so widely within
aerospace may provide useful information to managers in any enterprise who
wish to upgrade the quality of their services or products. For this reason,
quality assurance appears among the aerospace-related management techniques
and concepts.
NASA's quality assurance program is a comprehensive and permeative
discipline, encompassing a combination of management, engineering, in-
spection and test techniques which ensure that aeronautical and space
flight hardware will perform successfully as planned. Dr. Thomas 0. Paine,
former NASA Administrator, has stated:
A key element in the realization of this objective
is comprehensive, detailed knowledge about the hard-
ware and its operational and performance characteristics.
As a result, NASA places strong emphasis on hardware
inspection and testing, including comprehensive
analysis of anomalies, defects and failures and the
development of corrective and preventive techniques.
The knowledge gained from these activities has been
documented and distributed to other government agencies
and industry for use in improving the reliability and
quality of other products.*
A number of principles underlie the space program's quality assurance
program which pervades the organizations of NASA and its suppliers:
° Encourage industry initiative in achieving
quality and in developing objective evidence
of quality.
*A.ppendix 7 to statement before the Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, U. S. Senate, April 6, 1970.
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° Permit use of those existing industry procedures
found suitable for space quality, either as is,
or with modifications.
o Require deliberate management effort in many
quality functions, including but not limited to
traditional quality control and inspection.
° Permit variations in detailed effort to be tailored
to the circumstances of individual procurements.
o Provide for a firm understanding of quality require-
ments prior to NASA purchase and definition of quality
requirements in subsequent subcontracts.
0
 Require control from initiation of design through
to operational use.
° Provide for early problem recognition and solution
to avoid the cost and schedule impact of problem
solutions delayed to the end-item test or launch
site.
° Provide for personnel accountability and responsibility
through identification of the worker with his work,
training and certification.
Although these principles are intended primarily to help ensure
mission success and flight crew safety, they also offer identifiable
opportunities for cost control.
In the complexity of an aerospace environment, quality assurance
invades the management policies of the organization as well as its
technical operations. To reach top effectiveness, the quality assurance
activities require coordinated central management from the program office.
Problems of significance, especially those which threaten product
performance, must be quickly brought to the attention of a proper level
of management for corrective action, along with analysis of cost and
schedule impact. In General Electric's Aerospace Group, a quality
assurance program was formulated using a systems approach to develop
policy, procedures, and an organization structure under time and cost
8
constraints.
Both NASA and the U. S. Air Force have published numerous manuals
and documents on aspects of aerospace quality assurance. NASA has pre-
pared over 60 publications on the subject, many available through the
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U. S. Government Printing Office. Three of the most generally applicable
documents are listed as References 2, 3, and 4.
When adapted outside the aerospace industry, quality assurance has
a broader meaning than inspection (a checking and measuring against
standards) or quality control (a disciplinary system responding to
inspection results). Quality assurance implies a comprehensive system
which assures managers that products have been designed, manufactured,
and deployed to meet an established level of excellence. An effective
quality assurance program requires integration for planning and control
purposes of information from the environment as well as the functional
divisions of the organization. While inspection can be described as a
simple process of sensing and comparison, quality assurance implies a
more complex cyclic process ("feedback loop") in which the comparison
results are used automatically to alter the production mechanism and to
directly cause a desired change in the characteristics of the product.
An example of the far-reaching benefits of an active quality
assurance program occurred in 1969 at Kennedy Space Center, where a
flash fire occurred in a commercial resuscitator during a space flight
checkout. When investigation showed that a regulator component was made
of a highly inflammable material, the NASA quality assurance organization
not only corrected this design hazard but also alerted the U. S. Bureau
of Mines which took corrective action among all U. S. manufacturers of
commercial resuscitators.
Quality Motivation
The aerospace industry has originated and expanded some techniques
of quality motivation which are now widespread in U. S. industry. In
1966, the American Society for Quality Control established a National
Committee on Quality Motivation, a step which formally recognized its
importance.
Zero Defects programs are perhaps the best known of the aerospace
innovations in the area of quality motivation. Zero Defects is neither
a quality assurance program nor a replacement for one, but wholly a
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motivational program to make employees conscious of quality and to
develop in them a personal commitment to eliminate errors. Rather
elaborate promotional and record-keeping methods are used in the aero-
space firms with Zero Defects programs. (There are well over 1,000
such firms, for the Zero Defects programs are commonly extended to
the subcontractors and suppliers involved in the aerospace programs.)
The concept of Zero Defects is claimed to have originated in the
Martin Company's Orlando Division about 1961, in its work on the
Pershing missile system.* Martin Orlando has perhaps the best-known
Zero Defects program, with reported savings of $1,650,000 in one year
i 15alone.
Other firms have coined their own names for a Zero Defects-like
program (e.g., North American's PRIDE; Douglas' VIP; Raytheon's PAL;
Westinghouse's EFP) .
The basic elements of a Zero Defects program involve:
0
 Top management commitment
0
 Organization selection (committee and departmental
representatives)
° Establishment of program goals
° Indoctrination and motivation of employees
0
 Quality awareness campaign ("error cause
identification and removal")
° Continual program promotion
° Measurement and reporting of performance
o Recognition and reward for achievement.
Zero Defects programs are applicable to a wide range of manufacturing,
service, and governmental organizations. ' In fact, the Hartford
Insurance group announced, in late 1970, that it was establishing a
Zero Defects program.
*See Ref. 14, p. 11 ff. As is true in several other cases of attributing
origin of management concepts, some dispute exists. An executive of Bell
Laboratories stated during an interview that the concept began there in
1952 during manufacture of transatlantic cable.
165
Major References
1. Hagari, John T., A Management Role for Quality Control,
New York: American Management Association, Inc., 1968,
248 pp. [A non-mathematical explanation for managers,
of the role of aerospace quality control methods out-
side the aerospace industry.]
2. NASA Office of Reliability and Quality Assurance,
Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space
Systems Contractors, [NHB 5300.4(18)], Washington:
GPO, 1969.
/
3. NASA Office of Reliability and Quality Assurance,
Management of Government Quality Assurance Functions
for Supplier Operations, (NHB 5330.7), Washington,
1966. [Provides management guidance to contractors
in delegations and in duties of quality assurance
representatives.]
4. NASA Office of Reliability and Quality Assurance,
Inspection System Provisions for Suppliers of Aero-
nautical and Space System Materials, Parts, Components
and Services, [NHB 5300.4(1C)], Washington: GPO,
1971. [A companion publication to Ref. 2 covering
quality program provisions for suppliers to NASA and
its major contractors.]
Supplementary References
5. Weiss, Howard M. [Deputy Director, Reliability and Quality
Assurance Office, NASA Hq.], "NASA's Quality Program --
Achievements and Forecast," Transactions, 25th American
Society for Quality Control Technical Conference, Chicago,
Illinois, May 21, 1971, p. 71 ff.
6. Weiss, Howard M., "NASA Quality Requirements and Cost
Control," presented at the Eighth Annual Symposium on
Quality Control Methods and Management, Villanova, Pa.,
November 14, 1964.
7. Massaker, W. E. [Martin Marietta Corp.], "Guidelines for
Problem Analysis and Resolution," in Transactions, American
Society for Quality Control, 22nd Annual Technical Conference,
Philadelphia, May 6-8, 1968. Milwaukee: American Society
for Quality Control, Inc., 1968, pp. 119-30. [AIAA, A68-
31415]
166
8. Pierce, R. J. [General Electric Co. Aerospace Group],
"Quality Management Through Quality Systems," in
Transactions, American Society for Quality Control,
22nd Annual Technical Conference, Philadelphia, May
6-8, 1968. Milwaukee: American Society for Quality
Control, Inc., 1969, pp. 543-47. [AIM, A68-31442]
9. Olsen, M. N. and W. H. Shaw [TRW Systems Group], "The
Role of Reliability and Quality Assurance in Program
Management," in Annals of Assurance Sciences; Proceedings
of the Seventh Reliability and Maintainability Conference,
San Francisco, July 14-17, 1968, New York: American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1968, pp. 100-07.
[AIM, A68-37604]
10. Harris, Douglas H. and Frederick B. Chancy [North
American Rockwell], Human Factors in Quality Assurance,
New York: Wiley, 1969, 234 pp. [A discussion of human
performance as a factor in meeting quality objectives.]
11. Bureau of Public Roads, Office of Research and Develop-
ment, 'Quality Assurance Through Process Control and
Acceptance Sampling (Report No. 1088), IVashington, D. C. ,
1967, 83 pp. [NTIS, PB-176335]
12. American Society of Quality Control, Proceedings of the
Product Liability Prevention Conference, Newark College
of Engineering, 161 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, 1970.
13. Seymore C. Himmel, "Reliability," Chapter 4 of Selected
Technology for the Electric Power Industry, (NASA SP-
5057), Office of Technology Utilization, NASA, Washington,
1968.
References—Quality Motivation
14. Halpin, James F. [Martin Company], Zero Defects: A New
Dimension in Quality Assurance, New York: McGraw-Hill,
1966, 228 pp. [A thorough, informal description of a
Zero Defects program written by an aerospace Director
of Quality.]
15. American Management Association, Zero Defects: Doing It
Right the First Time, New York: AMA, 1965, 31 pp. [Five
short papers by aerospace executives relating to manage-
ment aspects of Zero Defects programs.]
167
16. Riordan, John J. (ed.), Zero Defects: the Quest for
Quality, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,
1968, 232 pp. [A comprehensive collection of papers
on many aspects of Zero Defects programs, written by
authors from different companies.
17. Weiss, Howard M., "Quality Motivation: Long Range
Management Tool," presented before the 10th Annual
Quality Control Symposium, November 12, 1966, Villanova
University and Philadelphia Section, ASQC.
168
CHAPTER X
CHARACTERISTICS OF AEROSPACE MANAGEMENT
To better understand the significance of aerospace management tech-
niques and their usefulness outside aerospace, it is helpful to review
briefly the social, political, and technological environment in which
they developed. Those management and organizational arrangements that
characterize aerospace today represent a response of men to awesome
challenges which faced them in an earlier time. Managers faced with com-
parable challenges today may find the aerospace experience a useful guide.
Historical Development
Throughout its history, the aerospace sector has been characterized
by the need to respond quickly to emergency needs, to grow rapidly (and
sometimes to cut back rapidly) in size, and to constantly accommodate a
greater complexity of technology, equipment, and organizational relation-
ships. It is precisely this sense of urgency in dealing with advanced
technology and immensely large and complex programs that has characterized
the aerospace industry and that has shaped its organization and manage-
ment techniques.
It is difficult to go back in time and visualize the environment in
which the aerospace industry grew. In its early beginnings in 1914, a
work force of 222 men produced 49 aircraft that sold for approximately
$790,000. During the next 30 years the aircraft industry grew from a
fledgling to a sizable industrial force. In 1944 the industry employed
1,296,000 workers, producing 96,318 aircraft, worth about $16 billion. *
Most of the growth of the aerospace industry occurred during World War
II. After 1945, growth occurred during other periods of national emergency
as well as in response to commercial air transportation requirements and
the advent of the space age. Aircraft changed in complexity and cost with
the introduction of complex electronic components, turbine engines, and
the continuing quest for more speed and greater size.
During the closing years of World War II the science of rocketry
showed its vast potential. International political considerations, often
*References appear at the end of the chapter.
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dubbed the "cold war" and the "missile race," intensified the nation's
concern with space age technology. The aerospace industry turned to
this new challenge which required development of vastly more complicated
electronics, guidance and control systems, launch vehicles, and tele-
metry. Aerospace industry marshalled many of the best technological
minds to develop these new systems, spurred on by the twin incentives
of national security and national prestige.
It is important to note that the development of aircraft had been
primarily associated with wartime needs and only secondarily related to
transportation needs. Technological innovation and production require-
ments therefore have been managed in an environment of intense pressure,
resulting from a need for rapid program development coupled with the
large scale of programs and an insistence on reliable performance of
equipment. In ,response to international political considerations, e.g.,
the missile race and national prestige, space programs also faced those
same requirements. Thus the industry was created and managed by techni-
ques suited to respond to these urgent requirements and pressure conditions.
After World War II the nation expanded its national security objectives
by assuming the role of a primary world power. It accepted a policy that the
United States would remain militarily strong as a deterrent to potential
enemies. This position required keeping up with, and staying ahead of,
technological development of weapons systems created elsewhere in the world.
The national policymakers could have chosen to build a large central
capability within the U. S. Government—a continuation of the traditional
"arsenal concept"--to accomplish the objectives of providing for the de-
fense, and later of achieving preeminence in space, with which it was
charged. Instead, the policymakers chose to operate in a decentralized
manner, by contract with existing organizations. Thus the government looked
to private industry for productive capability and to the industrial scienti-
fic community for research and development support. In this way the
aerospace industry was created. The situation was one of interdependence.
The government, as a buyer, needed industry as much as industry needed the
government.
The commitment to national objectives was strong. During this period
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defense budgets won almost unanimous approval in Congress, often in amounts
above those requested. After the Russians orbited Sputnik I, and again
after Yuri Gagarin's successful orbital flight, the nation supported plans to
"catch up" in the space race. On May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy
solidified the general feeling when he stated the " . . . goal, before the
decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to
the earth." The aerospace industry expanded to carry out this objective.
In summary, in the years after World War II, the aerospace industry
was faced with problems of developing and building large, very complex,
high unit cost systems that required, in some instances, several years to
complete. Time pressures were intense. The programs were large-scale,
requiring complex interfaces among many interdependent parts. Attention
to minute detail was essential. Reliability was a key factor since failure
would be painfully obvious and damaging to national policy. Managers were
asked to marshal the resources of the nation and manage those resources to
complete a task to which the electorate of the nation, and their leaders,
were firmly committed. The challenge was primarily concerned with techno-
logy and management, for which this country is renowned. Much of the
program was performed behind the scenes in offices and laboratories, with
periodic glimpses at results. Of course these results had to be near-
perfect because of their great impact on the nation and the world.
A Distinctive Aerospace Management Technology?
Stimulated first by the military, and later by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), the aerospace industry developed a
characteristic method of operation and organization suited to managing
the tasks to be accomplished. Management techniques were created,
adopted, adapted and developed. These techniques included operations
research, systems analysis, systems engineering, Program Evaluation and
Review Technique (PERT), configuration control, reliability engineering,
program management, proj ect management, and many others.
Professor Robert Fetter of Yale University believes there is no set
of uniquely aerospace management techniques. He views management techniques
as being universal, arising from many industrial and academic sources. As
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ideas are generated and are perfected they tend to gravitate to those
2
organizations and industries that need them. A modified form of this
view is expressed by Professor Leonard Sayles of Columbia University who
3
says:
There is no unique NASA management technology. In
managing their programs there is a need for terribly
precise coordination, yet room for flexibility for
highly qualified professionals. This coordination
is extremely difficult to achieve. Project manage-
ment was used by NASA, but project management is
certainly not a uniquely aerospace skill.
One NASA administrator concurred during an interview, "I am concerned
about some of the claims made about our great management skills. Much
of our success is due to the selection of elite people." Another NASA
executive commented, "We have done a great deal, but I don't know what we
have done that is unique. Perhaps the organizational mix is unique."
James E. Webb, Administrator of NASA from 1961-1968, describes many
aspects of the management of NASA during his tenure as Administrator in the
book, Space Age Management. He states that NASA utilized conventional
forms of organization as well as many conventional management techniques. But,
says Webb, the agency developed a highly flexible organization based on
proven management principles, and at the same time permitted innovation
and the adaptation of a variety of appropriate management techniques.
A distinction between management techniques and management skills is
made by Professor George Steiner of the University of California at Los '
A •, 5Angeles:
Skills include techniques as well as the practice
of good management principles, plus knowledge of
how and under what circumstances to use innovative
techniques. In specific problem-solving situations,
much depends on the manager's skill in knowing what
the circumstances are that make the choice of a
particular technique appropriate.
Regarding the possibility of a new aerospace management technology, the
issue was summarized by a management consultant to NASA, who stated in an
interview that, "They [NASA officials] have combined existing management
practices and principles in innovative ways." It seems that the critical
question is not what new management techniques the aerospace programs have
created. Rather the question is what have NASA and the aerospace industry
done that,,may benefit managers of other organizations facing new challenges
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in the private or public sectors of our nation in the years ahead?
What are the business arrangements, organizational relationships, and
management practices that are characteristic of the aerospace sector? These
subjects are examined under two broad headings: (1) program management
and government/industry relationships; and (2) project management and
contractor management practices. The details of specific aerospace
management techniques are covered in Chapters VI-IX.
Program Management and Government/Industry Relationships
In the management of programs the importance of well established
objectives cannot be overstressed. It also is essential that fixed objec-
tives have the continuing support of decision makers who provide resources
for their accomplishment. Also required is a ."critical mass" of support
through resource allocation. Webb has pointed out that just as an airplane
must achieve a certain velocity to take off, or a missile must achieve a
certain thrust in order to escape the earth's atmosphere, programs require
a critical mass of support before they can be expected to achieve even
minimally successful results.
After national space objectives were established and their support was
assured, there was a need to determine appropriate programs and action
priorities necessary to their accomplishment. This program planning function,
a traditional function of management, was carried out by government
administrators aided by recommendations and analyses from the aerospace
industry. Program administrators relied heavily on systems analysis
techniques in relating planning and budgeting activities to requirements
for accomplishing a mission.
Next, program management established the subgoals of the program,
determined the activities necessary to achieve each of these subgoals,
established the responsibility for their accomplishment, and scheduled
the sequence of the events to take place. In a complex program, this planning
process is necessarily systematic and detailed. Systems analysis is
an invaluable tool in this process. Early experience in the space program
revealed " . . . that a successful space program would have to be built
on a foundation of well-formulated basic policy, and planning be effectively
organized, be firmly supported with resources, and given high priorities."
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It might be said that program management is an organized method of defining
problems blocking the accomplishment of an objective and then defining in
detail what has to be done, and why, where and when actions should take
place, and by whom. How the task should be done is then specified in
great detail, and a project-oriented organization established to do it.
Thus program management is an attempt to rationalize the entire complex
process of accomplishing objectives.
In managing the development and purchase of defense and space systems,
the Federal government defined and translated program objectives and prior-
ities at the policy level, and then managed programs through their life
cycle. Industry provided the technological and productive skills.
Facilities were provided by both. Since the government was supervising
the technical performance of industry, it was necessary for NASA and
Defense program management offices to have sufficient technical ex-
pertise to determine whether all was going well in the program.
Two approaches were employed to provide technical expertise. The
military often hired nonprofit technical organizations to supervise the
technical progress of its programs. NASA, for the most part, developed
in-house capabilities to handle this supervision. In some of its
larger programs, NASA found it desirable to use nonprofits (e.g.,
Jet Propulsion Laboratory) and to hire outside technical assistance to
g
help oversee technical progress. Steckler comments on this arrangement:
The government does not have the facilities or
skilled manpower to produce aerospace items and
often finds it difficult even to supervise the
day-to-day operations of its prime contractors.
In fact, these government agencies have often
assigned the task of direction and coordination
to private companies, known as management companies.
Management companies perform the government's
function of supervision and coordination and
often suggest to the contractors, through the
appropriate government agency, an alternative
approach to a technical problem.
To oversimplify, the task of government was to determine what needed to
be done and then go out and buy it in the market. When there were no existing
suppliers of the necessary service, the government made imaginative use of the
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contract mechanism to induce potential sellers to develop the capability
desired. Once a contractor was engaged to provide the service, the govern-
ment, sometimes through management companies, would supervise the accomplish-
ment of the task and approve the results.
For scientific and production services, the government has made ex-
tensive use of prime contractors and successive layers of subcontractors.
A prime contractor would be responsible for developing, coordinating
and integrating an entire weapons system or program. The prime contractor,
which might retain some product development responsibility as well as the
integrating role, would then subcontract with other firms to provide
portions of the major system. This tier of subcontractors might further
subcontract for development or production of smaller portions of the work
to be done, and so on through several layers of subcontractors and suppliers.
The contractual policy is standardized by Federal Procurement Regulations
(FPR) and procedural requirements have been codified extensively in the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), dating from before 1947.
NASA has established similar (NASAPR) requirements. Thus the aerospace
industry has a fairly uniform, if complex, set of business practices to
which it can respond. These business regulations have been augmented
by the evolution of specialized government organizations which oversee the
complexities of contract negotiations, administration and auditing.
The importance of standardization of the government procurement
structure and regulations is evident to those aerospace companies that
have tried to sell their technological wares to other potential users.
As the corporate director for advanced product planning of one aerospace
firm says:
Aerospace companies are credited with systems ex-
pertise, but little is said about buyer systems
or organization or orientation. Within the envi-
ronment established by our government customers
we can discern needs, specify and give priority
to those needs, and we can examine the feasibility
of a system and begin pricing. But the degree of
organization is very important, especially when it
is absent, as in the case of selling a transportation
system to a multiplicity of local governments.9
He also made another simplified, but important, observation--"Business is
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the mechanism that links technology to people." The complex relationships
between government and the aerospace industry constitute business practices
through which the objectives of national security and achievements in
space are accomplished.
As a result of the dispersion of work among many prime contractors
and subcontractors, and because of the complexity of the systems being
acquired, two requirements arose that complicated, but at the same time
made possible, the management of these large scale programs: (1) the
development of baselines; and (2) detailed documentation requirements.
A baseline is a "snapshot" of what a system looks like at a specific
stage of its development. The purpose of establishing baselines is to
record and control changes in the design configuration. Baselines are
established at each critical stage in the design and development of a
system and form the base against which all changes in the system are
made. Each of these baselines is described and controlled through a
technique called configuration management (described in more detail in
Chapter IX). This technique makes possible the analysis of effects of
changes in any part of a system on all other parts of the system. Complex
weapons or space systems that are developed cooperatively by many companies
during many months of concurrent work require a technique for tracking
these interrelationships to assure that the entire system will work after
all necessary changes have been made.
Detailed documentation is necessary to identify what each firm has
contributed during the development of a system. Moreover, since
technical management of the entire program is coordinated in the program
office of the buyer or through a management company, the necessary information
must be provided for that function. This documentation might come from
literally tens or scores of companies.
A further complication arises in the purchase of defense systems that
will be operated and maintained by members of the armed forces. While the
owner's manual for an automobile is fairly simple, the same document for
the operation of a missile system is immense. Also necessary are manuals
for the repair of the system and documents for training the servicemen
who will operate it. Thus the flow .of technical and logistical information
often constitutes a major portion of the "product" produced by aerospace
firms.
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Finally, one characteristic of the relationship between government and
the aerospace industry that is generally not true of the free commercial
market concerns the financing of high-risk research. In NASA and the armed
services, most of the required research and development are undertaken
on a contract basis, in universities, federal contract research centers,
or industrial firms. Some R 5 D work is done in government laboratories.
Business firms traditionally have not supported massive research programs that
do not have a high probability of economic return through the sale of a pro-
duct in the marketplace. However, government programs in defense and space
systems often have required research by many firms that had the research
capability but not the production facilities to produce the system. Frequently,
the government wishes to have several firms research an idea competitively,
to maximize the likelihood of a research advance, even though it was known
that only one of the firms would get the engineering and production con-
tract. Therefore, in order to induce firms to bid on research projects, the
government offered R § D contracts to companies which paid for the cost of
the research, plus a profit for the use of the firm's resources. The govern-
ment used this mechanism to "buy management" of research projects. Thus it
became profitable for an aerospace firm to conduct necessary research even
though it might not "cash in" on an engineering or production contract
related to the system. The importance of this contract research arrangement
is easily seen when an aerospace company considers conducting an expensive
research program related to mass transporation systems that may never find
a customer. The risk is prohibitive.
Project Management and Contractor Management Practices
Large aerospace programs are subdivided into projects that represent
major portions of the program. In government agencies a project monitor
manages all aspects of the development of an assigned project. The pro-
ject monitor has a counterpart in the prime contractor's firm, a project
manager, who is responsible to the customer for all' aspects of the project,
including schedule, cost, and technical performance.
As an extension of program management, project management makes possible
better planning and control of complex, interfacing activities. In project
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management, the statement of objectives is critical, and day-to-day
management of projects tends to focus on problems that stand in the way
of accomplishing objectives. Organizational arrangements and management
techniques reflect this problem orientation. One aerospace company
manager stated, "In the aerospace industry we have insisted upon specific,
measurable statements of our objectives and goals. These are done in
qualitative terms and in specified, quantifiable, measurable terms." This
statement reflects one of the advantages of working on projects that are
primarily hardware-oriented; problems can be identified and pursued in a
systematic manner. As another aerospace executive puts it:
One of the most important things that comes from
aerospace management is the identification of the
most critical problems. The key element is to lay
out a complete plan for everything you are going
to do, then to identify the pacing elements. All
of these follow a PERT-type logic to establish
criticality and sequence of actions.
More will be said about sequencing and scheduling later in this chapter.
As one might expect.in the management of technical programs that are
pushing the limit of the state of the engineering arts, many problems arise
which require intensive, study. The mechanisms for "working" (seeking solu-
tions to) these problems exist, and both government and industry managers work
them vigorously. For example, an executive in the Apollo program noted:
NASA has been able to make the design review cycle
really work in the Apollo program. There is an
openness, a free exchange of ideas. For example,
after encountering a vibration problem on Apollo
6, over 250 people, including Mr. James Webb,
assembled at Marshall Space Flight Center on a
Sunday in April to discuss it. There was nothing
sophisticated—the problem was just worked intently.
He observed further:
NASA has the in-house capability to supervise major
programs. Everybody in the Apollo Office is an
engineer or a technical scientist. It is a
personnel hiring requirement.. Yet they have the
job of managing. None of them seems to like dis-
cussions of management philosophy--they just want
to get on with the job. Many managers couldn't
sit still and worry a valve problem for three days,
but engineers seem to enjoy it. Engineers are
trained to be technical problem solvers.
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Also, since all of the managers in.that office were engineers, they spoke
a common language and had similar ways of approaching situations. This
commonality very likely facilitated successful interaction^"
This intense problem-orientation also was present at the contractor
level. As one aerospace executive described it:
There is a willingness of management to get into
problems while they are still in the embryo stage.
People very high in the organization will work
intently on a problem until it is solved. Manage-
ment controls are designed to make problems obvious
early in their life, and when a problem becomes
visible it is worked until a solution is found.12
Another aerospace executive states that: ;
Our management, within major programs, is organized
like the problem itself: (a) top management rides
herd on end results; (b) middle management works the
interfaces where subproblems join together; and (c)
management of the functional disciplines works at
the subproblem level--i.e., at the first line
supervisory level of management.13
Control systems are based on planning in detail to specify results as
well as technical cost and schedule considerations. When a project falls
behind in the results that should be achieved by a certain time, it is
reviewed at a high level in the organization and the resources that are
necessary to bring it back on schedule are allocated. A detailed "catch
up" plan is established. This detailed planning makes it possible to
identify weaknesses in the technical abilities of the organization.
Critics of the aerospace industry have charged that, because of the
great need in aerospace programs for reliable end items and systems
performance, "gold plating" occurred—engineering standards were higher
14than they needed to be. In general business practice, manufacturers some-
times put less emphasis on safety and high performance in order to minimize
the cost of products such as consumer appliances. Because of the high
reliability requirements for military and space items, the tendency in the
aerospace industry has been to emphasize safety and high performance at
considerable expense to engineering and development budgets. Failure of
programs or equipment in the open glare of the international political arena
is hardly tolerable.*
*A parallel exists in public management: a failure cannot be tolerated
in a bridge, a health system, etc. Public administrators may find aerospace
systems reliability techniques particularly appropriate for some programs.
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Internal visibility was a key factor in program management, according
to Apollo managers. For example, NASA's Apollo program made use of what
were called Apollo Action Centers — identical briefing rooms located at
each of the Manned Space Flight centers and at the Washington, D. C., headquarters.
Management briefing and project review meetings were held daily concerning
the progress of the Apollo program. Each of the centers had the capability
for facsimile transmission of documents within two minutes. A telephone
hookup made possible on-line communication. As one observer noted, "These
were no-nonsense meetings. Pressure for results was tremendous; there was
management by embarassment, and responsibility was public and very visible."
However, this observer also noted that corrective disciplinary action was
administered in private. Another Apollo executive stated that the Action
Center was not just a discussion room but rather a place for a decision
meeting. "We never leave a meeting without a specific idea of exactly what
we are going to do. Action is specified." He further added that the
Apollo organization was effective because the leader could lead and give
strong direction. Obviously these devices and techniques were not unique
to the aerospace programs described, but the successful management of these
programs was partly due to their rigorous application.
The need for reliability resulted in redundant systems both in hardware
and in management organization. Failures were not acceptable in space
systems. Thus technological systems often were duplicated so that if one
should fail its function would be performed by a backup system. Wherever
possible, electronic systems were backed up by mechanical or manual systems.
The same was true in the engineering development and production of these
complex systems. Aerospace companies could not afford costly failures in
producing portions of a total system. Therefore they also built redundancy
into their management organizations in order to back up any failures that
might occur.
Redundancy was built into management organizations in several ways.
In some cases, responsibility for task completion was assigned both to
project and functional organizations to reduce the likelihood of failure
even at the cost of disputes over jurisdiction. In other instances, jobs
were assigned in such a way that, if one executive did not get his part
done, those.other executives whose jobs were interdependent upon his
performance would have to bring the effect to the attention of their
superiors. In this way, problems came to the attention of higher manage-
ment much sooner than they otherwise would. The benefits of redundancy
are noted by an aerospace executive who stated, "As a result of this
philosophy, our management organization is about thirty percent larger
than it otherwise would be, but results in the longer range are impressive."
Benefits of this deliberate policy of redundancy also have been noted by
administrators of public service organizations.
NASA management took great pride in developing a flexible organization
that could respond to problems and meet contingencies as they arose. Webb
has written about the critical necessity for flexibility. He observed
that the situation and the job to be done required it. Other administrators
who are interested in selecting and adapting aerospace management techniques
to their particular situations and tasks might agree with Thomas Jenkins,
Assistant Director (Management) for the Apollo program, who remarked in an
interview:
NASA was set up to do its kind of job. There is
nothing magic about a particular kind of organi-
zation—only that it fits the job to be done.
We needed an organization that was flexible rather
than static. -In NASA we had authority under the
President to establish the appropriate organization,
and that authority was used to set up a flexible
organization.
Conclusion
Aerospace management techniques and skills were a response to the
conditions and problems that faced the aerospace sector as it worked to meet
the objectives of national security and space program requirements. Techno-
logical innovation, time pressures, large scale, large impact, complex
systems, and large expenditures in multi-billion dollar programs charac-
terized the environment. Traditional management practices were not
adequate to accomplish the tasks to be done, and innovative ways of allocating
and managing resources were required.
For those who would choose to learn from aerospace managment skills, it
will be necessary to examine carefully what was done by aerospace managers,
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select those techniques that seem most appropriate to a specific situation,
and apply them with the same skill that characterized successful managers
of aerospace programs.
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CHAPTER XI
MAKING USE OF MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY
To an industrial manager or a public administrator, the important
question concerning aerospace management techniques is: Can I use
them to help me solve my problems? Our findings on this question
are summarized here.
This chapter describes the process of transferring aerospace manage-
ment technology to other sectors, and points out the necessary conditions
for achieving transfer. It concludes with several suggestions on how
aerospace management techniques can be adopted.
The next section contains, in concentrated form, findings from
research into the process of technology transfer. This material will be
of interest only to some readers of this guidebook; others may prefer to
skip to the next section, "Transferring Management Technology," on page 189.
The Technology Transfer Process
In'recent years, numerous research studies have explored the process
by which technology* is transferred. The process is a complex one, in-
volving not only the generation of technical knowledge but also its effective
communication to another who accepts and applies it.
A direct communication link between a disseminating source and a con-
suming receiver is probably the most effective way to transfer technology,
because it transfers both the technical knowledge and the experience-based
recommendation of the existing user. A less effective approach is to use
impersonal and indirect channels to communicate information about the technology.
Such information is usually diffused through a network of many different
channels, many different receptions and redisseminations, and among many sources
and receivers. When no direct communication link exists, even if the information
*Technology is considered to be technical knowledge (scientific,
engineering or managerial) which makes possible the conception, development,
design, production, and distribution of goods and services. Knowledge in-
cludes information embodied in people's minds or exemplified in products,
as well as documented information. The term transfer means the effective
communication of such knowledge from one person or source to a recipient
who accepts it and applies it or implements it. Transfer is particularly
concerned with the movement of knowledge from one stage in the developmental
process to another, e.g., vertically, from phenomenon-oriented research to
applied research to development; or horizontally, in movement from one sector
of the economy to another. Technology transfer is, therefore, a process
involving the generation, the effective communication and the application
of technical knowledge.
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about the new technology is widely and efficiently disseminated, there is no
assurance that it will reach the attention of the potential user. He may
have no motivation to seek or respond to the stimulus of the information.
It may reach him at the wrong time (i.e., when he is preoccupied or other-
wise not searching for new technology). He may not fully understand the
potential of the new technology in helping him solve a problem he faces.
Thus, because direct transfer links seem relatively rare, the diffusion
of new ideas normally takes place in many random steps, over a substantial
span of time. One source defines five stages of the process of adopting an
innovation for use: 1) awareness, 2) interest, 3) evaluation, 4) trial,
and 5) adoption. And at each stage, different types of technical know-
ledge may be required to assure that the process continues to the next
stage rather than ending before adoption occurs.
Figure 16 portrays schematically the process of technology transfer,
which can begin either with the generation of new technology (upper left)
or with the user awareness of an unfilled need (lower left). If there is
a direct communication link (top arrows) to one of the early stages of
the transfer process, transfer is significantly speeded and made more
likely. If transfer begins with awareness of an unfilled need which
starts a problem-solving search (bottom arrow), the process moves more
readily to Stage II. With this incentive, the transfer, process need'not
depend on a random diffusion process (wavy arrows) through the many barriers
which sometimes block the arrows of the transfer path and which delay or
stop the application of the new technology. The factors which affect the
strength of the barriers are a complex mixture of characteristics--the nature
of the new technology itself, and of its potential applicability; the
nature of the information which describes it; the natures (including motiva-
tion and technical sophistication) of both the generator and the potential
user of the innovation; the existence of a "change agent" or "product
champion" (the person who serves as catalyst in creating awareness, and
later in promoting trial, of the innovation); and the existing environment
in which the transfer occurs (or fails).
The arrows of Figure 16 are one representation of the complex network
of channels through which the technology is diffused. Earlier research
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concerned with the process of transfer of hardware technology assessed the
relative importance of various classes of channels (both personal and
written) of technology acquisition, including commercial channels, pro-
fessional channels, educational channels, and government R § D information
sources. It was found that with hardware technology at least, channel
choice varies with the needs of the acquirer. Different channels are used,
depending on whether the acquirer is trying to solve a specific problem
(the lower arrow of Figure 16) or merely is maintaining current awareness
of his field (either a straight or wavy arrow from the generator to Stage
I). Channel use also varies with: the role of the acquirer in his organiza-
tion; the nature of the organization; the acquirer's past experience; and,
possibly, his individual personality.
Transferring Management Technology
The transfer of management technology, as compared to engineering or
scientific technology, appears to rely more heavily on the face-to-face
contact of managers and staff personnel coming from different sectors of
the economy. Part of the reason may be that management differs from other
technology in the degree of personal involvement of the person performing
it. A chemist who tries an experiment which fails considers himself a
scientist who has expanded chemical knowledge. A manager who tries a
new management technique which fails considers himself a failure. His
colleagues frequently agree.
Certain successful innovations in technology transfer which have been
made by NASA's Technology Utilization Office (TUO) reflect an awareness
of the need for personal interaction. For example, the Biomedical Applica-
tions Team concept uses a multidisciplinary team actively searching NASA
scientific and engineering expertise for solutions to important biomedical
problems. One secret of the teams' success evidently is their close personal
interaction with the medical practitioners; the teams do not merely provide
a detached literature searching activity. Another example is the informal
working relationship encouraged between the industrial client and "the
professional staff of a NASA-sponsored regional dissemination center. At ARAC,
the center operated by Indiana University, an industrial client's technical
staff is urged to form a close working relationship with an ARAC staff member,
to advise him of specific technical problems or to identify a custom
interest profile, and to evaluate the results of his problem solving
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search. All of these actions guide the ARAC staffer to become more effective
in transferring aerospace technology to the client's needs. The evidence
seems clear that the more intimately managers work together on a problem
solution, the more effective the management transfer seems to be. Perhaps
because of the impersonal nature of their communication, publications
appear to be of limited value in promoting management technology transfer
(a matter of some concern to the authors of this document). Yet certain
types of publications evidently have far more influence than others.
Particularly valuable are those designed to explain the practical effective-
ness of management techniques, based on actual managerial experience.
Conditions for the Transfer of Management Technology
Can the aerospace management concepts and techniques be transferred and
used in industry, or in government outside aerospace activities? Yes, if
the conditions are favorable for adopting the new management methods and
making them work.
The ideal situation for the transfer and application of aerospace
management technology would closely parallel the conditions which lead
to its generation. That is, the problems that pushed aerospace firms
and agencies into these methods may also exist elsewhere. If they do,
the problems may also create opportunities for management innovation.
In aerospace, for instance:
Example: Major programs did not fit within existing
organizational or jurisdictional boundaries.
Project or task force organization was sub-
stituted for the traditional functional or
product-line structures.
Example: Project-type organization fostered a more
mobile work force, so the firm could accom-
modate to the completion of a project. This
mobility generated constant transfusions of
different expertise and viewpoints from one
firm or organization to another. It was made
possible by a reward system which encouraged
mobility, and it depended on a practice of
hiring people directly for responsible jobs
rather than exclusively emphasizing promotion
from within.
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Example: Evaluation of goods and services for which
there is no conventional market (and thus no feed-
back on the relative value or usefulness of such
services), e.g., national defense services,
was very difficult. Yet without such output
measurement, sound choices among different
demands for funds and human resources were
almost impossible to make. Cost-effectiveness
analysis and related means of comparing alter-
natives were developed as a necessary part of
systems analysis—an approach to designing
total governmental responses (hardware, man-
power, and all) to threats or problems.
Example: Similarly, systems management was developed to
control and coordinate many simultaneous
research, production, training, and test
operations—all bent toward rapid solution of
a problem. These tasks required effective tech-
niques for identifying suppliers of essential
goods and services, choosing which ones would
be the best suppliers, and then monitoring their
production. All of this demanded effective
contract and procurement management. The en-
tire package adds up to systems management.
Two points relating development and adoption of these and other
managerial approaches in nonaerospace fields should be noted:
1) These management concepts and techniques were applied
to aerospace problems which may not have counterparts
in industry, or in nonaerospace government.
2) These management concepts and techniques were not
always adopted automatically or easily in aerospace.
They were put to use because of urgent needs to deal
with serious problems, and because managerial (and
political) leadership was available to implement them
in the face of organizational inertia and other
obstacles. Furthermore, the urgent needs often justi-
fied giving a great deal of authority to the system
managers.
Since the aerospace environment is not often duplicated in other
sectors, some modification of the methods may be required. If certain
conditions for transfer are critically important, efforts should be
directed toward bringing these conditions into being. If that can't be
done, it may be desirable to prepare for a specific managerial innovation,
and then wait until it is timely, until conditions favor its adoption. This
is often a matter of managerial or political intuition.
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In any case, the crucial conditions for adoption of many aerospace
management methods may be combined and simplified down to five: Motivation,
Match, Men, Money, and Monitoring.
Motivation to innovate, to adopt a new management concept or technique,
may result from a crisis or a threat (competitive or internal). It
may result from a change in leadership, with an accompanying injection of
new energy or ambition. Or it may come from a newly perceived opportunity
to accomplish personal or organizational ambitions—political advantage or
public service, profit or cost saving, personal advancement or recognition.
Example: The aerospace and defense community has put
increasing emphasis on technological fore-
casting in the last fifteen years. This was
motivated by their need to estimate what
threats "the other side" might face us with
X years in the future, what might be expected
of our technologies to counter those threats,
and which technologies might be lagging these
goals and therefore needing more research
support.
More recently, manufacturing firms (like TRW)
began adopting technological forecasting
methods. They are motivated by the desire to
anticipate their future operating and marketing
environments, to identify product opportunities,
and--as in aerospace--to plan research programs
for best exploitation of future opportunities.
Match is required between need or opportunity and an applicable
aerospace management concept or technique. Ideally, the match is a
close one and the method can be directly applied. Otherwise, the
management approach must be adapted to the need. This report is
one possible means for identifying a Match. Other means include consultants,
experience of colleagues, or demands from outside an organization.
Men who can apply and carry out the new management tools also are
crucial. Many of the concepts and techniques described in Chapters VI-IX
depend on mathematical competence and some on computer capabilities. Others
require skills in particular disciplines such as economics or management
sciences. Several depend on creative imagination. If the necessary talents
are not already present, the organization must be able to recognize this
and be willing to acquire them. If in-service training or new hiring cannot
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furnish what is needed, consultants may be appropriate. Combinations of
all of these may be most helpful--people-oriented or face-to-face transfer
of management technology is commonly considered the most effective means.
Examples: The Office of the Secretary of Defense sought
to develop a strong, in-house, systems analysis
team, in the face of personnel policies resistant
to any idea of recruiting an elite group. Defense
officials succeeded by bending civil service
grades as far upward as possible, by building
up salaries with authorized overtime pay, and
by furnishing substantial psychic income to the
analysts by giving them exciting work close
to the seat of power, the place where decisions
and policies were being made.
New York City decided to develop a program and
policy analysis capability. It did so by contracting
with the RAND Corporation for analytical services,
and then developing a close working relationship
between the RAND analysts and the City people,
institutionalized through a new joint organization,
The New York City-RAND Institute. Here again,
the analysis group was close to power.
Money to implement the new management technology is usually necessary.
New managerial approaches often offer long-run savings, but they usually
involve start-up costs in equipment, new personnel training, and data,
gathering. The disruption of the status quo sometimes damages morale,
quality of service, or public confidence; all of these possibilities should
be guarded against.
Monitoring of performance is essential to assure that the new manage-
ment technique is being successfully implemented. Few managers would hire
a new employee without checking back on his performance during his first
weeks on the job. Prudent managers also evaluate new equipment installa-
tions to determine if they mesh smoothly with existing operations, and if
their promised savings have been realized. Certainly there is at least
as great a need to monitor a new management technique, implanted in a
strange environment, to assure that it doesn't fail.
If all five M1s are present, the conditions for adoption of new
management technology appear auspicious. Successful implementation is the
next concern.
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The practical details of insuring success vary with both the new
management method and the environment into which it is being introduced.
s
Some examples of such practical details can be drawn from the experience
of those applying one of the techniques — systems analysis--to the state
and local services sector, as described in Chapter IV. In these examples
based on successful applications, the analysts, with their relatively ex-
pensive talents, invariably came from outside the existing organization
as new employees or as consultants.*
The innovators—the analysts—must have support from the head of the
entire organisation. As one said in an interview, "It must be known that
the analysts are close to power." At the same time, the analysts must
understand the uses and limits of authority if they are to relate their
analysis to what can be achieved. They must be willing to introduce
political feasibility and political timing into their analyses.
Protective support from the top of the organization is not adequate
for long, however. The analysis group must quickly develop its own
prestige if people in the organization are to take it seriously. This may
be done by successfully handling specific practical "nuts and bolts" pro-
blems, but this can also be dangerous if it is done without the overview
of wide-ranging analysis which puts the various nuts and bolts jobs in
perspective. The best approach to prestige may have been voiced by a
successful analyst, saying, "You need an early success, blowing the con-
ventional wisdom clear out of the water in a sound and understandable
analysis." Imagination and creativity are vital in developing alternatives
and in measuring outputs of services.
Participation between the analysts and the users of their work is
important. Others, the non-analysts who know the problems and the bureau-
cratic system, must be involved in analysis. A close relationship lets
the analysts bring the operators' and users' understanding along as work
progresses. Obviously, this relationship depends substantially on
* These specifics are drawn from the experiences of several analysts,
operating as consultants or as in-house staff to cities, state agencies,
and universities.
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the analysts' personalities—an important part of their competence. Jargon,
elitism and snobbery, over-rigorous and time-consuming analyses, are all
obstacles to a good relationship.
The antithesis of participation is retreat into the ivory tower,
possibly the greatest source of failure. Instead, the analysts must be
willing and able to help define and clarify objectives at the beginning and
to consult on implementation at the end.
Finally, the analyst working with government must deal with split
goals. The elected official seeks short-term successes; he has only two
or four years in which to justify his decisions. Administrative per-
sonnel, on the other hand, are relatively permanent in their tenure.
Both are users of the analyst's work, and he must serve both.
Other Suggestions for Improving Transfera billty of Management Technology
1. Don't be intimidated by strangeness. It is very easy for administra-
tors and managers to be confused and frightened off by the strangeness of the
terms used in some aerospace management techniques.. The. trade jargon of
aerospace and the cultivated mystique of .technical programs add to the
exotic flavor surrounding some of the management techniques described.
Look beyond this strangeness. Look at the basic function which the
management technique accomplishes and look for analogies in your own manage-
ment problems.
2. Analyze your needs and seek ways to manage better. During an
April 1970 interview, James Webb, former NASA Administrator, explained
one reason for NASA's success in management of the space program--a conscious,
continual effort to innovate and adapt new management ideas. Webb said:
We had to be outstanding in every scientific and en-
gineering discipline to succeed. I decided on a con-
scious attempt to make whatever NASA did a show window
of the best in our society. The need for innovative
management was implicit in this decision.
Webb went on to describe the process by which he and his top associates,
Robert Seamans and Hugh Dryden, sought out outstanding competence in many
management areas. "We knew the space industry extremely well and knew who
the outstanding people were. This was a key feature in our success. The
transfer of people is the most important way of transferring management
technology." Mr. Webb observed that, on any new program, it first appears
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that the operational requirements are all that must be met. However, the
really important problems are those caused by the external, non-operational
requirements which the environment places on the organization. "Good in-
ternal management makes it much easier to respond to these non-operational
problems," he added.
An analysis of needs, present and potential, usually -will stimulate a
search for new management tools. The search, even if a difficult one, still
may be easier than overcoming the inertial barrier to the analysis. Most
organizations have some inertia which blocks self-analysis. The inertia
may relate to departmental insularity (a criticism sometimes directed at
the Federal government) or to a "not invented here" barrier against adoption
of others' ideas.
*•
 exPec £ sasy success . The common experience of innovators who
have adopted new management techniques is a degree of disenchantment, judging
by study interviews. Based on the experience of those who have tried, it is
wrong to expect too much at first from a management innovation. It is
equally unwise to expect a technique to be usable without adaptation to the
different environment of the innovator's organization. The more peculiar
the technique is to the unique aerospace environment, the more effort is
required to adapt it.
Organizations should be wary of adopting a management technique that re-
quires more resources than they have and are willing to commit during the
period of technique adaptation. The same caution should be used as when
contracting for a new digital computer. A common problem with some manage-
ment techniques (e.g., management information systems), as with computers,
is that original estimates of cost often are too low. The adopter is
warned that most systems seem to cost more than first expected. The
management consultant is warned against a human tendency to oversell. Often
the advantage of a new management technique lies in permitting new, or more
extensive, or higher quality, performance rather than in the area of cutting
costs .
Public administrators may improve their chances of successful transfer
of aerospace management techniques by using such technology in areas which
are related to equipment or facilities (e.g., fire protection, transportation)
rather than in areas related to social programs or services. It is clearly
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easier to construct a computer model of the tides in Jamaica Bay than a
model of public response to programs that reduce bay pollution.
4. Promote change and change mechanisms. An organization should
analyze itsvown ways of bringing about change, and should promote ways to
stimulate the change-making process.
One way to promote change is to revise management policies (usually
unwritten policies) which reward the standpatter and which penalize the
risk-taker when he fails. Innovation should be rewarded, as should
reasonable risk-taking.
Other ways to promote management change include more use of consultants
and contracted research studies, planned managerial rotation, hiring persons
with different training from the present managers, and developing programs
of management training in new techniques.
Public administrators can use consultants (such as RAND) to accomplish
change constructively and avoid some of the intensive public scrutiny which
could occur if the work were done in the city planning office. To promote
useful urban change there may be a need for efforts to develop a community
or regional commitment to long-range goals (e.g., public relations efforts
to promote a commitment to realistic air pollution control in the Northeast
corridor of the nation).
University professors should not need to be reminded of their heavy
responsibilities as change agents to: generate interest in innovation;
further refine management techniques and translate theory into practical
form for application; and continue to turn out students who actively seek
better methods.
The most difficult type of managerial innovation is the introduction
of a major new concept into an existing organization, particularly a concept
such as systems analysis which constantly questions and threatens the or-
ganizational status quo. The exact role of systems analysis is still being
fought out in the Defense Department, nearly ten years after its extensive
adoption. But under one name or another, it is there for some time to come.
Other concepts, and changes at the technique level, are usually less abrasive.
Nonetheless, change and innovation are inevitably disturbing to some,
and the chances for successful innovation are increased if the conditions
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are favorable. "Favorable," in this case, means that Motivation, Match,
Men, Money, and Monitoring are all present; with them, with attention to
details of implementation, and with some luck, aerospace management methods
can be selectively transferred into the other sectors.
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